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A recent tendency in criticism of Shakespeare's comedies is to emphasize 
their variety, as Ralph Berry and Alexander Leggatt do. 1 Certainly it is 
wise to beware oversimplification. But the greatest virtue of both these 
critics' books is that, for all the talk of variety, we begin to recognize 
in them distinctive ways of viewing Shakespeare's comedies. There is after 
all a certain coherence. 
Perhaps the true situation is best described by A. D. Nuttall: "the plays 
of Shakespeare do not constitute a series so much as an indefinitely complex 
system."2 But in such a case how do we match our ideas to the actual 
relationships within and among plays, with neither too much nor too little 
schematizing? Perhaps there is a need for a middle level of generality, 
between such unifying descriptions as Northrop Frye's (stimulating and 
useful as these are) and an ad hoc approach to each play (sensitive as this 
may be). Instead of looking for one or more basic patterns governing 
whole plays—or, failing that, insisting that there is no continuity among 
the plays—we might well be as flexible as we can in our expectations. A set 
of concepts may have definite relations among themselves yet be present in 
various groupings (complete or incomplete) in various plays; and each 
grouping may have its own coherence within its own play. We learn the 
whole range of possibilities by surveying the whole set of concepts, and 
afterwards we can better appreciate the unique combination in each play. 
To particularize: Shakespeare's comedies seem to range from the indi-
vidual's puzzled encounters with the world in The Comedy of Errors 
through the normal concerns of lovers (best known in the romantic 
comedies) to the problems of government in Measure for Measure and the 
miracles of the last plays. I propose then to study a set of basic ideas that 
shape action and characterization, or characters' concepts of themselves, 
starting with the individual's self-definition and moving out to his relations 
with others, with society, and with whatever of the world is beyond human 
control. Outside the individual there is thus a continuum from personal 
(the responses of someone who loves him) to social (vows, whether in 
love or other matters; and more remotely, a relation to government) to 
cosmic (the action of various hostile forces, finally tempered, perhaps, by 
something like providence). These ideas radiating from self-definition, 
coherent and dominant as they are, may combine freely in any play; and 
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the relation of ideas helps to fix the unity of a play as well as to connect 
the plays as a flexibly unified group.3 
The core of these ideas is a character's definition of himself by his own 
sense of purpose; though such self-declarations must frequently be right, 
comic situations often begin with a mistaken self-definition, a misplaced 
assertion of self-will Here is the first or innermost idea in the scheme; 
one example of it would be the stubborn misperceptions of Claudio in 
Much Ado about Nothing. Yet even*in this there may be a latent better 
self, to be coaxed or goaded into life by events or by other characters—that 
is, by external forces. So in response to self-will the most intimate of 
"external" influences, someone who loves the erring character, may try to 
draw out true selfhood by matching the error with another falsehood: dis-
guise or feigned death, the favored stratagems of heroines in the middle 
and late comedies. Third, erring selfhood may be reclaimed through vows 
and obligations—which are personal, but also social in that society may 
sanction and enforce them (hence the importance in many plays of rings 
as symbols of vows). Fourth, events may mock and threaten even sympa-
thetic characters, and other, perhaps hostile, characters (the most formidable 
one is Shylock) may try to dominate them. Next is the uncontrolled yet 
passing effect of exposure to the external through exile or wandering, the 
chronic danger in the last plays and some of the earlier ones. With the 
sixth step, government, our attention moves outward to society, whose 
interests are expressed by a ruler (who himself needs powers of individual 
self-government). Self-government of the same kind, but in a more strictly 
private role, may be important for disguised heroines, who must restrain 
their "real" selves (except in the hints or asides of a Rosalind or Viola) while 
teaching others self-control in love. Yet all pretensions to rule—political or 
private—are liable to parody: Shakespeare mocks governmental pride 
through the appealing yet subversive self-will of low-comic characters, Sly 
or Falstaff, whose attractiveness reminds us that a fascinating ambivalence 
is often at work in these ideas. Finally, a supernatural power may have 
ultimate control over all—or is this power really artistic, Shakespeare 
himself playing god as he describes, often self-mockingly, the power and 
limits of art? And if there is mockery at the outer edge of the play, may 
there not be also in those ideas which seem its more inward concerns?4 
These seven steps make seven chapters. The concluding chapter puts 
the plays together again, and they should have gained from a multiple 
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view.5 This plan, of ordering ideas before taking up works one by one, 
dodges for now the controversy roused by Frye's theories, whether one 
literary work is best referred to other works arranged in a system (and in 
practice to the system itself), or whether each work should be related 
immediately to life; the topics I want to discuss in Shakespeare's comedies 
are closely bound to each other, yet each applies at once to life too. But 
a faithful response to the plays will begin with the joining of related ideas 
in a play and with their working-out within the play; this working-out 
will show unresolved paradoxes and ironic undercurrents that give the play 
excitement and life. 
For all the schematism in the plan of this book, it must allow for 
variety and complexity, and must return to the plays as wholes. Many 
critical ideas of the past two decades about Shakespeare's comedies (especially 
the insights of Northrop Frye, Robert G. Hunter, Philip Edwards, Alexander 
Leggatt, R. A. Foakes, Howard Felperin, and Larry S. Champion) fit 
somewhere in the pattern; yet the pattern itself makes new emphases and 
suggests ways of giving structure to critical insights. A firm sense of design 
reveals countless details of meaning in the action of the plays and shows 
how Shakespeare builds and elaborates actions from one play to the next. 
The dynamic of Shakespeare's art moves us always to new complexities and 
ambivalences, to harsher external chances and sterner internal tests of 
characters' wills. Thus the level of discussion in this book, and perhaps 
indeed all our subtlest responses to Shakespeare's comedies, must be strictly 
cumulative. 
If we ask how the comedies, as presented here, would look in our own 
world, we must make a basic decision about literary form: we must 
recall the calculated unreality of comedy. Tempting as it may be to 
emphasize cynical, "realistic," possibilities in the plays, we must remember 
that comedy has one tradition of doing precisely not that, or of doing 
that only after it has done the opposite. If the unreality of what romantic 
comedy asserts is more obvious to us than to earlier eras, we must still pay 
the price of initial acceptance (however we may qualify our suspension of 
disbelief later); our awareness that we have paid the price will somehow 
enrich our experience of human ideals and their adjustment to actuality. 
Another challenge to comic idealism is Shakespeare's artful habit of letting 
the end justify the means, of sometimes allowing his "good" characters to 
win out by shady dodges. Again we pay the price, but we should be aware, 
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in an imperfect world, of how much we want to pay it. As a final response 
the reader should bring to the book as to the plays his remembered laughter 
of delight. Comedy needs its laughter, which is most natural in the theatre; 
criticism does best just to point up quiet ironies and notice parody. This 
book works best if it offers ideas that add to delight. 
Indeed the best knowledge may only rationalize our awe at Shakespeare's 
achievements. We think of his triumph in creating living characters: the 
self-sacrificing, outward-looking ones like Viola and Portia, but also the 
self-absorbed, obstinately mistaken ones like Shylock and Malvolio. The 
mistaken characters may be yet more basic in his comedy than they have 
seemed to critics. The means of correcting error through outside engage-
ments—disguises, vows, and the like, and the exchanges of rings that 
symbolize vows—are respected more now than in earlier decades; but unless 
we find Shakespeare a master of them even in detail, we owe him another 
look.6 Whatever comedy may bear of supernatural pattern surely exists in 
his last plays; the precise nature of this ordering, and its relation to 
artistic form, may emerge from better general awareness of how his charac-




Very early in his work as playwright Shakespeare began to make 
characters come to life. Perhaps he thought first of the motivations needed 
to make a plot work; in modeling The Comedy of Errors, which may well 
be his first comedy, on Plautus' Menaechmi, he would have examples for 
such concern. But he exceeds the basic requirements of motivation: 
sometimes his characters not only have objectives but think of these 
objectives as deep needs defining their own concepts of their whole being. 
Thus the wandering Antipholus of Syracuse, seeking the rest of his family, 
thinks his own selfhood is at stake in the search: 
He that commends me to mine own content, 
Commends me to the thing I cannot get: 
I to the world am like a drop of water, 
That in the ocean seeks another drop, 
Who, falling there to find his fellow forth 
(Unseen, inquisitive), confounds himself. 
So I, to find a mother and a brother, 
In quest of them (unhappy), ah, lose myself. (Lii.33-40)T 
He cannot properly be himself unless he finds his "fellow," and he fears 
that he himself will lose all individuality in an unknown world. Inversely, 
Adriana, wife of the brother Antipholus of Ephesus (who is the "fellow" 
that is being sought), hopes that she already has such a merged identity 
with her husband, and she resists the thought that he or anybody else 
might cause a separation: 
as easy mayst thou fall 
A drop of water in the breaking gulf, 
And take unmingled thence that drop again, 
Without addition or diminishing, 
As take from me thyself and not me too. (II.ii.125-129) 
This is another attempt at self-definition, though it does not work at the 
time because she is not on good terms with her husband. The husband 
himself is not explicit about his concept of his own identity, but assumes 
it as given. So as far as we know his self-concept, we know it by what 
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he takes for granted in the play: his wife, his courtesan, his credit rating, 
and the Duke's favor, won long ago by service in battle (V.i.191-194). All 
these notions of selfhood, which are well known to critics of the play, fit a 
distinction in the plot between those who come to Ephesus from outside 
seeking something, and those who are already there and want to hold onto 
and enjoy what already seems to be theirs. But the difference does not only 
motivate isolated acts; it conditions the way the characters see the world. 
The hilarious action of the play persistently assaults these concepts of 
self. Antipholus of Syracuse, who thinks he is and has nothing until he 
finds his family, is given almost everything else: a wife, a chain, a purse full 
of gold. Antipholus of Ephesus, who had been secure in the privileges of 
established social rank, must lose his comforts and have his word questioned 
in requital for his brother's pleasures: he misses his wife's dinner, he is 
dunned and arrested for the chain, and through the vengefulness of his 
wife and courtesan he is set upon by an exorcist. The wife, too, who would 
jealously bind her husband to her with the concept that they are one being, 
is confronted with the inconsistent actions of two men who seem to be one. 
The various mishaps upset not only particular plans but the characters* 
habitual ways of thinking about events. Each constructs new and wrong-
headed explanations which govern his subsequent acts: the visitor that he 
is surrounded by madness or witchcraft or is walking in a dream, the 
husband that he is a victim of conspiracies, the wife that her husband is 
possessed. If the characters are not quite rigid in a Bergsonian sense, they 
are flexible only to flex in the wrong way, toward greater mistakes and rash 
vengeance for misunderstood events. But they are both the more comical 
and the more lifelike for their attempts to comprehend their misadventures 
and to fit in into their notions of themselves and others. The play gains 
immeasurably from its characters' habits of self-definition. 
In The Two Gentlemen of Verona the main characters take more explicit 
pains to define themselves. Valentine, taking leave of his friend Proteus, 
discusses with him the love that keeps him at home, and after Valentine's 
departure Proteus gives a pat formula for the difference: "He after honor 
hunts, I after love" (I.L63). But soon Valentine is in love with the lady 
Silvia, and soon thereafter Proteus has changed his affections from his first 
love Julia to the -same Silvia; both men find that they can now define their 
inmost natures by the lady they love. Valentine, banished from Milan 
and Silvia through Proteus' treachery, sees that "Silvia is myself: banish'd 
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from her / Is self from self, a deadly banishment" (III.L 172-173). Proteus, 
looking to the consequences of his planned disloyalty, finds them inevitable 
if he hopes for self-realization through Silvia: 
I cannot leave to love, and yet I do; 
But there I leave to love where I should love. 
Julia I lose, and Valentine I lose: 
If I keep them, I needs must lose myself . . . 
I cannot now prove constant to myself, 
Without some treachery us'd to Valentine. (ILvi. 17-20,31-32) 
Earlier Julia too had found that love shaped her image of herself, though 
she reached this awareness through negatives; after her kittenish savaging 
of the love-letter that she would fain read, she blamed herself as "Unkind 
Julia" for her unreceptiveness to messages of love (Iii.106). 
All these characters, whatever we may think of their commitments, assert 
a deep involvement of selfhood in love. It is clear too, as a sign of Shake-
speare's interest in getting his characters deeply involved in life, that 
their self-definition results from crises or tensions: except for Proteus' early 
formulation, which soon fails, the self-characterizations are not donnSes (as 
in The Comedy of Errors) but responses. In The Two Gentlemen Shake-
speare is more directly and obviously concerned with the dynamics of 
character, as events force conscious redefinition and the redefinition brings 
about complicating actions. 
Doubtless there is something of a Platonic dedication to the ideal in 
the way the men try to devote themselves to Silvia and in their attempt to 
make love basic to their own natures.8 But however desirable it may be on 
an abstract level to have many individual souls aspiring to the One, the 
flesh-and-blood analogue is rivalry for the hand of Silvia, who cannot well 
be shared and who, unlike the One, expresses her own preference for the 
man she loves. And Proteus' dedication to Silvia is inconsistent with his 
commitment to Julia, who also has asserted a self-definition in love that 
must be respected. Dramatically an audience will judge all these claims to 
self-awareness in love by their bearing on the proper comic ending: Proteus 
united with Julia, and Valentine with Silvia. 
At first we lack this guide to a comic resolution, since the characters 
begin with other purposes, or at least without a readiness to love. Valentine 
abandons travel for love, Julia must tear the letter before she yields, and even 
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Proteus looks back to his bookish days before Julia "metamorphis'd" him 
and turned him from his studies (I.i.66-67). Similar complications are 
frequent in Shakespeare's early comedies: the unmarried twin in The 
Comedy of Errors seeks a mother and a brother, but not a wife until he 
meets Luciana; Lucentio in The Taming of the Shrew is nominally a 
student, though he soon begins to specialize in Ovid; and the noblemen in 
have's Labor's Lost take vows that would preclude any dealings with 
ladies. In The Two Gentlemen as in the other plays, the power of love 
is all the greater for its ability to transform someone who has other concerns 
and to make such a person concentrate his entire being on a woman.9 As 
love becomes the major concern of this and many later comedies, the 
interplay of character and action shows us the stability or instability of 
characters dedicated to, sometimes overwhelmed by, love. Naturally the 
focus is on young people who may not yet know what they want and may 
not have been expecting Cupid's golden arrow. 
Whatever absurdities we find in all the lovers, Julia's love guides our 
interests. She tears the letter near the end of the second scene. By the 
second act values other than love have been discarded by both men. With 
Julia at the center of attention (as she is even when Proteus is dismissing 
her in ILiv and Il.vi, and when Silvia is rejecting Proteus in IV.ii), we know 
how events should turn out. If we have noted the emphasis in the play, 
we will be able to predict as well as Launce does to Speed that there will 
be a match between Proteus and Julia: "Ask my dog. If he say ay, it will; 
if he say no, it will; if he shake his tail and say nothing, it will" (II.v.35-37). 
Obvious as these matters may be, they need to be pointed out because 
they should affect our reactions to much of the main action in the play. 
Julia's love for Proteus harmonizes with Silvia's love for Valentine and with 
the men's vows of friendship to each other; all these forces together favor 
the pairings that are the final result in the play, resist Proteus' attempt to 
dedicate himself to Silvia, and qualify our laughter at the lovers' posturings. 
Proteus' true self must abide with Julia as his ring does; when he purports 
to find his identity in Silvia, he must be overlaying this true self with a false 
one. The objective of the play must be to return Proteus to his true nature. 
The significant names of the two gentlemen tell us that we can indeed 
define their natures by their behavior in love. Valentine, once he discovers 
Silvia, is the true lover, and he is a faithful friend. Proteus is changeable 
in both love and friendship; like his mythological prototype (as the 
Proteus 9 
Renaissance often understood the myth), he is lustful, flattering, and 
generally deceitful.1 0 Though the more innocent readings of the Proteus 
myth might allude first to the changing appearances of nature, Shakespeare's 
character passes beyond these into deliberate role-shifting and deception. 
He calmly resolves on treachery to his lady and his friend, whose plan 
for elopement he betrays to Silvia's father. He tries to deceive Silvia with 
reports that Julia and even Valentine are dead (IV.ii.106, 112). He so 
inverts values that for him loyalty to Julia and Valentine—that is, resistance to 
his new infatuation with Silvia's picture—would be the way to "lose myself" 
(II.vi.20). His excuse is that his change follows the dictates of his nature. 
Since he chooses to define his being through his desire for Silvia, her 
excellence as an object of desire becomes a pretext for his own self-indulgence 
and the infidelity it requires: 
I to myself am dearer than a friend, 
For love is still most precious in itself, 
And Silvia (witness heaven, that made her fair) 
Shows Julia but a swarthy Ethiope. 
I will forget that Julia is alive, 
Rememb'ring that my love to her is dead; 
And Valentine I'll hold an enemy, 
Aiming at Silvia as a sweeter friend. (II.vi.23-30) 
Though Julia's fidelity is enough to discredit this with us, we should also 
follow through the myth of Proteus and the reasoning about the self that 
is connected with it in this play. If Proteus can be caught and held, he 
will return to his true form. Through Julia we infer a true form for Proteus 
and look for him to return to her. 
Although Proteus claims that his very being is bound up in Silvia, he 
must admit to but a flimsy knowledge of her (and therefore of himself, 
so defined), since by then he has seen only her picture: 
'Tis but her picture I have yet beheld, 
And that hath dazzled my reason's light; 
But when I look on her perfections, 
There is no reason but I shall be blind. (ILiv.209-212) 
And indeed he blinds himself to her love for Valentine and the falseness 
of his own behavior: 
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the more she spurns my love, 
The more it grows, and fawneth on her still. (IV.ii.14-15) 
In the concreteness of her presence and actions he persists all the more in 
illusory hopes and wishes. The famous song "Who Is Silvia?" is sheathed 
in the irony of his position. He has tricked Sir Thurio, the suitor favored 
by her father, into paying the musicians, and he is able to plead his own 
suit only because he has deceived Silvia's father and Thurio into thinking 
he speaks for Thurio. The words of the song that "all our swains commend" 
her heaven-sent graces do not strictly lead to her making any choice among 
admirers but leave her as a passive object of adoration (as she really should 
not be, of course, since she loves Valentine). The lines 
Love doth to her eyes repair, 
To help him of his blindness; 
And, being help'd, inhabits there (IV.ii.46-48) 
are undercut by Proteus' own words, quoted before, predicting his greater 
blindness. He does indeed run through more attempts at illusion—the lies 
about Julia's and Valentine's deaths, which Silvia does not believe—and ends, 
little advanced from where he began, by begging Silvia's picture. Since he 
must finally recognize her fidelity to Valentine, he makes a destructive 
admission about himself: "since the substance of your perfect self / Is else 
devoted, I am but a shadow" (IV.ii.123-124). He knows that in defining 
himself by his obsession with Silvia he has assumed an untenable identity.1 1 
Next Proteus puts the disguised Julia in the false position of pursuing a 
false suit for the man who has jilted her, and later he is still more offensive. 
The apparent moral anarchy of the forest makes him wild. First he would 
follow out the convention of romance that the man who rescues the 
heroine from rape wins her love; but when Silvia withholds that, he himself 
thinks of rape, which he admits is "'gainst the nature of love" (Viv.58). 
His awareness of the falsity in his role is one hope for returning him to 
his true and better nature. 
Valentine of course stops Proteus from doing any harm and tries to 
reclaim him, though his methods have embarrassed readers and audiences 
of the play. He is wholly (and implausibly) concerned with Proteus' 
offense against friendship: 
treacherous man, 
Thou hast beguil'd my hopes! . . . 
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Who should be trusted, when one's right hand 
Is perjured to the bosom? Proteus, 
I am sorry I must never trust thee more, 
But count the world a stranger for thy sake. 
The private wound is deepest: O time most accurst! 
'Mongst all foes that a friend should be the worst! (V.iv.63-64, 67-72) 
His position as outcast makes the loss of a friend more bitter—and in fact 
Proteus had instigated Valentine's banishment. Now Proteus repents, and 
Valentine overreacts: 
Who by repentance is not satisfied 
Is nor of heaven nor earth, for these are pleas'd; 
By penitence th' Eternal's wrath's appeas'd: 
And that my love may appear plain and free, 
All that was mine in Silvia I give thee. (V.iv.79-83) 
His astonishing gift of Silvia ostensibly proves his sincerity in accepting 
Proteus' apology. Apparently Shakespeare is intent on having Valentine 
present only the claims of friendship, with Julia standing by in disguise 
to urge the obligations of love. 1 2 And her presence reminds us that even 
if we credit Valentine's good intentions his offer cannot resolve the problems. 
If Proteus were to accept, he would still have been false to Julia; he can 
only be retrieved through his first vows in both friendship and love. Nor 
will it do to dismiss these vows, and Julia with them, and take the whole 
play as a satire on romance; like many other comic heroines (among them 
Viola and Helena) Julia, in loving someone we do not easily accept, makes 
us hope for better in her man, 1 3 
It may ease matters to find another meaning as well in Valentine's offer 
to Proteus. Even in his disillusionment he wishes it were still possible to 
believe in a friend: he had had "hopes," and once these are disappointed the 
world must be a "stranger." He is eager for a happier answer to his question 
"Who should be trusted?" and seems ready to trust again after Proteus 
repents. Suppose then that, despite Valentine's words, his offer of Silvia 
is a test or a sign of trust rather than a gift; then he would expect Proteus 
to prove himself worthy of trust by deferring to his friend and by consulting 
Silvia's own wishes. 1 4 In the theatre an audience would infer this motive 
if Valentine whispered with Silvia for an instant before accepting Proteus' 
apology (V.iv.77). Then her failure to speak, which otherwise is strange, 
12 The God of Arts 
would be perfectly natural; she waits to see how Proteus responds to the 
challenge, and she can easily enough give her own kind of challenge in 
her looks. But Julia is not in on this stratagem, and she may well fear now 
that all is lost. 1 5 In fainting she diverts attention from Valentine's offer 
and its potential testing of Proteus; but she has a stronger claim, and her 
challenge is the real test of Proteus' return to himself. 
Proteus belatedly begins to improve. He says nothing of Valentine's 
offer of Silvia, whom, if he were still his unreformed self, he would have 
been glad to gain by any means; instead he notices the disguised Julia 
fainting and urges, "Look to the boy" (V.iv.85). When Julia revives, she 
manufactures a confusion about rings to prepare for disclosing herself. 
Jul. . . . my master charg'd me to deliver a ring to Madam Silvia, 
which (out of my neglect) was never done. 
Pro. Where is that ring, boy ? 
Jul. Here 'tis; this is it. [Shows a ring.] 
Pro. How? let me see. 
Why, this is the ring I gave to Julia. 
Jul. O, cry you mercy, sir, I have mistook; 
This is the ring you sent to Silvia. [Shows another ring.] 
Pro. But how cam'st thou by this ring? At my depart 
I gave this unto Julia. 
Jul. And Julia herself did give it me, 
And Julia herself hath brought it hither. (V.iv.88-99) 
When Proteus inquires after the ring meant for Silvia, we can't tell whether 
he means to give it to her or to hold it back and take stock of the situation; 
but he is honest enough to admit that the boy has given him a different 
ring, and to be concerned enough about Julia to want to know how the boy 
got the ring. In this he compares favorably with Bertram, who at the end 
of All's Well that Ends Well is involved in a more gravely incriminating 
way with a mix-up of rings and is not at all ready to clear up the confusion. 
Julia now needs only to reveal herself and lecture Proteus on how much 
she has gone through for his love to make him repent and recognize his 
commitment to her. His comment— 
What is in Silvia's face, but I may spy 
More fresh in Julia's with a constant eye? (V.iv.114-115) 
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—should not be a gratuitous insult to Silvia or a proof of continued super-
ficiality but a correction of the error of his eyes, which before had been 
distracted by a picture. His emphasis is on the word "constant"; he asserts 
the subjectivity of beauty in order to affirm an absolute commitment in 
love. If beauty is in the eye of the beholder, the true lover will give his 
own stability to his image of beauty. Proteus has found his own reality in 
dedication to Julia. 
If nothing can argue away the faults of this play, still its one worst 
moment can be made bearable, and the characters have more than a fitful 
reality. Shakespeare makes a serious point about the true self and the 
false self; he shows how precarious self-devotion in love is and yet requires 
it as a sign of deep love; and he engages our hopes for the better side 
of Proteus through our sympathy for Julia. Here are the makings of 
later and better comedies; the heroine has begun to find her redeeming 
role. The carefully schematized self-definitions of this play must have 
helped Shakespeare work toward the freer and subtler self-awareness of 
his mature comic characters. 
Distinctions of true and false selves make another kind of dialectic in 
The Taming of the Shrew. Petruchio comes to Padua ready to overturn 
accepted notions about the wisdom of taking rich, ill-natured wives and 
hence to deny the common report of Katherina's shrewishness. As a 
stratagem of wooing he plans to misconstrue her own behavior and thus, 
it seems, her concept of herself: 
Say that she rail, why then I'll tell her plain 
She sings as sweetly as a nightingale; 
Say that she frown, I'll say she looks as clear 
As morning roses newly wash'd with dew 
If she do bid me pack, I'll give her thanks, 
As though she bid me stay by her a week; 
If she deny to wed, Til crave the day 
When I shall ask the banes, and when be married. 
(II1170473,177-180) 
Though he allows her to act out her scorn and matches wits with her in 
repartee, he refuses to assign to her manner the meaning she tells him 
it has. Having canceled the overtly intended effect of her acts on him, he 
undercuts any public protests she might make and lies to Baptista about 
her private behavior: 
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yourself and all the world. 
That talk'd of her, have talk'd amiss of her. 
If she be curst, it is for policy . . . . 
'Tis bargain'd 'twixt us twain, being alone, 
That she shall still be curst in company. 
I tell you 'tis incredible to believe 
How much she loves me. O, the kindest Kate, 
She hung about my neck, and kiss on kiss 
She vied so fast, protesting oath on oath, 
That in a twink she won me to her love. (II1290-292, 304-310) 
He refuses to let her be what she purports to be and what others have 
thought her, as if her shrewishness were falsehood; and she will finally 
let it be falsehood. If this were The Comedy of Errors, he might be 
describing a mild-mannered twin of hers; but here the discrepancies are 
not physical ones between persons but (as critics see) psychological ones 
between Kate as she now seems and Kate as she may really be or may 
become.1 6 
This could hardly work if she were content with her shrewish role; she 
would have found some way to wrest her hand loose at the legally crucial 
moment when Baptista proclaimed the match and Gremio and Tranio stood 
as witnesses. But Petruchio, subtle as he is, has sensed the paradoxical in 
her character, the desire to upset established judgments. An audience would 
see, besides whatever evidence he may have, why she scorns the self-
righteousness of the universally-sought Bianca, who protests to Kate: 
Unbind my hands, I'll pull them off myself, 
Yea, all my raiment, to my petticoat, 
Or what you will command me will I do, 
So well I know my duty to my elders. (IIi.4-7) 
(Of course, Kate's treatment of Bianca is extreme, a foretaste of what 
Petruchio does to Kate herself.) Baptista's favoritism rankles too, as 
Katherina tells him: 
She is your treasure, she must have a husband; 
I must dance barefoot on her wedding-day, 
And for your love to her lead apes in hell. (II.i.32-34) 1 7 
The shrewishness through which she expresses her complaints only 
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Compounds her problem. Though Petruchio's denial of her actions must 
be frustrating to her, he at least takes some pains with her and shows a 
kind of concern. She may have little hope for what she can become and 
may not know much about a "true" identity within her, but she can 
acquiesce (under protest, of course) in Petruchio's denial of her current 
role and his insistence that others have misjudged her. 
His later conflicts with her are more public. He is working toward the 
idea that if she cooperates by agreeing to see and judge the whole world 
as he does—that is, will define her whole being through his—they can conspire 
to upset the smug conventional wisdom of all Padua. At first his actions 
seem like mockery or domineering to her (and they are, if the whole 
question is only whose will is to prevail). His lateness for the wedding 
seems to repeat Baptista's treatment of her as unmarriageable: 
Now must the world point at poor Katherine, 
And say, "Lo, there is mad Petruchio's wife, 
If it would please him come and marry her!" (IILii.18-20) 
Petruchio obviously does have her on that hook; but when he appears, 
oddly dressed, his comment is a different one, directed rather at the men 
who take exception to his garb: "To me she's married, not unto my 
clothes" (III.ii.117), When he insists on leaving before dinner despite 
her protests, he pretends she has agreed and acts as if the others, who have 
simply entreated him to stay, meant to hinder them with arms. Their 
polite expectations, he implies, would have bound him to conventionality. 
Petruchio sets a stern regimen for Katherina, without meat, sleep, or 
new clothing, As he explains, "all is done in reverend care of her" (IV.i.204); 
nothing that might be provided for her is good enough to suit him, whatever 
her own judgment might be. Chance mix-ups in The Comedy of Errors 
had presented characters with contradictions to their own recent perceptions 
and had forced them to try to adjust; now Petruchio purposely denies 
Katherina's perceptions on the spot and forces a change in her. After 
various crossings she must agree to Petruchio's misnaming of the sun as 
the moon and a strange man as a young gentlewoman, and she must bear 
Petruchio's reproof as he corrects her and returns to true perceptions. These 
deliberate denials of perception become a game that they learn to play 
together; 1 8 in effect she has learned to define her own perceptions by his 
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sense of sport. The open scorn expressed in her shrewishness has given 
way to private collusion in mockery of others' fixed notions of reality. 
Of course the proper audience and butt for all this must be Baptista's 
household. Everyone who had ridiculed or patronized Katherina must 
admire her apparent tractability (expressed finally in the conventional 
doctrine of wifely submission) yet must succumb to her new show of 
superiority. When she wins the wager on "obedience" she proves that 
Bianca and the Widow are self-centered as she is not, and she demonstrates 
the misjudgments in the men who married them and the sound judgment 
in Petruchio, who preferred her. She seems another person, one who is worth 
more than she had been thought; so Baptista offers "Another dowry to 
another daughter, / For she is chang'd, as she had never been" (V.ii.114-115). 
The guided realization of potential seen in Katherina's development is 
doubled when Benedick and Beatrice are brought together. It is not an easy 
match; its proposer, Don Pedro, thinks of it as "one of Hercules' labors" 
and a task surpassing all of Cupid's efforts {Much Ado about Nothing, 
II.i.365, 385). But the potential is there, recognized by Leonato: "O Lord, 
my lord, if they were but a week married, they would talk themselves mad" 
(II.i.353-354). This is of course what tells us that they can be brought 
together: they are so busy breaking jests on and about each other that 
it is obvious that they cannot let one another alone. They are also the two 
characters in the play who have the wit and sophistication for such talk, 
and so again they are a fit pair. 
They are self-conscious about their assumption of witty roles, and 
therefore they are vulnerable to others' criticisms of their performance. 
When Beatrice uses the privilege of masquerade, whereby she can pretend 
not to know with whom she is speaking, to abuse Benedick a bit more 
directly than usual by calling him "the Prince's jester, a very dull fool," 
he is hurt: "The Prince's fool! hah, it may be I go under that title because 
I am merry. Yea, but so I am apt to do myself wrong. I am not so reputed. 
It is the base (though bitter) disposition of Beatrice that puts the world 
into her person, and so gives me out" ( I i i . 137, 204-209). Benedick can 
just barely dismiss this as Beatrice's malice; he must believe that on the 
whole his audience's laughter is genuine and does not compromise their 
respect for him. 
So when Don Pedro, Claudio, and Leonato arrange for Benedick to 
overhear their story, they plant the message not only of Beatrice's love but 
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of his probable scorn for it; Don Pedro says Benedick "hath a contemptible 
[contemptuous] spirit" (II.iii.180-181). And Benedick is bitten: "I hear 
how I am censur'd; they say I will bear myself proudly, if I perceive the 
love come from her. . . . I must not seem proud; happy are they that hear 
their detractions, and can put them to mending" (ILiii .224-226, 228-230). So 
also Beatrice overhears calculated comment from Hero: 
nature never fram'd a woman's heart 
Of prouder stuff than that of Beatrice. 
Disdain and scorn ride sparkling in her eyes, 
Misprising what they look on, and her wit 
Values itself so highly that to her 
All matter else seems weak. She cannot love, 
Nor take no shape nor project of affection, 
She is so self-endeared. 
She responds, 
Stand I condemn'd for pride and scorn so much? 
Contempt, farewell, and maiden pride, adieu! 
No glory lives behind the back of such. (III.L49-56,108-110) 
These criticisms attack in a basic sense the role that each character has 
acted, by taking the role literally, as if it were the sum of the whole person. 
Benedick and Beatrice, like Kate, are challenged to prove that they have 
something more to them than they have shown, that there are real persons 
underlying the roles. The joking that they must endure later implies another 
challenge, to sustain the roles and prove them consistent with the new 
reality of love. 
Perhaps Benedick needs to make the greater adjustments of the two. 
He begins at once, before Beatrice has overheard anything that would 
change her behavior, and he begins by falsifying his perceptions: he says 
"I do spy some marks of love in her" (ILiii .245-246), and he manages to 
squeeze a loving meaning out of her usual flippant words. But his harder 
task in love is to sever his friendships and try to follow Beatrice's command, 
"Kill Claudio" (IV.i.289). His immediate reaction—"Ha, not for the wide 
world"—is right, and he himself has better judgment in locating the true 
source of evil: 
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Two o£ them [Don Pedro and Claudio, among Hero's accusers] have 
the very bent of honor, 
And if their wisdoms be misled in this, 
The practice of it lives in John the Bastard, 
Whose spirits toil in frame of villainies. (lV.i.186-189) 
Beatrice's demand ignores the possibility that Hero may still love Claudio, 
and it conflicts with the Friar's plan for reforming Claudio, which Benedick 
has approved. In accepting the task, Benedick sets aside his better wisdom 
and tries to prove only what difficulties he is willing to undertake for love. 
His reaction to strain shows at once the seriousness in his character and 
the folly of which love is capable. But what counts for Beatrice is that he 
has dedicated himself, with a major sacrifice of past connections, to what 
is now most important to her. 
The evil consequences are averted, of course, by Hero's vindication and 
Claudio's repentance. The good that remains for Benedick and Beatrice 
is their acknowledgement to each other and themselves of their love. Like 
Katherina they learn to play a game for love's sake, and the particular 
game they play reconciles love with their old mocking roles. 
Bene, Do not you love me? 
Beat. Why, no, no more than reason. 
Bene. Why then your uncle and the Prince and Claudio 
Have been deceived. They swore you did. 
Beat. Do not you love me? 
Bene. Troth, no, no more than reason. 
Beat. Why then my cousin, Margaret, and Ursula 
Are much deceiv'd, for they did swear you did 
Bene. Then you do not love me? 
Beat. No, truly, but in friendly recompense. 
Leon. Come, cousin, I am sure you love the gentleman. 
Claud. And I'll be sworn upon't that he loves her, 
For here's a paper written in his hand, 
A halting sonnet of his own pure brain, 
Fashion'd to Beatrice. 
Hero. And here's another 
Writ in my cousin's hand, stol'n from her pocket, 
Containing her affection unto Benedick. 
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Bene. A miracle! here's our own hands against our hearts. Come, 
I will have thee, but by this light, I take thee for pity. 
Beat. I would not deny you, but by this good day, I yield upon great 
persuasion, and partly to save your life, for I was told you were in a 
consumption. (V.iv.74-79, 82-97) 
By qualifying their professions they dupe the others (who pride themselves 
on achieving this match) into throwing in superfluous evidence. And 
beyond that it is clear that Benedick and Beatrice will continue to mock 
each others' love harmlessly. They can be their serious selves yet have their 
frivolous defenses. 
The importance of the frivolous role as a counterbalance to the serious 
commitment in love shows up in the contrast between this witty couple and 
Claudio. Claudio is faced with a charge against Hero of exactly the sort, 
infidelity, that Benedick and Beatrice were wont to joke about as the 
chief peril in love. But Claudio, who seems altogether inexperienced in 
love, loses all judgment when presented with the mere accusation. With 
more sophistication, a jocular role of some sort, he might have been able 
to sift out truth from false appearance. Benedick and Beatrice, like few 
others in the play, are able at once to perceive Hero's innocence; from their 
role-playing, or from some other experience, they have gained a superior 
judgment of character. But of course the irony is that they do not read 
behind each others' roles, or behind their own, without some help from 
others. 
The self-definitions or self-dedications in these plays assert the characters' 
deep involvement in what happens, even if the definitions are sometimes 
mistaken. Many of the definitions involve love, though other values or 
purposes are mixed in; the worst misconception of selfhood among these 
particular plays is Proteus' choice for a while of the wrong woman to love. 
Events may work against the notions of self, either by chance as in The 
Comedy of Errors or by someone's active control of what happens (such 
as Petruchio's taming of Kate or various persons' manipulation of Benedick 
and Beatrice). Though Julia is not the same kind of active controlling 
force in The Two Gentlemen, she does keep her fixed purpose before us 
and holds our sympathy for it. The result of control or of such sympathetic 
focusing is to guide character change in someone else from false self to true 
self. This true self (which may be unknown to its right possessor but 
guessed at by other characters and by us) could show up as a prior vow of 
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love that must outlast a misdirected vow that belongs to the false self 
(as in Proteus' changes); or the true self could be a potential for love that 
emerges through and yet harmonizes with some consciously assumed role 
("false self" is too harsh a term here) as in Kate or in Benedick and 
Beatrice. The concepts of "true" and "false" result from our expectations in 
comedy, a notion of what a happy ending requires: so of course they cover 
very different cases, from Katherine's rageful cry for affection to Proteus' 
cool self-violation. We are aware both of the comic scheme and of our 
need to impose it. In his skill with all these matters, Shakespeare knew, 
perhaps from the very beginning, how to get his characters seriously into 
the action, how to use for the best his audience's sympathies and expecta-
tions, and how to build complexities into characters. His control over 
individual character gives us a vivid sense of that end of the comic spectrum. 
2 
A Disguise of Love 
One lover can hardly change basically without affecting the other in 
some way; this relationship of two (though other people may be involved 
as well) is the nearest broadening of concern outside the individual. The 
relation is often expressed formally by vows and symbolized physically by 
rings; in a comic action, specifically, it may be shown by the response of the 
other person to the first one's change. A powerful response may well guide, 
indeed reverse, the direction of change. 
Thus the changes in Julia, in The Two Gentlemen, match in a rough 
way the most important changes in Proteus. Not that she assumes her first 
change, a masculine disguise to go visit him, in response to his infidelity; 
on the contrary, she trusts in his love and wants to join him just because 
she misses him. But the announcement of her plan is carefully placed: just 
before this (ILiv and Il .vi) , Proteus has declared his shift in loyalty from 
Julia to Silvia, in terms that equate his selfhood with love for Silvia. So 
while Proteus is misdefining himself Julia is taking on a false identity.1 9 
The falseness of Julia's position is essentially the falseness of Proteus' 
love. He unwittingly gives us the best statements of the tenuous nature of 
her existence now that he does not love her. He lies to Silvia in telling her 
that Julia is dead (IV.ii.106), as if he were trying to make into fact his 
own prior resolve: " I will forget that Julia is alive, / Rememb'ring that 
my love to her is dead" (ILvi.27-28). And when he finds that Silvia will 
not love him, so that he can do no more than admire her picture, he finds 
a metaphor for the unloved lover that Julia thinks apt too: 
Pro. Madam, if your heart be so obdurate, 
Vouchsafe me yet your picture for my love, 
The picture that is hanging in your chamber; 
To that I'll speak, to that I'll sigh and weep; 
For since the substance of your perfect self 
Is else devoted, I am but a shadow; 
And to your shadow will I make true love. 
Jul. [Aside.] If 'twere a substance, you would sure deceive it, 
And make it but a shadow, as I am. ( IVi i . l 19-127) 
He plunges her more deeply into falsehood when he asks her to give 
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his ring, which he had had from her, to Silvia. Julia, in disguise, hints on 
behalf of her own love and tempts him to repeat his lie about her death: 
"It seems you W d not her, to leave her token: / She is dead, belike?" 
(IViv.74-75) When he does not lie again but hints that he has jilted her, 
she can urge her case more: "methinks that she lov'd you as well / As 
you do love your lady Silvia" (IV.iv.79-80). Her disguise is a chance for 
her to try the Golden Rule on him, but with no success. He is beyond such 
reasoning, and she must go on an unwelcome errand. 
Now her disguise helps her to self-dramatization, a stratagem also adopted 
by such famous disguised heroines as Rosalind and Viola; in this she is 
aided by Silvia, who is uninterested in Proteus and ready to discuss Julia 
with him sympathetically. Julia, describing herself in the third person and 
alluding covertly to her disguise, gives it a meaning that fits with the 
associations (set up by Proteus) of death and shadow-life: 
since she did neglect her looking-glass, 
And threw her sun-expelling mask away, 
The air hath starv'd the roses in her cheeks, 
And pinch'd the lily-tincture of her face, 
That now she is become as black as I. (IV.iv.152-156) 
She thinks of her present form, an obscuring of feminine beauty, as a 
product of grief. Sebastian the boy (who is Julia's persona) has earlier 
acted out grief in the role of Ariadne jilted by Theseus, and Julia imagines 
a situation full of variants of herself: Julia herself weeping for lost love, 
and Sebastian in Julia's gown playing Ariadne, the type of Julia's woes. 
Though the pathos of all this is not cut by the lightness and self-mockery 
of a Rosalind or a Viola, here are the beginnings of a complex self-awareness. 
And in this play itself the period of her false identity and self-contemplation 
through an assumed role matches Proteus' consciously false definition of 
himself and strengthens our reaction against it. 
Silvia's refusal of the ring from Proteus leaves Julia with two: the one 
which she had originally given Proteus, and the one that in turn had been 
Proteus' gift to her. Her own gift had been a sign of her love and of 
Proteus' vows and obligations to her, now neglected by him: "This ring 
I gave him when he parted from me, / To bind him to remember my 
good will" (IV.iv.97-98). Instead he wants to make it into an offering to 
Silvia. When she prepares to reveal her disguise and remind him of his 
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commitments, she uses the rings to good purpose. In place of the ring 
he intended for Silvia, the true meaning of which had become perverted, 
she first produces the ring that Proteus had given her, his past acknowledg-
ment of love and duty. She begins to remind Proteus of what he had been 
and had promised, and she hopes to return him to his proper being. 
That return, which begins when Proteus repents his thoughts of rape, 
is completed only when Julia discloses her identity and thus too returns to 
herself. Though love was the motive for her disguise and the disguise is 
proof of her love, she likens the falsehood of her disguise to the period of 
falsehood in Proteus' loyalties; 
Be thou asham'd that I have took upon me 
Such an immodest raiment—if shame live 
In a disguise of love! 
It is the lesser blot, modesty finds, 
Women to change their shapes than men their minds. (V.iv.105-109) 
With this Proteus reverts to his original being and vows constancy. If 
we will accept this first self as the true self, following Julia's wishes, we 
can trust the future. Proteus is bound like his mythological type, and the 
circular movement of the comedy is perfected and brought to rest. 
The heroine's changes of identity in this play—changes which are more 
carefully planned, with more significant details of action and dialogue, 
than critics usually want to notice-—foreshadow another stratagem to reform 
an erring man, the lady's supposed death as in Much Ado about Nothing™ 
Here, of course, Claudio's error is not his own infidelity but his belief that 
Hero has been unfaithful, and the resultant change in Hero does not involve 
a disguise; but the basic structure is much the same, and again Shakespeare 
makes the contrasts of true and false selves. The man's error is a lapsing 
into a false state of being, which is matched and cured (in part) by the 
lady's pretense of death. 
Claudio is insecure to begin with in his distinction of true from false 
appearances. His liking for Hero has only become love since his return 
from the wars (I.i296-305), and since his wooing is done for him by Don 
Pedro he has fewer first-hand impressions of Hero's commitment to him 
than a more direct suitor would; 2 1 he cannot have his own remembered 
image (and images become important in the play) of how she looked at 
the first mention of his love. He is liable to error, too, just because he 
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has an intermediary, and his failure of trust (when he hears a wrong story) 
extends even to his friend and commander: 
'Tis certain so, the Prince woos for himself. 
Friendship is constant in all other things 
Save in the office and affairs of love; 
Therefore all hearts in love use their own tongues. 
Let every eye negotiate for itself, 
And trust no agent; for beauty is a witch 
Against whose charms faith melteth into blood. 
This is an accident of hourly proof, 
Which I mistrusted not. Farewell therefore Hero! (II.i.174-182) 
His own self-doubt and his special insecurities about love (shared by 
Othello, who yet has a military self-assurance that Claudio may lack) make 
him deny in this one matter the trust that he usually gives to a well-known 
friend. By temperament and inexperience (a failing which his inability 
to declare his own love simply aggravates) he is disabled from sound 
judgment. 
But if he easily falls from a better state of mind, that better self is 
idealistic enough that we want to believe in its potential. In The Two 
Gentlemen^ our hope for Proteus' better side depended on our sympathy 
for Julia and for the love of Valentine and Silvia, and on our knowledge 
that old bonds of love and friendship should keep Proteus with Julia and 
away from Silvia. In Much Ado, Hero is too slight to arouse by herself the 
same sympathy as Julia, and Claudio's reason for breaking off with Hero, 
unlike Proteus' reason for change, would be adequate if only his facts were 
right. Rather we want the marriage to go forward partly because other 
characters whom we like, especially Beatrice, are hopeful, and also partly 
because we know that Don John is a villain; but there are grounds for our 
wishes too in Claudio himself. Even in embitterment he expresses the 
strength of the ideal he would like to read in Hero if only he would 
trust the present (and true) appearances: 
Behold how like a maid she blushes here! 
O, what authority and show of truth 
Can cunning sin cover itself withal! 
Comes not that blood as modest evidence 
To witness simple virtue? Would you not swear, 
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All you that see her, that she were a maid, 
By these exterior shows? . . . 
Out on thee seeming! I will write against it: 
You seem to me as Dian in her orb, 
As chaste as is the bud ere it be blown. . . . (IVi.34-40,56-58) 
Our greater knowledge o£ events strengthens our sense o£ Claudio's tribute 
to Hero's beauty: we can find in it a true sign of moral beauty, just as we 
know that Desdemona is truly the "cunning'st pattern of excelling nature" 
in a moral as well as physical sense. Othello's idealism (even if he will not 
trust it) is a necessary means of establishing his nobility as a tragic figure. 
W e must be able to make the same kind of judgment, though with less 
urgency, in comedies such as this where an erring but later reformed hero 
is, if not noble, at least marriageable: his better self must make excuses for 
his worse. So it is Claudio who most of all provides his own credentials. 
Even without knowledge of Don John's trick to make Claudio think 
Hero unfaithful, it is possible for a careful observer, like the Friar, to see 
her innocence "By noting of the lady": 
I have mark'd 
A thousand blushing apparitions 
T o start into her face, a thousand innocent shames ' 
In angel whiteness beat away those blushes, 
And in her eye there hath appear'd a fire 
T o burn the errors that these princes hold 
Against her maiden truth. (IV.i.158-164) 
He does better than Leonato, who doubts his own daughter without 
even the excuse of the deceit that had been put upon Claudio: "could 
she here deny / The story that is printed in her blood?" (lines 121-122) The 
issue that distinguishes among characters in the play is the right perception 
of appearances;2 2 it is also the means of defining Claudio's return to his 
true self. The Friar thinks, rather too hopefully, that if he reports Hero 
dead to Claudio, 
When he shall hear she died upon his words, 
T h ' idea of her life shall sweetly creep 
Into his study of imagination, 
And every lovely organ of her life 
Shall come apparell'd in more precious habit, 
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More moving, delicate, and full of life, 
Into the eye and prospect of his soul, 
Than when she liv'd indeed (IV.i.223-230), 
and he will want her back again. Claudio's original failure to form a stable 
image of Hero that would refute Don John's slander must be corrected by 
an appeal to his imagination. Hero's "change"—her supposed death—not 
only matches Claudio's change in its timing, as Julia's change matched 
Proteus'; it is meant to turn Claudio's change directly back. It continues and 
develops from The Two Gentlemen in another way: the story about a 
death, which had been Proteus' fiction to himself and then his lie to 
Silvia, becomes in Much Ado a supposed fact which is presented to the 
man by others. The Friar's lie about Hero's death is needed to counteract 
Don John's He about her infidelity; as in many comedies, the good turn 
their enemies' weapons against them. But the result is not cynical (even if 
the Friar's plan fails to work as intended); if there were not a better self 
in Claudio that is capable of genuinely appreciating the pure, true image 
of Hero, no such plan would have been worth trying. 
When Don John's successful plot is revealed (through no fault of the 
constables who overheard it) and Claudio again believes the truth about 
Hero, he regains his ideal picture of her: "Sweet Hero, now thy image 
doth appear / In the rare semblance that I lov'd it first" (V.i.251-252). 
Now the Friar's scheme comes into its own; if it had not caused Claudio to 
repent, at least it now makes a good test of his sincerity. Leonato urges 
strongly the supposedly irrevocable nature of events, and from there h e 
gets right to the point of the reparation that Claudio and Don Pedro 
can make: 
I cannot bid you bid my daughter live— 
That were impossible—but I pray you both, 
Possess the people in Messina here 
How innocent she died, and if your love 
Can labor aught in sad invention, 
Hang her an epitaph upon her tomb, 
And sing it to her bones, sing it to-night. (V.i.279-285) 
If Claudio has really returned to his true being and has within him o n c e 
more a true image of Hero, he will make it public to undo some damage 
that the false image has done. 
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Although the motivation seems bizarre even for this altered version of 
vendetta, there is more purpose than the comic rush to a happy ending in 
Leonato's next demand, that Claudio should marry his niece. This sounds 
like extreme generosity to Claudio (and he takes it as such), but it is 
presented as his duty of restitution: the niece matches Hero eye for eye and 
tooth for tooth ("Almost the copy of my child that's dead"—-Vi.289), and 
Claudio must "Give her the right you should have giv'n her cousin. . . ." 
The likeness to Hero continues in an odd way one notion of the epitaphs 
that Claudio must write: he is to prove how much he had really loved 
Hero herself after all. These peculiarities are resolved in outcome (and to 
that extent in motivation) when the masked "niece" turns out to be Hero 
after all. Once Claudio has proved himself, duty becomes a pleasure and 
justice becomes mercy. 
The exact form of Hero's revelation is important. Its penitential quality 
is exactly what Claudio had volunteered: "Choose your revenge yourself, 
/ Impose me to what penance your invention / Can lay upon my sin" 
(V.i.272-274). He surrenders initiative and control over himself to 
Leonato; Leonato is not only to choose the nature of the penance but 
even, it turns out, to decide whom Claudio should marry. Claudio, 
the penitent, trusts Leonato, the wronged man, and looks for him to 
do justice; how much better than the reverse, a Valentine trusting a 
Proteus! So Claudio, by Leonato's command, must take the lady's hand 
before the Friar and assembled witnesses and must promise to marry her 
before he sees her face. He makes a legally binding commitment by 
Elizabethan standards;2 3 only then can he be accepted and rewarded. 
Hero's words of return emphasize the meaning of the changes she 
and Claudio have undergone: "when I liv'd, I was your other wife, / And 
when you lov'd, you were my other husband" (V.iv.60-61). She is returning 
to her original state now that Claudio has become himself again in his 
repentance. On Claudio's exclamation—"Another Hero!"—she explains, 
"One Hero died defil'd, but I do live," and Leonato adds (to Don Pedro), 
"She died, my lord, but whiles her slander liv'd." Her state of false being 
was both her feigned death and the slander that occasioned it. Slander 
had cast both lovers into a state of falsity: Claudio had ceased to be himself 
(implicitly defined through the person he loves) when he lost faith in Hero, 
and Hero had suffered a distortion of image or loss of name through the 
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false story. As the lovers are reunited, they are restored to themselves, and 
the process is described for us. 
The Claudio-Hero plot of Much Ado takes for granted the conscious 
self-definitions of The Two Gentlemen and develops and generally improves 
several elements of the story. All's Well that Ends Well takes from both 
of these plays, builds greater complexities, and pushes the issues harder. 
Infidelity is again a problem, though it is not simple infidelity nor Bertram's 
only problem. Helena goes into disguise to follow her man as Julia does 
(though with better knowledge of his feelings) and, like Julia, finds him 
unfaithful; and her pose as pilgrim is an acting-out of Julia's metaphor of 
the "true-devoted pilgrim" who "hath Love's wings to fly" (TGV II.vii.9-11). 
Like Hero, Helena is supposed dead, though most of the characters do not 
know that this report was consciously planned (AWW IV.iii.47-59). As 
Proteus had imagined and then lied about his lady's death, Bertram implies 
the same wish in the words of his letter to Helena, "Till I have no wife, I 
have nothing in France" (III.ii.99), and he finds it convenient to promise 
Diana marriage after some unknown time when Helena may die (IV.iL 
71-72). Shakespeare repeats himself to intensify the challenge in events. 
But the newest development is the ultimate among disguises, the bed-
trick. Like the other disguises or changes in the heroine that have been 
mentioned so far, it obviously corresponds in its own way to the man's 
refusal of the lady; if Bertram were not pursuing someone else there would 
be nobody for Helena to replace in bed. 2 4 But there is a closer connection 
in that Bertram's letter rejecting Helena virtually invites the trick: "When 
thou canst get the ring upon my finger, which never shall come off, and show 
me a child begotten of thy body that I am father to, then call me husband; 
but in such a 'then' I write a 'never'" (III.ii.57-60). He means these 
conditions that he forces upon her to be only nominal, since he thinks 
their fulfillment impossible. But Helena's sharp eye notices that she could 
fulfill the requirements if she could lure him into intercourse (and become 
instantly pregnant) without his knowing who she was, and if she could 
acquire the ring at the same time. Whether presenting him with these 
surprising fulfillments of his demands would make him accept t h e 
marriage any more than the King's command had, is another question; here 
is one of the gambles she must take. What is important for the basic 
structure of the play is that she reads his statement of separation from her a s 
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a set of tasks through which she may be able to regain him, and that while 
she pursues this aim she assumes various sorts of false existence. 
Is it fair to Bertram to say that his true selfhood is bound up with 
marriage to Helena? There is more strain in this assertion than in similar 
ones about Proteus and Claudio; here is one instance where this play pushes 
the issues harder. Again, as with Julia, we depend on sympathy with the 
heroine; in Helena's curing of the King we find our sympathy with her 
increasing. Her adoption by the Countess reinforces our feelings and 
weakens Bertram's argument about disparity of birth. It is already a feeble 
enough argument, as the King points out, being based as it is on nothing 
more than a snobbish concern for family name: 
If she be 
All that is virtuous—save what thou dislik'st, 
A poor physician's daughter—thou dislik'st 
Of virtue for the name. (II.iii.121-124) 
Though Bertram tries hard to hold onto his ring as "an honor 'longing 
to our house, / Bequeathed down from many ancestors" (IVii.42-43), he 
agrees to part with it to Diana, thereby, through that and a related act, 
jeopardizing his family's and his own good name. In fact, then, he cares 
little enough about something that is hard to defend in the first place. 
Another question, tending in the opposite direction, would be whether 
Bertram really does have a better self than the erring one we see through 
most of the play. Again the play raises difficulties, and perhaps we cannot 
do much more than make excuses for him. Bertram is expected to be 
overwhelmed by Helena's "virtue" in healing the King. But he fails to 
respond as theory, the King, Helena, and the audience would have him; 
given that fact, he may fairly object to being made the prize in what is 
really the King's rewarding of virtue. There is this modicum of justice in 
what is otherwise, for all we can tell from his reasons, merely a snobbish 
resistance. Beyond this, our hopes for a better Bertram must depend on 
Helena's love for him, the virtues of the Countess his mother and her 
love for him, and the remembered virtues of his father. Through the whole 
play his virtue remains mostly in potential. 
Bertram goes further in infidelity than Proteus and is harder to reform; 
yet the demands for reform are more exacting in nature than they had been 
in other plays. When Helena is thought by all to be dead and Bertram is 
before the King and about to take a new wife, he claims that since Helena 
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died he has come to love her (V.iii.54). Such an admission, along with acts 
of penance, sufficed when it came from Claudio; indeed the Friar's whole 
plan to make Claudio lament Hero's loss depended on the principle 
That what we have we prize not to the worth 
Whiles we enjoy it, but being lack'd and lost, 
Why then we rack the value; then we find 
The virtue that possession would not show us 
Whiles it was ours. (Ado IV.i.218-222) 
The King lectures Bertram about the same principle, but although he is 
ready to let him remarry, his tone as he recalls the injury done Helena is 
not approving: 
That thou didst love her, strikes some scores away 
From the great compt; but love that comes too late, 
Like a remorseful pardon slowly carried, 
To the great sender turns a sour offense, 
Crying, "That's good that's gone." Our rash faults 
Make trivial price of serious things we have, 
Not knowing them until we know their grave. (AWW V.iii.56-62) 
Still, the King would let the past go; Bertram has offered, this time more 
willingly, to marry again by the King's direction (V.iii.29)—as the repentant 
Claudio had agreed to follow Leonato's choice. But the planned acceptance 
of Bertram, unlike Claudio's acceptance, does not go smoothly. In a more 
complex way than in The Two Gentlemen, rings reveal the truth b y 
recalling past obligations. Bertram tries to send for his new bride with a 
ring that he thinks Diana had given him; if his supposition were true, h e 
would be misusing it faithlessly, for he had promised her marriage, and h e r 
ring would be one token of that contract.2 5 But since it is Helena's, h i s 
treatment of both women comes into question. 
When Helena enters with Bertram's own ring she resolves everything: 
she has fulfilled the task Bertram had set her, and she has his pledge of love 
and obligation, given more freely to her than his marriage vows had been . 
She announces herself with a description of her state of false identity as a 
rejected wife: " 'T i s but the shadow of a wife you see, / The name, a n d 
not the thing" (V.iii.307-308), Bertram, for all that he has twisted a n d 
turned before, acknowledges her at once in her full selfhood: " B o t h , 
both. O, pardon!" If this is rather brief as an expression of Bertram's r e f o r m 
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(he speaks one couplet soon after, professing love), it is concentrated and 
meaningful if we recall how Shakespeare has treated lovers' identities in 
other plays. Helena is returning to herself, and indeed beyond her past 
identity in that Bertram is now conscious of a real attachment to her; and 
in this movement to better and fuller reality she brings Bertram with her. 
Other disguises or feigned deaths by heroines in response to changes in 
their husbands are Imogen's in Cymheline and Hermione's in The Winter's 
Tale. In both these late plays the complexities of the situation require 
further contexts for discussion; for the moment it is worth just noticing 
the continuity and the degree of complication. Cymheline features disguise 
by both husband and wife (if Posthumus' change of clothing counts), 
feigned death by the wife, suspicion by each of the other's infidelity, and 
much more. The Winter's Tale has Leontes' assumption that Hermione is 
unfaithful, her supposed death, and her miraculous restoration after he 
has repented. The situation at the end of Much Ado, when Claudio places 
himself under Leonato's direction in marriage, is repeated, with variants, 
in Leontes' acceptance of Paulina's guidance in remarriage: 
Will you swear 
Never to marry but by my free leave? . . . 
Unless another, 
As like Hermione as is her picture, 
Affront his eye 
Yet if my lord will marry—if you will, sir, 
No remedy but you will—give me the office 
To choose you a queen. She shall not be so young 
As was your former, but she shall be such 
As (walk'd your first queen's ghost) it should take joy 
To see her in your arms. (V.i.69-70,73-75, 76-81) 
At the proper time she will offer him a wife as like Hermione as is her 
statue. The proper time is not before repentance has brought him sufficiently 
to himself; but unlike the situation in Much Ado, in this play it is not given 
to the persons directing the repentance to decide when there has been enough 
of it; Paulina must keep in mind that the oracle has implied the hope of 
other recoveries. 
Another continuity is the possible suggestion of Hermione's statue by 
imagery in one source for Much Ado about Nothing, which has some 
structural likeness to The Winter's Tale. In Bandello's tale of Timbreo and 
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Fenicia, when Hero's (and in part Hermione's) counterpart, Fenicia, was 
falsely accused, the description of her as she fainted suggests that she looked 
like a statue.2 6 If passages from a source for an earlier play did indeed 
reverberate in his mind for many years, Shakespeare must have made a 
connection in the behavior of the two heroines, and must have found a 
new intensity and complication in the old issues and situations as he returned 
to them in later plays. 
The heroines of the plays discussed in this chapter have a powerful effect 
on their men through their passage into some sort of false existence. Their 
concern with change of identity once their love is threatened shows the 
nature of the problem as Shakespeare defines it: the men have somehow 
changed identity too, in an ominous way, and return to themselves is also a 
return to discarded vows. We can best react to the plays by letting the 
heroines guide us and by hoping for some better self in each erring hero. 
That we may not instinctively do this points to a weakness or problem; 
Shakespeare must have felt some kind of artifice in this story line himself, 
for he keeps returning to it, elaborating it, and especially loading it with 
new obstacles to our ready acceptance of the expected comic resolution. 
He dares us to believe that all may be well. 
3 
Paying the Debt 
Lovers' obligations to each other have a social aspect, at least insofar as 
society promotes marriage as a stable fulfillment of vows of love. The goal 
of Graeco-Roman New Comedy may be to harmonize lovers' commitments 
(in this case, already stable ones) with society's class-bound expectations 
and monetary arrangements.2 7 And in Shakespeare's time, in life as well 
as art, even quite private vows of fidelity could easily become social in 
that they were legally binding betrothals, or actual marriages.2 8 The 
facility of this societal involvement (which one could call external as far 
as the lovers are concerned) shows in Measure for Measure when, on the 
strength of old vows since denied, Angelo is considered Mariana's "husband 
on a pre-contract" (IV.i.71). Others feel justified, then (although not all 
critics would agree), in bringing them together again, even without Angelo's 
knowledge; and their intercourse, though it involves a bed-trick played on 
Angelo, makes a legally valid marriage. And in Alts Well when Helena 
produces Bertram's ring as proof of their intercourse, she has not only 
fulfilled the task set by his letter but consummated and therefore confirmed 
with his consent (also by a bed-trick) their binding marriage.2* These 
deceptions are extreme, and Shakespeare took some pains to prepare and 
justify them; 3 0 but they differ mainly in degree from the erring Claudio's 
penitent betrothal in Much Ado to an unknown masked lady. When the 
truth comes out, these men prove their love in that, in a strange sense, 
they do not "alter when they alteration find." Legally they cannot alter; 
that is the point of society's involvement. But, for the ladies' sakes at 
least, we should hope that the men's private wishes too at last match up 
with their public obligations. 
Society concerns itself also with the continued meeting of obligations 
after marriage. One of the "duties" of marriage, as then regarded, has some 
importance in Shakespeare's comedies, the marital "debt" of sexual inter-
course implied in 1 Corinthians 7:3. "Debt" is the Vulgate word (Uxori 
vir debitum reddat), and the Rheims version translates verses 3-5 "Let the 
husband render his dette to the wife: and the wife also in like maner to 
her husband. The woman hath not power of her owne body: but her 
husband. And in like maner the man also hath not power of his owne 
body: but the woman. Defraude not one an other, except perhaps by 
34 The God of Arts 
consent for a time, that you may giue your self to praier, . . . " 3 1 The 
headnote explains "That maried folke may aske their debt, and must pay 
it," and the annotations mention "the bond and obligation that is betwene 
the maried couple for rendring of the dene of carnal copulation one to an 
other. . . ." Though Coverdale translates debitum as "that due is," the 
major English Protestant Bibles of the Tudor age (Great, Bishops', Geneva) 
all try to make the meaning more general—"Let the luisband giue vnto 
the wife due beneuolence, and likewise also the wife vnto the husband"— 
and Geneva's note says that "due beneuolence" "eonteincth all dueties 
perteining to marriage."3 2 But influential Protestants, though accepting this 
wording of the text, might read it as euphemism by Paul, implying still 
the sexual meaning above all; so Heinrich Bullinger: 
thus with comly words expresseth he the actual workc of manage. 
. . . But Paul commaundeth [the Corinthians] to marry, the one to 
geue due beneuolence vnto the other, no double for the auoiding of 
whoredom, and eschuing of vncleanes. For it followeth in Paul 
immediatly after. The wife hath no power of her own body, but the 
husband. Likewyse the husband hath not power of his own body, but 
the wyfe. Whereby hee forbiddeth that eyther of them shall deny hys 
body vnto the other. 8 3 
Whatever their opinion of this passage, Christians in Shakespeare's time 
would know the argument for a sexual duty in marriage. 
When Bertram pursues Diana despite his marital vows, she answers 
him pointedly with exactly that argument: 
Ber. In your fine frame hath love no quality? 
If the quick fire of youth light not your mind, 
You are no maiden, but a monument. 
When you are dead, you should be such a one 
As you are now; for you are cold and stern, 
And now you should be as your mother was 
When your sweet self was got. 
Dia. She then was honest. 
Ber. So should you be. 
Dia. No; 
My mother did but duty, such, my lord, 
As you owe to your wife. (AWW IV.ii.4-I3) 
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Her actual word "duty" appears in Henry Cornelius Agrippa's paraphrase 
of the passage from Corinthians, in the wording "the carnall duetie."3'4 
She insists that Bertram has a positive duty to Helena, not merely a con-
straint against seeking other women. Yet for all we know, Bertram might 
have avoided Helena, and perhaps got the marriage annulled, if he had 
been willing to remain celibate long enough; at least that is one protection 
against bed-tricks. But Bertram seems determined to go wrong both in 
shunning Helena and in seeking Diana, and one seems to follow from 
the other. And as the two ills are related, so are their remedies. 
Helena's curing of Bertram consists of proving to him that he really 
wants what he had thought he did not: he must learn to redefine his 
status. When he first resisted her choice of him as husband, he asked the 
King, "In such a business, give me leave to use / The help of mine own 
eyes" (II.iii.107-108), and his objections to her birth and poverty seemed 
to the King like prejudice against virtue simply "for the name" of Helena's 
status as "A poor physician's daughter" (lines 123-124). But when he 
meets Diana he undermines his position: he changes from abstinence to 
importuning, he abandons concern for good name (at least his own), and 
in succumbing to a trick in the dark he above all makes his choice without 
using his eyes. Helena's paradoxes express his general state of delusion: 
O, strange men, 
That can such sweet use make of what they hate, 
When saucy trusting of the cozen'd thoughts 
Defiles the pitchy night; so lust doth play 
With what it loathes for that which is away. . . . (IViv.21-25) 
Unintentionally and in private he has submitted himself to an experience 
with the wrong label on it; when the experience is made public and given 
its right name, he will remain true to the experience itself and decide that 
he does not dislike the name after all. 
Making the facts public—involving society in Bertram's adherence to his 
vows—is essential to Helena's plan. Public coercion seems needed with 
Bertram, and his acceptance of his wife would not be complete until 
public—indeed he does not know it is she that he has accepted until every-
thing is public. The ring she gives him, besides being her individual 
commitment of love to him, can also be a cry of help to the King: 
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She call'd the saints to surety 
That she would never put it from her finger, 
Unless she gave it to yourself [Bertram] in bed, 
Where you have never come, or sent it us 
Upon her great disaster. (V.iii.108-112) 
Since the King wrongly eliminates one explanation for her parting with 
the ring, he is left with the suspicion that Bertram, and later Diana, might 
be implicated in Helena's death; but the false lead is helpful, since the 
investigation puts pressure on Bertram and so contributes to making his 
deeds public. 
Besides the private pledges conferred by the rings that Bertram and 
Helena exchange (however little Bertram means any promise), the rings 
had already had social meanings given to them by Bertram and Diana; 
Bertram said of his ring, 
It is an honor longing to our house, 
Bequeathed down from many ancestors, 
Which were the greatest obloquy P th* world 
In me to lose, 
and Diana replied, 
Mine honor's such a ring, 
My chastity's the jewel of our house, 
Bequeathed down from many ancestors, 
Which were the greatest obloquy F th* work! 
In me to lose. (IV.ii.4249) 
If their exchange, and what it implies, were really to take place, there 
actually would be such a loss on both sides; but in fact Bertram gives over 
the keeping of his reputation, and his actions as well, to Helena, who can 
save him more surely than he would save himself. Speaking for Helena, 
Diana gives a public meaning to the second ring, which privately is Helena's 
token of love to Bertram: 
And on your finger in the night 111 put 
Another ring, that what in time proceeds 
May token to the future our past deeds. (IVii.61-63) 
Even apart from its sexual meaning this speech is deliberately ambiguous: 
"what in time proceeds" may be any of the events that may result. But 
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especially Helena would look ahead to her pregnancy and to her claiming 
fulfillment of her task through pregnancy and through possession of the 
other ring. But though he cannot guess these matters, Bertram has had 
his warning that what happens now will be known and binding in the 
future, and he will need to face the social consequences of his vows. 
When Helena arrives at the end to make her public claim on Bertram, 
she speaks as if still in her former state: " T i s but the shadow of a wife 
you see, / The name, and not the thing" (V.iii307-308). She refers not 
only to the half-existence of unrequited love as described in earlier chapters 
(and also portrayed by Julia with a metaphor of shadows) but also to two 
matters of social concern in the institution of marriage: the incompleteness 
of an unconsummated marriage (which might still be annulled) and the 
failure of Bertram to pay the marital debt. Of course things have changed, 
as Bertram at once acknowledges. But until he makes this public admission, 
Helena's position as wife is not established. Only through the revelation of 
events does Bertram know that his private desires in the dark are now 
reconciled with his public marital vows, and only in his recognition of this 
harmony is it really true that Helena has received all the promises of 
marriage. With this we can begin to hope that the title of the play is, or 
may be, fulfilled. 
The concept of the marital debt is more important still in another play, 
The Merchant of Venice; it is the metaphor that unites some major actions 
in the drama and shows the fitness of Portia's behavior. No sooner does 
Bassanio win the right to marry Portia than he learns the hard news that 
Antonio, whose loan had financed his wooing, is at Shylock's mercy for 
debt, which he intends to collect in flesh rather than cash. At once Portia 
offers to pay off more than the money owing, and she outlines with some 
care the sequence of events she plans: 
First go with me to church and call me wife, 
And then away to Venice to your friend; 
For never shall you lie by Portia's side 
With an unquiet soul You shall have gold 
To pay the petty debt twenty times over, (111.11.303-307) 
She will go on with the wedding service, but she postpones the consum-
mation of their marriage until after she can free Antonio of his indebtedness 
to Shylock. She will not pay the debt until she has paid the debt. 
But as Jessica has warned, Shylock will not be bought off with even 
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twenty times the sum owed him. Portia seems apprehensive about this 
problem, and besides sending money she follows after to Venice, disguised 
and provided with expert legal advice. Shylock is a hard case: he refuses 
offers of higher payment; appeals to mercy get nowhere with him; and he 
declines even to provide a surgeon out of mercy if he is not obliged to. 
He will back down only when threatened by unforeseen applications of 
law. Portia works hard in her judicial role, and by the customs of the time 
she deserves a reward, which Bassanio offers—with Antonio's seconding: 
Bass. Most worthy gentleman, I and my friend 
Have by your wisdom been this day acquitted 
Of grievous penalties, in lieu whereof 
Three thousand ducats, due unto the Jew, 
We freely cope your courteous pains withal. 
Ant. And stand indebted, over and above, 
In love and service to you evermore. (IV.i.408-414) 
Now there is a new kind of debt, a recognition of Portia's merit in out-
witting Shylock, and significantly the money that had been intended for 
him would now be diverted to her. But Portia is unknown because in 
disguise, and before she discloses herself she wants to make more of the 
nature of this new indebtedness; so she asks for something that is harder 
for Bassanio to part with, the ring that is token of her love. 
Her gift of the ring to him had been phrased in the financial language 
that fills the play: 
Myself, and what is mine, to you and yours 
Is now converted. But now I was the lord 
Of this fair mansion, master of my servants, 
Queen o'er myself; and even now, but now, 
This house, these servants, and this same myself 
Are yours—my lord's!—I give them with this ring, 
Which when you part from, lose, or give away, 
Let it presage the ruin of your love, 
And be my vantage to exclaim on you. (III.ii.166-174) 
In keeping with this play's habit of talking about all kinds of values as i£ 
they were monetary, she sounds as if she were delivering a deed o f 
property.35 The ring should have a certain value to Bassanio, which i s 
whatever value he finds in her offering herself and all her goods to h i m . 
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Valuation for her services as judge is also implied in her request for 
the ring— 
if your wife be not a mad woman, 
And know how well I have deserv'd this ring, 
She would not hold out enemy for ever 
For giving it to me 
—and in Antonio's urging that he give it up: 
Let his deservings and my love withal 
Be valued 'gainst your wive's commandement. (IV.L445-448, 450-451) 
Bassanio feels that his wife's value as summed up by the ring and the 
importance of the ring to her as a token ought to be greater than even the 
value of the judge who has saved his friend's life and the value of the token 
to the judge. So Bassanio holds out against the gift until the end, when he 
relents. 
When Bassanio returns to Belmont and Portia is in her own role again, 
inevitably she must taunt him for parting with the ring. Again she alludes 
to its value: 
If you had known the virtue of the ring, 
Or half her worthiness that gave the ring, 
Or your own honor to contain the ring, 
You would not then have parted with the ring. (Vi.199-202) 
If Bassanio had known the truth by now, this speech would carry its own 
answer: Portia-as-judge is worth even more than Portia-in-Belmont, since 
her virtues have been put into action; and so as judge she deserves the 
ring. But there is another valuation to consider, as the bawdy jests about 
the ring remind us; Portia-as-wife has not yet shown all her value, since 
she has postponed payment of the marriage debt and even, in fun, threatened 
to withhold it completely until the ring is returned. The competing valu-
ations are brought together when Antonio makes another bond for his 
friend by pledging his soul that Bassanio "Will never more break faith 
advisedly" (VA253) and when Portia gives Bassanio the ring again and 
reveals her identity as judge. 
Now Portia's actions are public, and her appreciation in value from 
bride to judge to wife can be realized. She has more than paid any debts 
that anyone has incurred, and all debts of gratitude, which always come back 
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to her, she freely forgives. She even seems ready to set Antonio up in trade 
again, on the pretense that some of his ships were saved; except for this, 
everything she does, as an expression of love, must be public so that it 
can be valued rightly. As Portia pays off "debts" in love, friendship, and 
marriage, her increasing "value" is a sign of an aspect of the whole play 
that one critic has called "love's wealth"3 6—and the ring, which therefore 
is worth more when she returns it to Bassanio than when she first gave it, 
is a tangible symbol of this wealth. 
Thus far society's concern with vows has been seen in vows of 
betrothal, as in Much Ado, All's Well, and Measure of Measure, and in the 
sexual obligations in marriage, as in The Merchant of Venice and All's Well. 
There are other kinds of vows and involvements in Love's Labor's Lost. The 
vows of. study and seclusion originally taken by the men create a little 
society with its own set of laws. And the King of Navarre, in describing 
this society as his court, gives it a place as a society within, yet withdrawn 
from, a larger society: "Navarre shall be the wonder of the world; / Our 
court shall be a little academe" (I.L1243). We are scarcely aware of that 
implied larger society, but another one soon impinges on the small society 
of oath-bound men: the Princess of France, with attendant ladies, comes 
on a diplomatic mission that cannot be ignored, and the men must break 
their regimen to meet with them. But among courtiers such as these the 
vows are doomed anyway, as Berowne's criticisms show; perhaps he joins 
the group partly in hopes of seeing the others break sooner than he: " I 
believe, although I seem so loath, / I am the last that will last keep his 
oath"(I.i,159~160). 
Once the men see the ladies the race to forswear begins; all write poems 
to their ladies, and in their verses all except the King try, with little success, 
to excuse the fact that in vowing love they are breaking a prior vow. T h u s 
Berowne: 
If love make me forsworn, how shall I swear to love ? 
Ah, never faith could hold, if not to beauty vowed! 
Though to myself forsworn, to thee I'll faithful prove. . . . 
Study his bias leaves, and makes his book thine eyes. 
Where all those pleasures live that art would comprehend. 
If knowledge be the mark, to know thee shall suffice. . . . 
(IV.ii.105-107, 109411) 
Though he pleads the superior power of beauty as a cause of oath-breaking, 
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he does not really resolve the paradox of the first line; and his defense is 
undermined by the equivocal suggestions of "know" and "mark" (the 
latter a subject of bawdy puns in the previous scene). Nor is Longaville's 
sophistry acceptable: 
Vows for thee broke deserve not punishment. 
A woman I forswore, but I will prove. 
Thou being a goddess, I forswore not thee. (IV.iii.61-63) 
Still less, Dumaine's feeble excuse: 
But, alack, my hand is sworn 
Ne'er to pluck thee from thy thorn; 
Vow, alack, for youth unmeet, 
Youth so apt to pluck a sweet. (IV.iii.109-112) 
"Apt" is another ambiguous word. 3 7 Though the men give likely reasons 
for their change, these are not reassuring of future stability. The ladies 
have doubts too, as in the Princess' comment to the King, "Your oath once 
broke, you force not to forswear" (V.ii.440), By masking and exchanging 
their gifts from the men when the men come dressed as Muscovites, they 
mock the vows of men who need tokens to recognize the objects of their 
eternal faith. 
In all this mutability Berowne has a special problem in justifying himself, 
for besides breaking the vows that he shares with the other men, he has 
renounced his individual role as "love's whip," the mocker of others' folly 
in love: 
Nay, to be perjur'd, which is worst of all; 
And among three to love the worst of all, . . . 
It is a plague 
That Cupid will impose for my neglect 
Of his almighty dreadful little might. (III.i.194-195,201-203) 
He is like a Benedick who has half predicted his fate; the others have less 
self-awareness and less spirit of mockery, but their fate is the same. 
The "society" of the men disintegrates as they catch each other out in 
their oath-breaking poems, but it forms again with another common aim, 
their pursuit of love. Berowne is asked to give this new task a rationale— 
or as Longaville more frankly says, "Some tricks, some quillets, how to 
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cheat the devil" (IV.iii.284). His reply is a heightened version of the 
now-familiar argument: 
Let us once lose our oaths to find ourselves, 
Or else we lose ourselves to keep our oaths. 
It is religion to be thus forsworn: 
For charity itself fulfills the law, 
And who can sever love from charity ? (IV.iii.358-362) 
Although the results are more agreeable, this is in principle something like 
multiplying Proteus by four. The redefinition of selfhood is still too 
facile. The King's "religion" consists of crying "Saint Cupid!" and 
Berowne continues with bawdry: 
Advance your standards, and upon them, lords; 
Pell-mell, down with them! but be first advis'd, 
In conflict that you get the sun of them. (IV.iii.364-366) 
Even in a serious moment at the end of the play, Berowne's argument to 
the ladies is the same, without the bawdry: 
We to ourselves prove false, 
By being once false for ever to be true 
To those that make us both—fair ladies, you; 
And even that falsehood, in itself a sin, 
Thus purifies itself and turns to grace. (V.ii.772-776) 
Although Berowne has improved his tone of professed sincerity—he has 
had practice enough—he still can find no way around the basic difficulty. 
The resolution comes from outside in the French King's death, which 
forces an outcome, one way or another, by necessitating the ladies' departure 
and obliging them to go into mourning. Their discipline is a model 
for the men and a way for them to prove their faith by dedication that 
as such is selfless yet leads toward a reward for love. The two men 
whose specific tasks we learn are sent, in disparate directions, into alien 
experience: the King, to a hermitage, Berowne, to a hospital. The courtly 
constrictions of the play (which apply to the characters of the subplots too, 
since they are laughed at mainly from a courtly viewpoint, especially i n 
the Play of the Worthies) are suddenly widened and its artifices and absurd 
vows are subjected to a more severe criticism. If the King wants t o 
withdraw from the mundane, he will at least practice a kind of withdrawal 
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that, as society recognizes, has a severe regimen; if Berowne must dally 
with oaths even when the news of death has arrived, he will test this spirit 
against serious human concerns, among the sick and dying. Slender vows, 
which might be easily made and unmade, will be tried by confrontation with 
genuine adversity. The homely imagery of the seasonal songs is a foretaste. 
Social enforcement of marriage seems on the way in A Midsummer 
Night's Dream when Athenian law is invoked in an attempt to wed Hermia 
to Demetrius. But this is enforcement of a father's will contrary to lovers' 
free vows: Hermia and Lysander love each other, and Demetrius' first vow 
has been to Helena, who still loves him. Our sympathies work out the 
ideal solution in the return of Demetrius' stray desires, but neither the 
lovers themselves nor the officialdom of their society will bring this about. 
Only other powers, external even to the human world, can succeed. When 
they do, Demetrius, though baffled by his change of heart, accepts it as a 
return to his "natural taste" (IVi.174), and the others, even Hermia's 
father, must support the harmonious outcome. 
So it is generally with vows that have social consequences; the plays 
work toward a goal, easy or hard, of reconciling private wishes with public 
stability. Sometimes there is little strain: Demetrius' first claim to Hermia, 
even when supported by her father, is not a serious threat and arouses no 
ambivalence in us. The presence of a Bertram makes the problems less 
tractable: his right to see with his own eyes would be undeniable, at 
least now, if that were what he really wanted to do, and he goes out of 
control partly because he is denied that right. The harmony of inner 
passion and outer act (performance of vows) in a comic ending depends on 
the arts of the active heroine; Portia especially, among the ones discussed 
so far, acts out her promise of love and worth in her dealings with the outer 
world. 
4 
Things that Befall Preposterously 
For the moment A Midsummer Nighfs Dream and The Merchant of 
Venice offer handy examples of the way that forces outside the main 
characters—and indeed outside, or almost outside, the control of society— 
may for a time run counter to the main characters* wishes. The problem 
may thus at its worst appear to be greater even than hostility from society 
itself. In the Dream, society's obstacles to the lovers, as listed by Theseus, 
are a known quantity from the start; but Lysander assumes, apart from 
this, that "The course of true love never did run smooth," that even if social 
disparities do not exist between lovers there are the accidental threats of 
"War, death, or sickness' (Ii.134, 142). In running away the lovers expose 
themselves to the risks of the unknown, and they never do understand just 
what happens to themselves. Events may seem to happen by chance, though 
from time to time the men try to find rationales for their changes in love; 
finally the characters must give up the question in wonder. From our 
superior position, since we know about the fairies and their magic, the 
element of chance seems lesser and the role of purpose greater. We expect too 
that events are working toward the lovers* good. Finally, beyond the fairies 
themselves is another level on which purpose is possible, the artistic one 
where we look for the whole play to be intelligible and worthwhile. This 
level, which is usually left implicit but which becomes open in the Epilogue 
when Puck calls the actors "shadows" and the events of the play "visions," 
would exist even if all the events were presented as accidental. This play 
as a dramatic model, then, tends toward the explanation of apparently 
chance events, first through the purposes of hidden agents if possible, and 
then through any purpose, rationale, or meaning that appears in the whole 
sequence of experiences once the total pattern is known. Apparent mischance 
is to be explained away, if possible, by agents or results. 
In the Merchant, by contrast, the character of the agent who may 
obstruct people's wishes is only too well known. As a merchant Antonio 
necessarily takes a certain amount of risk; but he compounds his perils by 
applying to Shylock for help, thereby potentially giving Shylock power over 
him. Shylock personifies external risks: he is an outsider to Antonio's 
company and is barely tolerated in Venice; and he is also "external" in 
that he offers a solution to a money problem that Antonio cannot solve by 
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himself. He is a risk (though underestimated by Antonio) in that he is 
openly hostile and offers a bond with ominous terms. Since Bassanio is 
beholden to Antonio for the expenses of his wooing and Antonio in turn is 
(in a strictly financial sense) indebted to Shylock, the lovers have a moral 
obligation that makes their happiness dependent on coming to terms with 
Shylock. The external threat or cause of adversity is known; the problem 
is to avoid the danger—to reform Shylock, as Portia first tries, or to outwit 
and overpower him. 
These contrasted examples are the merest beginning of a survey of 
"external" forces (either characters or events—hostile, uncontrolled, alien) 
in some of Shakespeare's earlier comedies. These notions are broad enough 
to provide for a cornucopia, or perhaps a mare's nest; so they need to be used 
with care. 
In The Comedy of Errors the home comforts of Antipholus of Ephesus 
are diverted or disrupted by the arrival, unknown to him, of his twin from 
Syracuse. He has no suspicion of the truth but instead evolves amusing 
paranoid explanations. When he is shut out of his house at dinner time 
(or somewhat after, since his lateness has added to the problem) because 
his twin has got there first and is inside eating, he blames his wife and 
servants and wants to break open the door with a crowbar. Balthazar the 
merchant reasonably urges him to keep an open mind: 
Herein you war against your reputation, 
And draw within the compass of suspect 
Th' unviolated honor of your wife. 
Once this—your long experience of her wisdom, 
Her sober virtue, years, and modesty, 
Plead on her part some cause to you unknown. . . . (IILL86-91) 
He ought to withhold judgment and seek out unforeseen causes; if he 
could have done this he might have found the cause. But he sets out for 
vengeance instead. Worse troubles follow when Iiis twin intercepts a gold 
chain: the Ephesian Antipholus, unable to pay at the moment and doubtful 
that the chain has been made, is arrested for debt, and the Courtesan to 
whom he had promised the chain seeks revenge by stirring up his wife to 
believe him mad. His wife's extreme response to this story, especially her 
use of an exorcist, in turn drives him to frenzy. The effect of unknown 
outside causes on his resistant and oversensitive mind is to magnify his 
faults by depriving him of things that he takes for granted as part of 
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himself. The wife too, being jealous to start with, is made worse by finding 
her supposed husband first apparently strange and distant (the twin) and 
then wildly accusing (her own husband). Although the most important 
outsider, the wandering twin Antipholus, might be expected to be more 
receptive to unexplained experience (especially the generally good fortune he 
meets) because he himself is on a search, he is so filled with Ephesus' 
reputation for magic and witchcraft that he becomes more and more wary 
of the gifts (and also fails to suspect his twin's presence). The events 
that result from the visitors' arrival increase the characters* foibles; we 
laugh at the further confusion that punishes the foibles and at the mistaken 
explanations of characters who do not detect an external yet simple cause 
of disorder. The chance events of the play are unerringly accurate in 
their revelation of laughable flaws of character. 
In The Taming of the Shrew, however much we may think of Petruchio 
as being at the center of the play, to the Paduans he is an outsider (a welcome 
one at first), and it is worth considering him so and looking at the 
results. He is also outside the norms of Italianate Renaissance comedy as 
represented by the Bianca plot, based on the Supposes, adapted by Gascoigne 
from Ariosto. While Petruchio is conducting his "taming-school," Bianca 
is learning lessons of a very different sort, for example in how to receive 
flattery and surreptitious wooing from suitors disguised as a schoolmaster 
and a musician. She had already displayed her natural wiles in playing the 
obedient daughter and making a spiteful contrast to her spirited sister and 
in the wager at the end of the play she proves that the aim of her trickery 
is to let her rule herself in everything.8 8 But this description of the Bianca 
plot involves other norms; in itself, if it were to set its own (the usual 
Italianate Renaissance) standards, it would present the admirable scheme 
of a young lover and his clever servant to win Bianca despite the riches 
of an elderly rival suitor—in the lover's words, naming his rival as an 
Italian comic character, "that we might beguile the old pantaloon'* 
(IILi36-37). T o this aim thus conceived Petruchio is merely an accessory: 
he removes an obstacle to marriage with Bianca by satisfying her father's 
Hobson's-choicc demand that Katherina be wedded first. If the Bianca 
plot were the main one, Petruchio might have been fabricated in the same 
way that the tricksters produced an impostor father as the suitor to Bianca. 
But in all ways there is more honesty and frankness about Petruchio as he 
is, and as he chooses and wins a wife, than about Bianca and her appendages. 
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And his surprising descriptions and treatment of Katherina, not to mention 
his success in getting her to play his game, as discussed in the first chapter, 
all unsettle the smug values of the Paduans. The outsider holds up for 
criticism the world he enters, a world that happens to be modeled on a 
very definite notion of comic drama. Much occurs, especially to Kate, that 
is unexpected, but little if anything that is chance; Petruchio manages events 
so that he can call ordinary incidents misfortune. He has his own purposes, 
of course: he upsets Kate's self-conceptions (as chance events in Errors 
upset characters' self-conceptions) to bring out her better self. Both of 
them, returning as outsiders, will be subtle critics of Padua. 
Thus far The Comedy of Errors approximates the pattern of A Mid-
summer Night's Dream except through purely chance actions that never-
theless have a rationale. And The Taming of the Shrew shows a benevolent 
and purposeful variant of the methods that chance had used in the other 
play. Still other situations apply in other plays. The Two Gentlemen of 
Verona (like The Shrew, though with a different model) takes a standard 
narrative and dramatic pattern, the romantic escapade, and alters it: what 
might be chance misfortunes in lovers' encounters with the perilous outer 
world (if they occurred in Heliodorus or Sidney), the banishment of 
Valentine or the attempted rape of Silvia, owe their being instead to the 
"internal" villainy of Proteus, which can be reformed. In Love's Labor's 
Lost the avowed intentions of the men are twice challenged and tested by 
visitors who represent major human concerns that would have been denied 
by the men's attempted seclusion: the ladies (love) and Marcade (death). 
The latter test of course is whether love can survive the stress of life as 
symbolized by mourning and penance. 
A Midsummer Night's Dream, as described before, complicates and 
surpasses what The Comedy of Errors had begun. The fairies' magic, an 
unknown external force, disrupts the lovers' attachments yet ends by 
resolving a problem they could not work out for themselves. But the 
disorderly complex of events, like the chance of Errors, calls attention to 
absurdities in the lovers and their love. Thus the first misapplication o£ 
magic results from a peculiarity of mortal love that Puck does not know. 
He thinks that the separation of Lysander and Hermia in sleep is a sign 
of discord, the problem he had been sent to correct: "Pretty soul, she 
durst not lie / Near this lack-love, this kill-courtesy" (II.ii.76-77). In fact 
the two are in love and Hermia has kept Lysander off "in humane modesty" 
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(II.ii.57); so Puck gives Lysander the love-juice by mistake. No harm 
would have been done i£ the sleeping lovers had been let alone, but 
chance sends a discordant couple their way. It is an "unnatural" situation, 
Helena's pursuing Demetrius for love—as she says, referring to women, 
"We should be woo'd, and were not made to woo" (II.i.242)—and it is a 
fearsome one for her because she is left behind, alone in the dark wood. 
So in the disordered state that her love has got her into, she wakes Lysander 
and unknowingly creates more disorder by securing his affections magically. 
The next complication is a start toward correcting this error, but the 
process of correction will bring for a time more complication, to the delight 
of the audience and Puck, for whom "those things do best please me / That 
befall prepost'rously" (III.ii.120-121). Demetrius is to be charmed into love 
for Helena, as first planned; but for a while he will be a rival with Lysander. 
Besides this conflict there is Helena's reaction to suddenly having two 
admirers instead of none as at first, that everyone has conspired to mock 
her. Recalling to Hermia their schoolgirl friendship, she makes a sweet 
and scornful appeal, a natural prelude to the eye-clawing that soon follows. 
And Hermia herself, having trusted (perhaps smugly) in the beauty that 
had procured her the man she wanted, is at a loss over the failure of her 
powers: "Am not I Hermia? Are you not Lysander? / I am as fair now as 
I was erewhile" (IIIii.273-274). She manages to find an insult to her 
appearance in something Helena says, and the fight is on. The magic is 
an occasion for the follies of love to bring the characters to blows. But after 
we and Puck have had this fun with them, they will be put straight by 
magic and rewarded with lasting love (whose follies, if any, may be less 
obvious). 
The characters try harder than those in Errors to make sense of their 
mishaps (in Errors the magic of Ephesus was known to foreigners, and 
even the residents had an exorcist around; Athens should be the seat of 
reason). Most laughable is the attempt to justify change in love by reason, 
which might not apply evfen if no magic were involved. Thus Lysander, 
changing his loyalty from Hermia to Helena: 
The will of man is by his reason sway'd; 
And reason says you are the worthier maid. 
Things growing are not ripe until their season, 
So I, being young, till now ripe not to reason. . . . (II.ii.115-118) 
The fallibility of such judgments has already been suggested in Helena's 
50 The God of Arts 
comment on the folly of her and others' love, "Things base and vile, holding 
no quantity, / Love can transpose to form and dignity" (I.i.232-233), which 
is enacted in Titania's attempt to find grace and beauty in the metamorphosed 
Bottom; as Bottom says, "reason and love keep little company together 
now-a-days" (IILi.143-144). 
Equally absurd but more engaging to us is Demetrius' explanation of 
his loss of interest in Hermia: "My heart to her but as guest-wise sojourn'd, 
/ And now to Helen is it home return'd, / There to remain" (IILii.171-173). 
What he says is true to our hope and trust in a happy ending, and our 
sympathy for his first love, Helena, is something like our feeling for Julia, 
the first love of Proteus. Oberon and Puck too make a distinction: this 
is the one spell that will not be removed. As external agents controlling 
human concerns they show a constant purpose, to realign the lovers properly 
—though they do not mind a bit of mischief along the way. The uniting and 
reconciling that emerges by chance in The Comedy of Errors (a goal of the 
play as art, though achieved by what are called chance events) is here con-
sciously willed by characters in the play (who in the Epilogue, along with the 
other characters, fade into "shadows," the materials of art). 
In The Merchant of Venice, as suggested before, Shylock is the main 
embodiment of external peril. Such danger has not been prominent in 
earlier plays. In The Comedy of Errors the characters exaggerate and 
misconstrue most of their troubles (and the threat to Aegeon's life, 
though severe in his mind, is not so in ours once we know he has a son 
well established in Ephesus), and an unexpected good is on the way. The 
greatest danger in The Two Gentlemen of Verona is momentary and is 
not external but comes from Proteus, whose past involvements with the 
other characters give hope of reform. Lesser mishaps in The Taming of 
the Shrew and A Midsummer Night's Dream are controlled for good 
purposes, and the events in Love's Labor's Lost that happen to act as tests 
(but not serious threats) may well lead to happiness. The risk that Shylock 
presents is clear early, and, once we know that Portia's wealth will not 
buy him off, there is no immediate and obvious hope for a solution. 
Antonio's agreement to put himself in Shylock's power functions as a 
rash promise, for he minimizes the signs of danger. Indeed he invites the 
hostility in Shylock's actions (though it existed already, and though 
Shylock rather than Antonio would be morally accountable): 
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I£ thou wilt lend this money, lend it not 
As to thy friends, for when did friendship take 
A breed for barren metal of his friend ? 
But lend it rather to thine enemy, 
Who if he break, thou mayst with better face 
Exact the penalty. (I.iii.132-137) 
They had been talking about whether the taking of interest was justified. 
Now Antonio severs the notions of interest and friendship, and he finds a 
quite different relation involved in commercial lending: the penalty for 
nonpayment of a debt (which is here made distinct from the charging of 
interest) 3 9 suits well with the dealings between enemies. Thus Antonio 
turns Shylock's attention from interest to penalties for forfeiture, and 
he puts his emphasis on hostility. At once, as if agreeing with this argument, 
Shylock offers, professedly from friendship, to forgo interest on the loan; 
but he suggests a forfeiture penalty of flesh. He is not pursuing a financial 
advantage—as he says, "A pound of man's flesh taken from a man / Is not 
so estimable, profitable neither, / As flesh of muttons, beefs, or goats" 
(I.iii.165-167)—but rather expressing a hatred that he feels and that Antonio 
has encouraged him to indulge. Yet he does so under cover of a "merry 
sport," indeed self-parody: if Antonio thinks that Shylock's way of life in 
effect feeds on his fellow human beings, Shylock will jokingly put that 
idea in the bond—and then make it come true. 4 0 
Since Shylock's loan finances Bassanio's wooing, love becomes in a 
sense dependent on hatred. It is morally natural, then, if not perhaps 
legally orthodox, for Portia, disguised as a judge, to try to convert Shylock's 
hatred into mercy. 4 1 She tests him again for signs of mercy in suggesting 
that he provide a surgeon to stop the blood (IV.i.257-258); he insists on 
the obligations of the bond alone, and so prepares for her strict enforcement 
of the bond, which does not allow the shedding of blood at all. When 
Shylock abandons his forfeit she introduces a new legal issue and a new 
moral question: 
It is enacted in the laws of Venice, 
If it be proved against an alien, 
That by direct or indirect attempts 
He seek the life of any citizen, 
The party 'gainst the which he doth contrive 
Shall seize one half his goods; the other half 
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Comes to the privy coffer of the state, 
And the offender's life lies in the mercy 
Of the Duke only . . . . (IV1348-356) 
Until now Portia had merely forestalled execution of the bond on 
technicalities (though they involved choice or refusal of mercy). When she 
invokes this law (with results that have seemed merely vengeful to some 
critics) she addresses for the first time the actual intent of the bond: to 
take Antonio's life in hatred. Although the forced religious conversion 
cannot be palatable today, the dickering over Shylock's possessions is not 
mere vengeance but an effort to respond legally to his hostile intentions, 
and the conversion itself seems to be an attempt to neutralize the hostility. 
All of this is second-best, of course: the preferred solution for everyone 
would have been for Shylock to volunteer mercy and reform himself. But 
Shakespeare is being realistic enough to show that this does not always 
happen, and to the extent that coercion must be substituted for free will, 
there is a sharp edge to the "happy" solution. Shylock is an alien, an 
external force that has tried to do harm (hence he falls under this law), 
and if he could he would remain the same. If he cannot be allowed to stay 
as he was, the reason must be for the protection of Venice and Venetians; 
meanwhile we can think without misgivings of the safety of these lovers 
and their friends. The celebration by Lorenzo and Jessica of ordered 
beauty in Belmont (V.L1-8S) returns us to the ideal in which all tones 
contribute to harmony. 
In Much Ado about Nothing Don John is another treacherous outsider. 
Though newly accepted by his brother, he holds out against true recon-
ciliation, and he keeps physically aloof from the innocent characters until 
he sees chances for mischief. In his major trickery he tries to minimize his 
known malice and let external evidence, supposed facts that an observer 
may see, speak for themselves: 
You may think I love you not; let that appear hereafter, and aim 
better at me by that I now will manifest. . . . If you will follow me, 
I will show you enough, and when you have seen more, and heard 
more, proceed accordingly. (III JL95-97,120-122) 
Of course he wants to present the tableau of Hero's disloyalty, arranged 
by him and his accomplices, as unpleasant but unassailable visible proof, 
an intrusion of truth upon Claudio's idealism. The notion of an intruding 
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fact is basic in the play: the pattern of witnessing and overhearing 
throughout the events of the play makes us think about the ways that we 
know about the external (perceived) world and how we can decide whether 
to trust what we perceive. 4 2 This is a commonplace of criticism for this 
play, but some of the "external" factors in other plays suggest that the same 
questions might apply more widely. Antipholus of Ephesus should open 
his mind to other causes of events; Kate decides to alter her perceptions to 
fit Petruchio's for game's sake; the courtiers who have vowed to study 
should leave the King of Navarre's park and encounter the world; the 
lovers in the Athenian wood, affected perforce by magic, finally let a sense 
of wonder overspread their impressions of the mad night. These examples 
urge a welcoming reccptiveness to new experience, though one might want 
to qualify it when villains are about. But in Much Ado ironies undermine 
the urges to perceive: Claudio's vulnerability to Don John's show does him 
no good, indeed makes him unable to perceive rightly Hero's innocent 
reaction to his charges; Benedick and Beatrice perceive Hero well but at 
first see each other ill, and Benedick's first attempt at a loving perception 
is mistaken. Perception of what most needs to be known, the villains' 
villainy, is given to dolts who mistake its nature. Still the movement of 
the whole play prompts us toward greater awareness of external appearances 
and greater judgment in sifting them. For all that outside forces may upset, 
mock, or threaten, we are to be receptive. 
These matters certainly apply to As You U\e It. But since "externals" 
in all senses are bound up in that play with a place, Arden, the question is 
best postponed a chapter. In Twelfth Night even more than in The Comedy 
of Errors, the main visitors are open to new experience, however puzzling, 
and in turn they open up the experience of the settled Illyrians. Sebastian 
announces, "my determinate voyage is mere extravagancy" (II.i.11-12), and 
goes to look at the town; Viola, though attracted to Olivia's seclusion, 
accepts an active life with only a disguise for privacy. Both find and welcome 
love. Viola is ready to allow whatever result time will work out—"O time, 
thou must untangle this, not I " (IIii.40)—and Sebastian is ecstatic about his 
unexplained good fortune: 
This is the air, that is the glorious sun, 
This pearl she gave me, I do feel't and see't, 
And though 'tis wonder that enwraps me thus, 
Yet 'tis not madness. ( IViiLl-4) 
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On the other side, Olivia is stagnating in a state of mournful seclusion and 
the Duke in a self-indulgent pose of hopeless love; but the visiting twins 
free both of them. Though it is Viola who evokes the figure of "Patience 
on a monument" (II.iv.114), her involvement makes her more complex 
than a smiling statue. 
Quick descriptions of other plays may give some notion of the variety 
of externals ahead. The Merry Wives of Windsor treats Falstaff as an 
intruder (robber and lecher) to be expelled, whether by laundresses or 
fairies. In All's Well Bertram would risk his family name with an outsider, 
Diana, but Helena, who is very much at the center of things, retrieves him 
and cancels the risk. In Measure for Measure the whole point is that the 
problems are internal to Vienna and to the individual characters. In the 
romances the role of external forces and experiences is too great to be 
summarized, or by now to need summary; suffice that it is there. 4 3 Among 
these plays it might be best to leave The Merry Wives for now as an 
anomaly, to consider that the "dark comedies" or "problem plays" return 
us to the pattern of The Two Gentlemen where (appearances notwithstand-
ing) evil is internal to someone who must and can be reformed, and to think 
of the romances in the opposite way, as showing more than ever a value 
in accepting the most challenging and perplexing external events as 
somehow leading to a restoration of good. 
The main differences among these plays relate to distinctions among 
external agents and between moral purposes; differences in structure and 
attitude follow from these. In The Comedy of Errors and Love's Labor's 
Lost external influences come initially by chance (though the ladies 
soon adjust to the absurd situation they meet, and they set about controlling 
events except for a few moments near the end) ; the events produce mockery, 
which the victims should welcome and endure, and beyond the mockery 
is a reward. In The Taming of the Shrew and A Midsummer Night's 
Dream "external" characters control apparent misfortunes and upsets for 
benevolent purposes; again the values of mockery and receptiveness are 
the same, and the manipulated characters should be open to change. In other 
plays there is an agent seeking to bring about misfortune. Although he may 
be "internal" to the action—central to a society, or at least marriageable 
to the heroine or another important lady—as Proteus, Bertram, and Angelo 
are, yet he may try to cause external misfortune (Proteus) or dally with 
external risks (Bertram). For structure and attitude the important points 
Things that Befall Preposterously 55 
are that such characters need to be reformed, and can be if someone else 
sifts truth from appearance and recognizes better potential in them. Still 
other plays deal with malicious characters who are "external" as outcasts. 
These are the hardest to deal with—examples are Shylock and Don John— 
and reform seems unlikely. Here the need to perceive truth is greater than 
ever, and to handle a Shylock at least, one also needs a bit of power. On 
the outer edge of the "external," then, comic characters do not stand 
alone but must ally themselves with, or win over to their own purposes 
and values, the authority of society. With such powerful forces needed to 
impose a comic ending, the emotional stakes are high: comedy may become 
a transaction between victor and vanquished, and the vanquished may end 
as a scapegoat. 
5 
The Uses of Adversity 
The power of events over comic characters is heightened when the 
characters are banished or put to flight; these are not the worst of evils, 
of course, and in comedy they are temporary, but they control a character's 
total experience as other single events may not. Forced change of place 
sometimes has a symbolic function too: a new place may represent a change 
of fortune, new experience, new ways of looking at oneself—indeed an 
extension of selfhood. Or, especially if an exiled character does not settle 
but continues to travel, his movement may suggest rootlessness and self-
alienation. In any case the fugitive must at last come home, or be ready 
to come home, to our and his starting point. 
The most famous place of exile is perhaps the Forest of Arden in As You 
Like It. Perceptive comments have been made about this and other wood-
lands or wilds in various plays as a "green world" which transforms and 
renews the characters who flee there. 4 4 The basis in this play would be 
the exiled Duke's enraptured moralizing: 
Hath not old custom made this life more sweet 
Than that of painted pomp? Are not these woods 
More free from peril than the envious court? 
Here feel we not the penalty of Adam, 
The seasons' difference, as the icy fang 
And churlish chiding of the winter's wind, 
Which when it bites and blows upon my body 
Even till I shrink with cold, I smile and say, 
"This is no flattery: these are counsellors 
That feelingly persuade me what I am." 
Sweet are the uses of adversity, 
Which like the toad, ugly and venomous, 
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head; 
And this our life, exempt from public haunt, 
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, 
Sermons in stones, and good in every thing. (HJ . 2 -17) 
We must not sentimentalize here, or think that the Duke is sentimentaliz-
ing, in ways that the rest of the play will not support. A few bits of stage 
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greenery will not suffice; the essential value of this experience is in the 
adversity, the poisonous toad. The icy winds are real—and, along with 
man's ingratitude, pervade the songs in the play almost till the e n d -
though they are not felt. Despite the lessons he has learned there, the Duke 
does not claim that Arden is idyllic; others could easily remind him that 
it is not. 
Indeed for all that the Duke prefers Arden to his court in its moral 
nature, he finds a moral injustice in his being there and supporting his 
life off the forest: 
Come, shall we go and kill us venison? 
And yet it irks me the poor dappled fools, 
Being native burghers of this desert city, 
Should in their own confines with forked heads 
Have their round haunches gor'd. (II.i.21-25) 
One of his lords agrees by reporting the moralizings of Jaques about a 
wounded stag as it wept into a stream, 
Left and abandoned of his velvet friends: 
" 'Tis right," quoth he, "thus misery doth part 
The flux of company." Anon a careless herd, 
Full of the pasture, jumps along by him 
And never stays to greet him. "Ay," quoth Jaques, 
"Sweep on, you fat and greasy citizens, 
'Tis just the fashion. Wherefore do you look 
Upon that poor and broken bankrupt there?" 
Thus most invectively he pierceth through 
The body of the country, city, court, 
Yea, and of this our life, swearing that we 
Are mere usurpers, tyrants, and what's worse, 
T o fright the animals and to kill them up 
In their assign'd and native dwelling-place. (II.i.50-63) 
There is too much grief of this sort in the world, too much weeping into a 
stream, and at the end Jaques blames the courtiers for adding to the 
misery by plundering the natural world. Grief isolates the stag, as, to 
reverse the connection, separation from their fellow men is a cause of 
unhappiness (though overcome) for the Duke and his men. Divisions 
among men are basic causes of misfortune in the play, though nobody 
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in Arden is to blame: both the Duke and Orlando are victims of brothers 
who have turned against them. The whole scene and the moral comment 
on it portrays a world of injustice and separation of man from man and 
of man from his surroundings. Some of this may fit a tradition of 
complaint against hunting; 4 5 and there is besides an emblem by Barthelemy 
Aneau that explains the stag's tears as a lament that his friend, man, has 
violated their love. 4 6 Whatever good may have come to the Duke and his 
friends while in Arden, their presence is a symptom and a compounding 
of the disorder in the play, an expression of unnatural divisions and 
breaking of faith. 
The value that the Duke finds in exile is parodied even to distortion 
by Jaques' melancholy posturing. Jaques has been not only an involuntary 
exile as now, but before that a traveller who willingly alienated himself 
from every place to perfect his melancholy. He calls his melancholy "the 
sundry contemplation of my travels, in which my often rumination wraps 
me in a most humorous sadness," and he assents to Rosalind's speculation, 
"I fear you have sold your own lands to see other men's; then to have 
seen much, and to have nothing, is to have rich eyes and poor hands" 
(IV.i.17-25). He is restless in his mockery and negation of values; if 
the Duke finds in Arden a critique of courtly life, Jaques will not stop 
there but must find faults in Arden as well as the court, and indeed 
everywhere. When Orlando enters tired and hungry, the Duke senses 
real misery beyond the adversity he has been enjoying and says, 
This wide and universal theatre 
Presents more woeful pageants than the scene 
Wherein we play in. (II.vii.137-139) 
Jaques is too ready to generalize that "All the world's a stage" and find 
woe in all of human life at every age: the infant's mewling, the schoolboy's 
whining, the lover's sighing, the soldier's jealousy, anger, and futility, the 
justice's hypocrisy, and then the decline in the senile man (II.vii.139-166). 
Not only is his vignette of old age belied by the arrival of Adam, as many 
critics have said; the whole speech trifles with the misfortune of Orlando 
and Adam by generalizing as if they suffered no more than the necessary 
lot of mankind. In travel and experience Jaques has compiled instances 
to support his melancholy, but he has not distinguished causes or degrees 
of unhappiness, and he has not learned compassion. He has passed through 
the world as an alienated observer. 
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Neither has he learned, as the Duke has, that misfortunes can "feelingly 
persuade me what I am" ( H i l l ) . He had laughed at Touchstone's 
apparently mocking sermon on the fact that as time passes "we ripe 
and ripe" and "rot and rot" (II.vii.20-34)—-which is in effect a parody 
in advance of his own Seven Ages speech—and he craves the universal 
license to mock that is granted a fool. 
Invest me in my motley; give me leave 
To speak my mind, and I will through and through 
Cleanse the foul body of th' infected world, 
If they will patiently receive my medicine. (ILvii.58-61) 
But he lacks the self-knowledge to receive this purification himself before 
trying it on others. As the Duke says, he would be doing 
Most mischievous foul sin, in chiding sin: 
For thou thyself hast been a libertine, 
As sensual as the brutish sting itself, 
And all th' embossed sores, and headed evils, 
That thou with license of free foot hast caught, 
Wouldst thou disgorge into the general world. (II.vii.64-69) 
In the metaphor of disease, since he has not cured himself he will only 
spread the contagion. His apparent detachment from every folly he 
describes is not disaffection or conquest of passion but cynicism; his 
moral nihilism might really encourage the vices he seemed to vilify. In 
his lack of self-knowledge and his unwillingness to use the scourge on 
himself that he would apply to others, he is a foil to Rosalind; she is 
perfect in self-knowledge, and as she whips Orlando's affectations in 
love she is mocking herself. 
Rosalind's conduct is our chief practical sign of the positive renewal 
that can take place in Arden. Even before her exile she had called 
herself "one out of suits with Fortune" ( I i i 2 4 6 ) ; by the time she and 
Orlando arrive separately in Arden their fortunes arc low and their love 
too seems hopeless, for neither knows the other is there. Orlando succumbs 
to unhappiness and through it misses the possibilities of his new home; 
he decides that the boughs above him are "melancholy" and that Arden is 
a place to "Lose and neglect the creeping hours of time" (H.vii.111-112). 
In love too he falls into dismay and writes melancholy verses that travesty 
other complaints in Arden: 
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Some, how brief the life of man 
Runs his erring pilgrimage, 
That the stretching of a span 
Buckles in his sum of age; 
Some, of violated vows 
'Twixt the souls of friend and friend. . . . (III.ii.129-134) 
This catalogue of woes suggests that Orlando has less control than others 
over his griefs and disillusionments; and strictly as love poems they are 
laughable even to Rosalind. Orlando would surrender to the purely 
negative side of his surroundings, the adversity of his being there, separated 
(as far as he knows) from what he values. But in Rosalind's disguised 
presence there is more to value than he expects; and before she lets him 
know that she herself is there, she strengthens his endurance of separation. 
Her powers of renewal come mainly from her disguise; and in her use 
of it she overcomes her own problems of adversity in a way that befits 
the Duke's concept of lessons to be learned in Arden. Disguise is first 
another severing from previous self-definition, like the banishment itself. 
Rosalind herself is plucky enough about a false identity in calling herself 
Ganymede, but her companion Celia shows the depressing possibility in 
her name of Alicna (more significant than the source's Alinda). Yet in 
disguise Rosalind is able, as she might not be in her own person, to mock and 
temper Orlando's adulation of her into a love that she can trust. The keynote 
for this action is her famous declaration that 
Love is merely a madness, and I tell you, deserves as well a dark 
house and a whip as madmen do; and the reason why they are not so 
punish'd and cur'd is, that the lunacy is so ordinary that the whippers 
are in love too. (HIii.40tMM). 
She glances at her own dual role, for as the whipper who mocks love she 
herself is in love; and the whip must fall on her as on Orlando. In her 
double identity she holds together contrary attitudes: Celia charges that 
in her mockery "You have simply misus'd our sex in your love-prate," yet 
Rosalind answers, "O coz, coz, coz, my pretty little coz, that thou didst know 
how many fathom deep I am in love!" (IV.i.201-207) What began in 
adversity as self-alienation becomes redefinition in a more complex unity; 
ironic doubts of seriousness and fidelity in lovers strengthen her commitment 
just as the icy winds of Arden bring the Duke self-knowledge and augment 
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his appreciation o£ his woodland life. And Rosalind is both learning for 
herself and teaching Orlando, so that she is building a greater unity for 
both and reinforcing the values to which she commits herself. 
In this pattern, then, adversity is part of a larger movement, is included 
as self-testing (though not at first voluntary) within self-affirmation; it 
is not a pleasure or value in itself. So when the chance comes, the Duke 
and his courtiers, and the ladies, must return to court. But for Jaques, who 
enjoyed adversity itself or found his pleasure in its opportunities for 
mockery, and whose mockery never turned in on his own faults, another 
direction is better. He had been alienated from Arden itself, had sought a 
kind of exile-within-exile. A truer goal for him, that adds self-knowledge 
yet does not require any greater involvement with outer life (even the 
outer life of Arden), would be the retirement of the religious hermit. 
This is what Jaques seeks. And for the first time, without the need to 
define his alienation by mockery, he praises others generously in leaving 
them (Viv.186-190). 
Though it is no match for Arden and has no literal green about it, 
the setting of Florence for the middle scenes of All's Well that Ends Well 
has a surprisingly restorative function—yet it partakes also of the notion 
of external perils, or at least hostilities. First, the restorative. The explanation 
of the war by the Duke of Florence moves a French Lord to some 
remarkable comments. Of a war about which we learn nothing more 
except the fiasco of the drum and a trick played on Parolles, he says, 
Holy seems the quarrel 
Upon your Grace's part; black and fearful 
On the opposer. (III.i.4-6) 
And he expresses the likelihood of more French volunteers by asserting, 
I am sure the younger of our nature, 
That surfeit on their ease, will day by day 
Come here for physic. (III.i.17-19) 
Somehow, we must understand, there is holiness and healing here. Bertram, 
as a self-proclaimed fugitive from his marriage, his family home, and his 
court, comes here with no such noble objectives; but he needs to gain by 
whatever cure might be available. 
Indeed Bertram knows that he brings a sickness with him. He urges 
Diana, 
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Stand no more off, 
But give thyself unto my sick desires, 
Who then recovers. (IV.ii.34-36). 
What he intends with Diana will entail still more impairment of his 
moral health; he can be cured only by Helena, the healer of the King. 
In leaving France he had tried to alienate himself from all his past 
connections (except the worst, with Parolles) and seek experience external 
to his past life. But Helena will not allow him to range outside marriage 
or repudiate her; she makes her own arrangements to hold him. She is 
bolder in following her man than the earlier heroines; no previous heroine-
in-disguise had set out from the first to go where she already knew she 
was not wanted. She willingly confronts possible external difficulties and 
the known difficulty that Bertram bears in himself. She keeps him from 
harming himself and her by converting his instability to a firmer connection 
with her; thus she restores his true selfhood in his commitments at home. 
Yet there is a way in which his planned outside adventure is a self-enhance-
ment for him, for she proves to him, when the truth is known, that there 
is something at home after all that he would really want. 
In Pericles almost everything happens in exile, and Tyre is never 
vividly made into home; Pericles wanders through a world that, for all 
he himself knows at first, might be moral anarchy. Though we may know 
better from Gower's comments, he would think the chance of renewal 
slender. His need for flight begins in the danger he incurs at the court of 
Antiochus. His attempt to win a wife by solving a riddle recalls Bassanio's 
choice among caskets to win Portia; but all is perverted from that much 
neater situation.47 The stakes are much larger, as we know from the 
display of former suitors' heads on Antiochus' gate. Bassanio risked a 
life of bachelorhood if he chose wrongly; Pericles would forfeit life if he 
failed, and he endangers his life when he succeeds by discovering the incest 
hinted in the riddle. The riddle, unlike the choice of caskets, is not a 
genuine test for a suitor but a threat against all suitors. In showing that 
he can see through appearances in the riddle Pericles only learns that the 
reward itself is illusory. And unlike Bassanio, who had Antonio to assume 
that risk and Portia to cancel it, he himself must accept the threat of death. 
His remedy is to flee Antiochus and expose himself to other external perils. 
After he decides that Tyre is unsafe, his first port of call is Tharsus, 
which is ravaged by famine. Such coherence as there is in his experience 
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thus far would lead toward cynicism. In Antiochus' court willful evil was 
expressed in the riddle through a metaphor of cannibalism: "I am no 
viper, yet I feed / On mother's flesh which did me breed" (I.i.64-65). But 
in Tharsus human misery, caused by events outside human control, threatens 
to lead to actual cannibalism: mothers are ready to eat their children 
(I.iv.42-44). Pericles is able to do good by dispensing grain, but his 
success will be qualified by hidden danger, for he will later put more 
trust than he should in Dionyza, the Governor's wife. 
So little can he judge whether external events are bringing him good 
or evil, that he thinks the storm at sea is the work of the "angry stars of 
heaven" (II.i.1) when it washes him up at Pentapolis, where he will find a 
wife; it even, as if at his wish (II.i.111412), brings ashore his father's 
armor so that he can appear at the tourney in honor of his future love. 
There seem to be the beginnings of regeneration here; but the gain 
demands work, for Pericles must prove himself in arms, dancing, and 
musicianship; and he must endure a test in the father's pretended anger, an 
apparent echo of the threat from Antiochus. Pericles even thinks his 
life in danger again (II.v.44); but he keeps his integrity bravely and is 
rewarded. 
When divine vengeance sends down a fire to consume Antiochus and 
his daughter, Pericles is free to return to Tyre. If he had got there without 
another storm, the play would have described a neat cycle from the shock 
and disillusionment of discovering a false love to the joy of winning a true 
one. Of course the sources of the play do not suggest such a simple pattern, 
but that is the point: for all the simple, archaic qualities of this story, it 
could have appeared to Shakespeare (if he was involved in choosing the 
story and planning the early part of the play) as a complication beyond 
the exile-and-return format of As You Li\e It. He would be subjecting 
Pericles to a harder test of fortune than earlier characters had met. 
Pericles' earlier troubles had had a specific cause, the corruption in 
Antiochus and his consequent need to flee. They were products of a 
distincdy human corruption, not of a malevolent universe. Events turned to 
good after all, for the sea led him to his bride and in restoring his armor 
helped him win her. Now he seems to be at the mercy of whatever powers 
caused the storm and let his wife appear to be dead and be cast in the sea. 
This twist of fortune is more vividly present than the shipwreck and 
separation mentioned in The Comedy of Errors, which had taken place long 
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before the events of the play. Its woe persists longer than Viola's sense of 
loss in Tu/elfth Night, since she had to busy herself in Illyria. And it does 
not have the obvious sense of plan that underlies the feigned deaths 
(directed by human agents) in Much Ado about Nothing and All's Well 
that Ends Weih Any planning here must be supernatural and might be 
perverse. As Pericles says, Job-like, 
Oyou gods! 
Why do you make us love your goodly gifts 
And snatch them straight away? (III.i.22-24) 
When Pericles is told that his daughter Marina is dead (as she would 
be if Dionyza's plan had held), he seems to have lost all. He mistakes 
human evil for a general malevolence of fortune; his apathy and despair 
complete, he begins a mournful wandering at sea. This is an ultimate 
expression of a progressive self-alienation brought about by apparent losses: 
of his kingship (in that he dares not stay home), his wife, his daughter. 
In misfortune he gives up his self-defining roles: his kingship to a vice-
gerent, his daughter to foster parents. Now in total loss he abandons even 
the will to live and, like Lear wandering on the heath, puts himself at the 
mercy of external events, without any actual trust that there is a power 
guiding them. Yet for once there is something to trust about events, for 
they bring him within reach of Marina and recovery. 
The burden of restoring losses falls most on Marina. She is given the 
trappings of this role as it is conceived in the last plays—a symbolic name, 
flowers, devotion to chastity—and she announces the apparent meaning of 
tempests as exiling, alienating forces: "This world to me is a lasting storm, 
/ Whirring me from my friends" (IV.i.19-20). Yet despite continual 
misfortune she has the power to transcend her surroundings and overcome 
evil. Pericles was able only to flee evil and later to be duped by it in 
Dionyza; Marina protects herself in the brothel, reforms the patrons, and 
secures her own escape. She is an active force for good as her father was 
not, and she uses her own natural powers without revealing her birth (as if 
she were disguised). Her story is, as her father's had been for a while, a 
tale of patience victorious over erotic corruption. 
Marina must draw her father out of himself entirely by her own 
powers of persuasion; he makes no effort himself, so far is he estranged 
from experience. She follows the urging of an unknown power that 
advises her, "Go not till he speak" (V.i.96). As soon as she has sung, he 
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does speak, as he begins to put together her report o£ high birth and 
misfortune with her physical likeness to his wife. The way he does this, 
as he goes over her words, is a response to her assertion that he and she 
have the same kind of parentage and history: "My fortunes—parentage-
good parentage— /-To equal mine—was it not thus? What say you?" 
(lines 97-98) At this moment in his life the slightest movement he makes 
of sympathy for anyone, and the slightest recollection of his past selfhood 
and connections in the world, will show him wonders. 
To complete the restorations, the goddess Diana appears in a vision and 
sends him to Ephesus to find his wife, who has been Diana's priestess. 
In going there as an act of faith, Pericles completes a pattern of wandering 
that has brought losses and gains both, and that begins to be intelligible. 
In his travels he was exposed to the world's evils, rescued and rewarded 
briefly for his endurance of them, then presented with the harder case 
of external misfortunes that he could not assign to human evil but had to 
conclude were the unprovoked acts of cosmic powers. He was not at 
fault except as events brought him to a pardonable degree of apathy; he 
was being tested, not punished. He took risks by unwittingly trusting evil 
when he tried to find a wife in Antioch and when he left his daughter 
in Tharsus; but he needed also to risk himself while being open to possible 
good when he sought a wife at Pentapolis, and he had to learn openness 
again to recognize his daughter and, by trusting in a vision, to regain 
his wife. The necessary perils of life are exemplified in his travels. But 
he learns that flight and apathy shut out good as well as evil, and that 
even a world that seems amoral or hostile may be preparing good in a 
hidden divine plan. 
In Cymheline apparent moral chaos in the world at large is expressed 
not in ceaseless wandering by one character but in the scattering of characters 
from Cymbeline's corrupt court and in the dissatisfactions or dangers they 
meet when they leave. 4 8 Cymbeline had banished Belarius, who in reprisal 
had abducted his sons; now under his Queen's poisonous influence he 
banishes Posthumus for having married his daughter Imogen, while the 
Queen, Imogen's stepmother, plots to bring her to love the Queen's son 
Cloten (Lv.49). The separations and other ill consequences of banishment 
may be almost as bad as the evil of the court itself—and even more fearsome 
because less well known. As the cause of exile, Cymbeline acts as the 
usurping Duke and the unjust brother Oliver do in As You U\e It; 
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at the end he repents, as they do. The great difference is that Cymheline 
is the heroine's father; so the exile of Posthumus must be a greater wrench 
to Imogen's feelings than Rosalind's exile was. Yet when the characters 
are reunited and reconciled the central figure in court is the same man 
who had caused the separations; the exile is a hard one, and the trans-
formation that ends it must be great. 
While Imogen is to be tested at home, Posthumus meets the uncertain 
perils of exile. In Cymheline Shakespeare mixes chronologies to produce a 
world with the greatest possible combination of evils and ambiguities: 
legendary Britain, whose chronicles show the moral extremes of folktale, 
coexists with Renaissance Italy, whose evil cannot be fathomed by honest 
Britons. Posthumus is in danger as soon as he makes a well-meant but 
idle boast about his lady in the uncertain moral atmosphere of international 
table-talk. Iachimo makes a cynical comparison of Imogen with the ring 
Posthumus is wearing: 
If she went before others I have seen, as that diamond of yours 
outlustres many I have beheld, I could not but believe she excell'd 
many. But I have not seen the most precious diamond that is, nor 
you the lady. (Liv.72-76) 
To Iachimo women are possessions, to be assayed like jewelry. He is a 
threat to Posthumus' moral stability because he suggests applying a spirit 
of calculation and possessiveness to love. His cynicism stereotypes women 
and jewels in the process of valuing them; any comparison of values in 
this reductive way would demean them no matter which value won. The 
ring is an apt choice for such corruption, for it was Imogen's token to 
Posthumus of her love: 
This diamond was my mother's. Take it, heart, 
But keep it till you woo another wife, 
When Imogen is dead. (Li.112-114) 
For Posthumus the ring is thus a symbol of his lady's love, and if one is 
worthless so is the other. In wagering the ring he implicitly questions the 
value of the love it represents and offends against the vow with which it 
was given. 4 9 
In this needless trial of his wife Posthumus clouds his love beyond 
Cymbeline's hopes or plans. Of course she passes the test and astounds 
even Iachimo with her peerless virtue. He can discredit her only by stealing 
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her bracelet, again a fitting choice of token because it is "a manacle of 
love" (line 122) embodying Posthumus' claim on Imogen and love for 
her; by telling Posthumus that Imogen has given away this bracelet to 
himself, Iachimo makes Posthumus repudiate the vow it symbolizes. Separa-
tion caused by exile has given the chance for this test and for the lying 
report that follows it; and villainy has seized the chance. 
When Posthumus believes Iachimo's lie about Imogen's infidelity, the 
play develops in part like a mixture of Much Ado about Nothing with 
All's Well that Ends Well—as if to show how bad the lovers' entanglements 
can become even when both begin with good will. Iachimo's villainy is 
harder to penetrate than Don John's, and Posthumus carries disillusionment 
as far as plotting to kill his lady (unlike Claudio, who thought himself 
the accidental cause of her death). For her own part Imogen finds herself 
in a more bitter position than Helena; Helena was publicly scorned by 
her husband, but Imogen learns that hers is actually trying to have her 
killed. She explains this hard fact by reverting to Iachimo's story that 
Posthumus was unfaithful and suspects that her husband only accuses her 
to cover his own fault (III.iv.46-57). In this situation too the play goes 
further than All's Well: Bertram actually did plan infidelity, but he let 
his feelings toward his wife rest in a mere wish for her death. Like other 
heroines whose men change, Imogen matches his change: she lets him 
believe her dead and goes in disguise to seek him. 
Again there is a complication beyond that of earlier plays, and physical 
separation (as in the first exile and resultant testing) contributes to it: 
Imogen, expecting to find Posthumus among the Roman forces, loses her 
way to Milford Haven and wanders among the Welsh mountains. But 
this time there is good fortune about the complication, for the natural world 
renews her. In the example of the two boys (actually her brothers) and the 
old man (really the banished courtier Belarius) she regains some faith in 
humanity: 
Great men, 
That had a court no bigger than this cave, 
That did attend themselves and had the virtue 
Which their own conscience seaPd them, laying by 
That nothing-gift of differing multitudes, 
Could not outpeer these twain. (III.vi.81-86) 
The Uses of Adversity 69 
Belarius is happy in this tiny court—indeed, like the Duke in Arden, he 
draws lessons from exile and finds that in a low-roofed cave the 
gate 
Instructs you how t' adore the heavens, and bows you 
T o a morning's holy office. (III.iii.2-4) 
But the boys, who have never proved themselves in a larger court, will not 
be satisfied until they have. All the characters here, even Belarius, who is 
at least willing to go along, have other destinies. 
Imogen almost loses hers when she mistakes the headless body of 
Cloten for that of Posthumus. 5 0 Now there seems to be nothing to interest 
her among the Romans. Yet when the Roman general chances on her 
she goes with him. Without a clear aim, she serves him well, though his 
objectives are not at all hers. Meanwhile, Posthumus, hearing that Imogen 
is dead (by his own plot, he thinks), severs his loyalties too in obvious 
alienation from his past: having returned to Britain with the Romans, he 
leaves them to fight as a British peasant and, after fighting heroically, 
returns to the Roman side in hope of being killed. Even when husband 
and wife are aimless or misdirected and find nothing to hope for (and, 
in Posthumus' case, little to admire in his past), they perform well in 
roles to which they are indifferent, and their service will help to restore 
their losses. Meanwhile the exiled Belarius and the boys act heroically in 
battle along with Posthumus and prepare their own honorable return to 
court. 
When Posthumus is imprisoned and expects the death he seeks, a re-
deeming pattern begins to emerge in events as Jupiter descends in a vision; 
but Posthumus distrusts and fails to understand the promise. Old wrongs 
are righted one by one systematically in the last scene, which is ruled over 
by a Cymbeline who, though he is not always aware of what he is doing, 
has shed the influence of his late Queen. Thus are banishments in effect 
repealed and reasons for flight or exile removed. First the earliest wrong, 
the expulsion of Belarius, is unknowingly corrected when Cymbeline knights 
him and the two boys as heroes in battle. Then in pardoning Imogen 
(disguised as a British boy serving the Roman general) Cymbeline begins 
to repair the breach with her that had followed from his banishment of 
Posthumus. Imogen follows out the wrong consequent on that banishment 
by asking about Posthumus' ring on Iachimo's finger; as a result more 
truths come out. Posthumus discloses himself, the lovers are cleared of 
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supposed offences against each other, and both are reconciled to Cymbeline. 
Cloten's death comes next, and his killer is pardoned, though awkwardly; 
as restitution this process brings out the true identity of Belarius and the 
princes, and we are reminded of their feats in battle (V.v.288, 306-7, 388), as 
if the corrective replaying of events had reached that crucial scene. Among 
recognitions only Posthumus' valor in the battle remains, and finally that 
comes out. Jupiter's prophecy of Posthumus and Britain is proved valid, 
and peace made with Rome. All these restorations resulted from Cymbeline's 
proper reward to unknown persons for service in battle, service whose full 
import the participants had not known. Shakespeare goes about as far as 
he can in this play in making redemptions result from good actions done 
in ignorance or despair by exiles. Even the person who can declare the 
exile ended, Cymbeline, begins in ignorance of his own acts. 
The complexity of Cymbeline, even if we think it a flaw in the play, 
has a purpose. Shakespeare is trying to bring his characters to the greatest 
possible disillusionment; situations that would have passed with less question 
in earlier plays become suddenly more complex. The same is true in 
Pericles, with its simpler linear story that approaches yet evades neat 
formulas. He wants the quality of raw event or perverse fortune—yet he 
means to demonstrate a redeeming power. Similar redemption in adversity 
is true to the paradoxical character of Arden, except that the challenge in 
Cymbeline is harsher; and as the physical setting of Arden is basic in our 
sense of a regenerating exile, so (again in a harsher sense) the travels and 
separations in these first two romances show us the threats and hardships 
the characters face, along with the working of unknown and benign powers 
to bring them together. 
In the breaking of pattern there is a more modest version of what happens 
in some of the later tragedies, when they toy with but deny a pattern of 
Job-like restoration by providence after self-knowledge and suffering. The 
greatest is the death of Cordelia, when Lear seemed already to have earned 
and gained relief; another is Coriolanus' inability to return to Rome after 
he has yielded to his mother and made peace; another, without even self-
knowledge, is Timon's persistence in misanthropy and hatred of Athens, 
with no recognition of the folly in his earlier generosity. Shakespeare wants, 
to evoke a milder version of such disruptive occurrences, one that can be 
finally tamed for comedy by a larger pattern. Thus, in Lear, an apparent 
pattern of restoration is broken by events and we are left to ask whether 
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there is after all a rationale for events and a providence controlling them; 
in Pericles and Cymbeline, an apparent pattern is complicated or broken 
by events, but a larger pattern inclusive of them reasserts a providential 
rationale. 
Finally, this notion of a divine plan may be the outermost circle of 
Shakespeare's comedy, the possible source of strongest control. But for 
the moment it can be embodied humanly in the paradoxical faith and the 
uncalculating acts of good that help to resolve Pericles and Cymbeline. 
And beyond those are other human efforts to guide events through conscious 
self-control and rule over others. 
6 
Self rule, Sovereign Rule, Misrule 
Attempts to control external events when more than one person is 
involved would in some way involve efforts at government, in the sense 
of control or manipulation. Government in this meaning may be manipu-
lation of individuals by individuals, as well as the usual political sort, and it 
must certainly be supported by the "ruler's" own government of self. 
As the examples in the first chapter show, self-definition is not the same 
as such self-government; it too easily goes wrong, perhaps for lack of 
restraints on the workings of self. The most immediate signs of self-
government and of government of other individuals show up in the 
disguised heroines, who because of their disguises undergo complicating 
experiences within themselves. 
Although Julia in The Two Gentlemen foreshadows the major disguised 
heroines, her role in disguise stops short of actual control of others; what 
is emphasized is rather her self-sacrifice and self-restraint, which is a kind 
of self-government. Her strongest effort to move Proteus, until she leaves 
her disguise, is her unavailing comment that Julia must love him as much 
as he loves Silvia (IV.iv.79-80). When he sends her to give the ring that 
is rightly hers to Silvia, she points out for us in soliloquy the strength of 
her self-sacrifice—"How many women would do such a message?" (IV.iv.90) 
—and she says that in wooing Silvia for Proteus she "cannot be true 
servant to my master, / Unless I prove false traitor to myself" (IV.iv.104-105). 
The notion of treachery to self is the reverse of Proteus' when he rationalizes 
that if he kept faith with Julia and Valentine " I needs must lose myself" 
(II.vi.20); Julia wants to be true to her original and valid selfhood, not 
find excuses for a new false one; and, more important, she still goes ahead 
with the "treacherous" mission even though she hopes it will fail In the 
course of her errand she gives us her more complex image of herself while 
she is in disguise: here she describes to Silvia the fiction of Sebastian the 
page, dressed in Julia's gown, playing the role of forsaken Ariadne and 
moving Julia's tears (IViv.158-172). The picture confirms Silvia's sympathy; 
if Julia had used the same verbal skills on Proteus as on Silvia, she might 
sooner have governed, and taught him to govern, his mutable loyalties. 
Rosalind, in As You U\e It, uses images of herself, and the relation 
between herself and her disguise, to greater purpose (in, to be sure, an 
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easier situation). In her disguise she gives Orlando her well-known self-
mocking advice that "Love is merely a madness, and I tell you, deserves 
as well a dark house and a whip as madmen do; and the reason why they 
are not so punish'd and cur'd is, that the lunacy is so ordinary that the 
whippers are in love too" (III.ii.400-404). Yet though she herself is in love, 
she will act as a whipper and mock the excesses of his love to teach him 
the same self-ridicule in love that she uses; they will be another Benedick 
and Beatrice in love, though for them (Orlando, certainly) the love preceded 
the mockery and the mockery is most firmly of self. She is describing 
two sides of her own character and self-awareness in roles: as the whipper 
Ganymede, she is the witty, somewhat cynical boy she professes to be; but 
as she is in love, she is the obscured Rosalind who has already committed 
herself to Orlando. As is obvious to us, her statement that the whippers 
are in love alludes quietly to the truth of her own identity. Yet these roles 
are clearly not separate; her character is both to love and to mock her own 
love, both to encourage Orlando's professions of love and to make game of 
them. 
The mingling of roles is the more complete in that Rosalind/Ganymede's 
method as whipper is to pretend to be Rosalind and answer scornfully to 
Orlando's pleas and promises. Like the distant Petrarchan lady she belittles 
his woes and tells him that "men have died from time to time, and worms 
have eaten them, but not for love" (IV.i.106-108); but she can also speak 
against women's faith, can say that a woman's wit will out at casement, 
key-hole, or chimney, and that when caught in misdeeds a woman will 
always have an answer that will "make her fault her husband's occasion" 
(IV.i.174-175). Yet even as she talks this way—again the merging of roles 
—she brings him to formal statement of his love-vows. She (as Ganymede) 
impersonates Rosalind, and Celia is the priest; they join hands; he says 
"I take thee, Rosalind, for wife," and she replies, with some elaborations, 
"I do take thee, Orlando, for my husband" (IV.i.125-139). If Orlando 
were aware that this is really Rosalind whose hand he holds, the little 
ceremony would be a valid handfasting: a legally-binding betrothal at least, 
and perhaps (if followed by consummation) a marriage. Rosalind's careful 
"do" puts her oath firmly in the present tense of a de praesenti contract.51 
But Rosalind will not spring that kind of trap nor settle for that kind of 
marriage. Her next comment, "There's a girl goes before the priest, and 
certainly a woman's thought runs before her actions" (IV.i.139-141), sends 
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out barbs in two directions: against the excessive ease of such commitments 
(which could be licentious, girls not waiting for priests), and, more tellingly, 
against her own enactment of her thoughts, a more guarded version of not 
waiting for the priest. For she has carried out her hopes with Orlando 
except for her defensive reservation that he does not know who she is; 
at the same time she puts him to a double test of seeing whether he really 
has in mind and faces up to an actual marriage vow, and after that whether 
he can still endure mockery of love and fidelity. His reactions suggest that 
he can indeed govern himself well in both vows and mockery. 
There is another image of "government," as valid here as in the alter-
cation (with political overtones) between Prince Hal and Falstaff in Act I, 
Scene ii of 1 Henry IV over the time of day: can Orlando govern himself 
well enough to keep his appointments on t ime? 5 2 He does ill in being an hour 
late for the meeting that leads to the betrothal; but since the betrothal 
ensues it is obvious that he is forgiven. He promises to return two hours 
thereafter. He does not keep that pledge, but the message he sends 
through Oliver makes it clear that he has been well occupied in saving 
his brother's life and reforming him. So he has governed himself well in 
the different sense of making the most of opportunities and putting time 
to good use. And indirectly he helps himself, for the sudden love of Celia 
and Oliver makes him impatient with mere pretenses and roles—he can 
"live no longer by thinking" (V.Ü50), even the kind of thinking that goes 
before the priest—and his mere expression of impatience, now that he has been 
tested, leads Rosalind to disclose herself (with due pageantry) and conclude 
their love. 
The mocker too is mocked. The fact that Rosalind comes to Arden 
without knowledge that Orlando is also there makes her prospects in love 
look bad to her, and she is sympathetic to Silvius' lament that Phebe does 
not return his love: "Alas, poor shepherd, searching of thy wound, / 
I have by hard adventure found mine own" (II.iv.44-45). Touchstone at 
once picks up the idea for some of his best foolery: 
And I mine. I remember when I was in love, I broke my sword upon 
a stone, and bid him take that for coming a-night to Jane Smile; 
and I remember the kissing of her batler and the cow's dugs that 
her pretty chopp'd hands had milk'd; and I remember the wooing of 
a peascod instead of her, from whom I took two cods, and giving her 
them again, said with weeping tears, "Wear these for my sake." We 
76 The God of Arts 
that are true lovers run into strange capers; but as all is mortal in 
nature, so is all nature in love mortal in folly. (ILiv.46-56) 
Without knowing the past or consciously predicting the future Touchstone 
has divined the truth about and even some details of Rosalind's wooing. 
As she says, "Thou speak'st wiser than thou art ware of," or partly, as 
we see, than she herself is aware of. The words of his gift, ''Wear these 
for my sake," would recall to her the words with which she gave her own 
token to Orlando: "Wear this for me: one out of suits with Fortune" 
(Iii.246). The joking about cods and codpieces (implied in "peascod")53 
has a present application to her, since she is equipped with a codpiece as 
disguise. Possibly she has been banished and is in disguise indirectly for 
Orlando's sake, i.e., is wearing the cods for his sake as in Touchstone's 
speech: that depends on whether the Duke's anger at meeting Orlando, 
the son of his enemy, carried over into the sudden anger with which he 
banished Rosalind, whose father was friend to Orlando's father. But 
certainly she wears the disguise for Orlando's sake in a sense yet unknown 
to her—that her presence in Arden will lead to the fulfillment of their 
love. "The wooing of a peascod instead of her" is also predictive: Rosalind 
will arrange for Orlando to woo the boy Ganymede (Rosalind in disguise) 
impersonating Rosalind. And the moral that Touchstone draws about 
folly in love is also basic to Rosalind's attitude in disguise: she applies it 
to herself and teaches it to Orlando. Touchstone has given her the meaning 
of her disguise, a way of looking at herself with detachment and self-
ridicule that will help her govern herself in love and teach Orlando self-
government. 
Rosalind's sympathy for unrequited lovers continues, and it, along with 
other factors, involves her in a further governing role. When she tries to 
cure Phebe of her scorn for Silvius, Phcbc falls in love with her (as 
Ganymede). Eventually she is beset from all sides (what better sign of her 
governing position?) by an impatient Orlando, a plaintive Silvius, and an 
importunate Phebe. She professes magical ability to solve the problems to 
everyone's satisfaction, and she does so by extracting a set of vows that 
will match her with Orlando, and Phebe with Silvius (Viv.6-25). If 
this effort really changes Phebe beyond merely catching her in a promise, 
it is government through teaching concern for others: Phebe's hopeless 
love for Ganymede (once she knows that it is hopeless) should make her 
sympathetic to the love that Silvius has felt for her. 
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Images of misgovernment in love abound in Twelfth Night. Viola, with 
some help from events, tries to set the main ones right. She has misgivings 
all along about her involvement. When she hears that Olivia has been 
mourning in seclusion because her brother is dead (as Viola thinks her 
own brother dead), her first wish is to join in that way of life: 
O that I serv'd that lady, 
And might not be delivered to the world 
Till I had made mine own occasion mellow 
What my estate is! (Iii.41-44) 
She wants a disguise that will keep her away from the world until she 
chooses to face it, a role in a surrounding that seems totally sympathetic 
to her mood. Perhaps this mood, though proper, is better crossed than 
long encouraged; in any case, Olivia's own position is not as stable as 
Viola is told, for Viola herself accidentally undermines it later. So even 
if Olivia's withdrawal from the world had not made it impossible for Viola 
to become her servant, that isolation is weakened as a choice in life simply 
because, like the men's vows in Love's Labor's Lost, it cannot survive 
challenge. 
Instead Viola takes service with a Duke whose life is governed by the 
flickering moods of the love that obsesses him. She plans to be a singer, 
though she turns out instead to be a music critic (IÜ56-59; ILiv.20-22); but 
either way she feeds the emotions of the Duke, for whom music is—he 
avers— "the food of love." In serving him she needs self-restraint, since 
his impulsive will imposes itself on his servants; his will becomes a compli-
cating principle in her life, qualifying whatever identity she might have 
wanted for herself. The tensions become greater, of course, when she 
falls in love with him yet must urge his suit to Olivia. The very lack of 
self-control in him demands more in her. 
She has a discipline for herself, and a way of teaching him self-discipline 
(though the lesson does not take yet) : by creating fictitious descriptions of 
herself for him, she hints at her identity to him and also contemplates 
herself as if from outside. She is more direct and pointed in her comments 
than Julia was in The Two Gentlemen. Yet disguise sets up more barriers 
for her than for either Julia or Rosalind, since the real identity that she 
hints at beneath her disguise lacks both the past claim that Julia can make 
on Proteus and the instant attraction that Rosalind would hold for Orlando. 
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Against the Duke's refusal to accept Olivia's rejection of him, Viola puts 
her own case hypothetically: 
Say that some lady, as perhaps there is, 
Hath for your love as great a pang of heart 
As you have for Olivia. You cannot love her; 
You tell her so. Must she not then be answer'd ? (II.iv.89-92) 
On the same assumption of hopelessness she offers another fantasy: 
My father had a daughter lov'd a man 
As it might be perhaps, were I a woman, 
I should your lordship. . . . 
she never told her love, 
But let concealment like a worm i' th' bud 
Feed on her damask cheek; she pin'd in thought, 
And with a green and yellow melancholy 
She sate like Patience on a monument, 
Smiling at grief. (II.iv.107415) 
This description of pining love is in much the same tone as Julia's account 
of the page acting Ariadne, but it has the direct practical virtue of being 
addressed to the person who ought to be moved by it, the unappreciative 
man. These lines, and the earlier ones with the Golden Rule morality, at 
first seem to have no effect on Orsino; but at the end of the play, when 
Viola's identity is known, he shows that he can recall some of her hints and 
reconsider their meaning. If the speeches in this scene do work at all, 
they should train the Duke in sympathy for other lovers in his plight 
and move him to gentleness with them. For Viola her allusions to herself 
are a schooling in the possibility that she may never win the Duke's love; 
yet in stating her own love, however obliquely, she reveals a germ of hope 
and creates just the beginnings of optimism. 
Perhaps she is already trying out such expressions of her love for the 
Duke in her first meeting with Olivia. But the results are unlucky. She 
would be thinking of the same likeness between the futility of her love 
for Orsino and his for Olivia: 
If I did love you in my master's flame, 
With such a suff'ring, such a deadly life, 
In your denial I would find no sense, 
I would not understand it. (I.v.264-267) 
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She would 
Write loyal cantons of contemned love, 
And sing them loud even in the dead of night; 
Hallow your name to the reverberate hills, 
And make the babbling gossip of the air 
Cry out "Olivia!" (I.v.270-274) 
She is too eloquent, and she projects too much of her own dismay in love 
into this situation. The hypothesis that seems to carry this projection, "If 
I did love you in my master's flame . . .," is in its form like the deliberate 
hints to the Duke: "Say that some lady, as perhaps there is . . .," and 
more directly, "As it might be perhaps, were I a woman. . . ." Olivia might 
well wonder if these speeches to her contain a hint of the boy's love, and 
for a wild moment she even wonders if the "master's flame" might be a 
direct self-description (as the one about the father's daughter really is to 
the Duke) by Orsino dressed up as a page ("Unless the master were the 
man," I.v.294). Viola seems to have gone to two extremes at once, of 
self-sacrifice in pleading Orsino's cause and of self-indulgence in relieving 
her own similar grief. She should hardly have predicted nor should she 
be blamed for the quickness of Olivia's attachment; but her self-concern 
has helped against her will to produce this disorder in love. 
Olivia's impulsiveness is a disruption in herself and others, and she can 
scarcely rationalize it : "Fate, show thy force: ourselves we do not owe; 
/ What is decreed must be; and be this so" (I.v.310-311). At this moment 
and in this way, she is little better than Malvolio, who willingly reads in 
the planted letter, "Thy Fates open their hands, let thy blood and spirit 
embrace them" and exclaims, "Jove and my stars be prais'd!" (II.v.146-147, 
172-173) As Olivia persists in thrusting her love on the disguised Viola, 
she becomes like the Duke, who will not accept her own refusal of him. 
T h e culmination of her second meeting with Viola is her assertion of her 
ungoverned will: "I would you were as I would have you be" (IILi.142). 
The Duke, Olivia, and more absurdly Malvolio (who already had fantasies 
of his mistress that the letter seems to confirm) are all one in asserting 
this will to create love in someone else according only to their own desire. 
Malvolio completes this adulation of willed love by carrying out the only 
sort of accommodation to another's feelings that he knows, the servility 
that puts him in cross-garters: "Jove, I thank thee. I will smile, I will do 
every thing that thou wilt have me" (ILv.178-179). The unruly, self-willful 
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passion of all these characters imposes what they call "Fate" (or the Duke's 
version of inevitability, the strength of his love, ILiv.93-103) on two 
recipients: on the beloved as a demand for acquiescence and on the lover 
as an excuse for his lack of control. 
In contrast to all these is Viola, who hints and waits to sec whether 
Orsino will be ready to accept and love her in her true identity, and who 
disciplines herself even to obey skillfully the commands that would work 
against her love. In her attitude to events she is far from Olivia's self-
justification in a self-created "Fate": " O time, thou must untangle this, 
not I, / It is too hard a knot for me t' untie" (II.ii.40-41). She is willing 
to let events go as they will, to submit herself to whatever may emerge 
from them and take opportunities only as they arise. This submission that 
waits for opportunity in order then to make the most of it is a major 
quality in Shakespeare's concept of the good ruler. 5 4 Viola's own model 
for it is Feste the clown: 
This fellow is wise enough to play the fool, 
And to do that well craves a kind of wit. 
He must observe their mood on whom he jests, 
The quality of persons, and the time; 
And like the haggard, check at every feather 
That comes before his eye. This is a practice 
As full of labor as a wise man's art; 
For folly that he wisely shows is fit, 
But wise men, folly-falPn, quite taint their wit. (IILL60-68) 
The jester's care in judging his audience is much like the care that Viola 
uses in hinting to the Duke (but not, to her regret, to Olivia), and like 
the concern that a true, not self-willed, lover must show for the wishes of 
the person he loves. The comparison to the haggard fits Viola in that the 
self-disciplined lover or ruler must take up every opportunity that comes.55 
Viola knows and proves (and teaches others by example) that ruling the 
passions and loving are related arts. 
Occasion carries out what Viola cannot do; but she makes the most of 
the chances that occasion offers her. Sebastian's arrival answers to Olivia's 
wish, relieves Viola of an impossible demand on her, and makes Olivia's 
rejection of Orsino too clear for him to ignore. His thought of revenge on 
Viola/Cesario, though none too pleasant a reflection on his own character, 
still brings forth his description of his servant as "the lamb that I do love" 
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(V.i.130), and Viola would offer up her life. Again Sebastian appears in 
good time and everything is resolved. 
In these adjustments Olivia and the Duke are late in beginning to govern 
their feelings toward others, but there arc signs that they have learned from 
experience. Their marriages may seem better than they deserve, but so do 
many in comedy. After she is settled with Sebastian, Olivia can look back 
on her obsession as "A most extracting frenzy" ( V I 281). As soon as he 
has taken in Viola's true identity, Orsino begins to recognize the love in 
her hints—"Boy, thou hast said to me a thousand times / Thou never 
shouldst love woman like to me" (V.i267-268)— and in her service to him 
"So much against the mettle of your sex, / So far beneath your soft and 
tender breeding" (V.i 322-323). Through the generosity of events they can 
reflect calmly on what they have learned about self-rule. Orsino especially 
contemplates the image and example of Viola. 
An interesting and quite different role of government in love is shown in 
A Midsummer Nights Dream. Although Theseus tries to speak for order 
and rationality,5* his attempts to set matters of love right by invoking 
Athenian law against Hermia are useless and heavy-handed. In this instance 
the real "rulers," the ones who have the power to make the needed changes in 
the lovers' actual desires, are the fairies. Like a true government, they produce 
disorder if they divide themselves by squabbles; hence, because of the conflict 
of Oberon and Titania, "The nine men's morris is fill'd up with mud" 
and "The seasons alter" so that "the mazed world, / By their increase, now 
knows not which is which" (II.i.81-117). For the same reason, Oberon 
and Puck have at hand magic juices that can affect human love. Oberon's 
plan to torment or mock Titania with an unsuitable love until she comes 
to an agreement with him, when he will take pity on her, necessarily 
involves Bottom (or someone else like him) ; the effort to solve the young 
lovers' problems comes simply from a ruler's sympathetic wish, while he 
has magic available, to see all happy and well-ordered. It does not appear 
that the lovers learn much self-government, as in later plays, except that 
Demetrius recognizes a feeling of "home" about the return of his affections 
to Helena; magic is a short-cut solution. The power of the spell that is 
left on Demetrius and the blessings that are given to all confer a stability 
that unblessed mortals reach only through self-control. 
In the plays considered thus far the aim of "government" has been to 
produce or confirm love. It is a harder task to elicit mercy, as in The 
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Merchant of Venice or Measure for Measure; someone who is in the position 
to give mercy must also have power, and he may use this power to resist 
the plea of mercy. Thus Shylock does not volunteer mercy despite Portia's 
eloquence; he stands on the strict wording of his bond and will let go 
his apparent advantage only when legal power is turned against him. 
When coercion is needed, government in a literal sense is involved, as 
when the Duke of Venice threatens Shylock with punishments. Public 
and private virtues work together, since Portia's skill as a magistrate is 
referred finally to her values as a wife. 
In Measure for Measure the Duke gives Angelo control over "Mortality 
and mercy in Vienna" and the charge "So to enforce or qualify the laws 
/ As to your soul seems good" (I.i.44, 65-66). Qualifying the laws, tempering 
their application by the principle of mercy, was assumed to be part of the 
ruler's duty; 5 7 but there is little mercy in Angelo. If mercy is an integral 
part of actual enforcing and administering of laws, Angclo's lack of it is a 
basic weaknesss in his ability to govern. His strictness depends, it appears, 
on unwillingness or inability to know human nature through himself; 
when Escalus urges leniency for Claudio because even the virtuous Angelo 
himself must have felt carnal urges and might easily have acted in the 
same way, Angelo replies, " T i s one thing to be tempted, Escalus, / Another 
thing to fall" (II.i.17-18). Persons who have yielded to temptation arc 
categorically different sorts of beings, he thinks, from ones who have not; 
he does not scrutinize the thin line between potential and actual Angelo 
knows, of course, that those who pass judgment on others may themselves 
have hidden faults, that in the jury there may be "a thief or two / 
Guiltier than him they try," but he concludes only (with dramatic irony) 
that when these faults are found they should be punished with equal 
harshness: 
You may not so extenuate his offense 
For I have had such faults; but rather tell me, 
When I, that censure him, do so offend, 
Let mine own judgment pattern out my death, 
And nothing come in partial. (II.i.27-31) 
This sounds just, but it misses Escalus' point: not that laws should be 
enforced selectively, or that the impossibility of enforcing them completely, 
even on the judges, should invalidate them, but that a judgment of human 
nature will attribute Claudio's fault to a common and not malicious impulse 
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that the law did not intend to punish severely. He thinks the way to make 
this judgment is through introspection; he wants Angelo to consider 
That in the working of your own affections. 
Had time coher'd with place, or place with wishing, 
Or that the resolute acting o£ your blood 
Could have attained th* effect of your own purpose, 
Whether you had not sometime in your life 
Err'd in this point which now you censure him, 
And pullVl the law upon you. (1111046) 
Angelo sees no need to take a look nor will he admit the principle that 
knowledge of human nature would explain the meaning of the law. He 
finds no essential relation between self-knowledge and government of 
others. 
Isabella, the nun-to-be, urges the same self-examination as Escalus, but 
more eloquently and in explicitly Christian terms: 
How would you be 
If He, which is the top of judgment, should 
But judge you as you are? O, think on that, 
And mercy then will breathe within your lips, 
Like man new made (ILii.75-79) 
A greater difference is that without intending it (and the more temptingly 
because she is devout and docs not intend it ) , she can arouse the very same 
feelings she talks of: 
Go to your bosom, 
Knock there, and ask your heart what it doth know 
That's like my brother's fault. If it confess 
A natural guiltiness such as is his, 
Let it not sound a thought upon your tongue 
Against my brother's life. (II.ii.136-141) 
Isabella may have about her an attraction that almost frightens herself 
(hence her religious vows); 5 * though she does not mean to provoke Angelo, 
her words almost challenge him to find lustful impulses. He does not 
experience mere natural guilt; on the contrary he finds an unnatural guilt, 
and its very unnaturalness fascinates him: 
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Is this her fault, or mine? 
The tempter, or the tempted, who sins most, ha? 
Not she; nor doth she tempt; but it is I 
That, lying by the violet in the sun, 
Do as the carrion does, not as the flow'r, 
Corrupt with virtuous season. 
O cunning enemy, that to catch a saint, 
With saints dost bait thy hook! Most dangerous 
Is that temptation that doth goad us on 
To sin in loving virtue. Never could the strumpet, 
With all her double vigor, art and nature, 
Once stir my temper; but this virtuous maid 
Subdues me quite. (II.ii.162-167,179-185) 
He has looked and found even worse sin than Escalus or Isabella had 
hinted; but he is not at all inclined to convert his new knowledge to mercy 
for Claudio. Instead of creating an internal basis for the better understanding 
of external law, he has discovered an internal lawlessness that will distort 
even more his external application of law. 
As he seeks to entrap Isabella, he becomes more deeply tangled in the 
disorder of his own mind. In their second interview he makes a hypothetical 
comparison between murder and Claudio's crime of begetting an illegitimate 
child: 
It were as good 
To pardon him that hath from nature stol'n 
A man already made, as to remit 
Their saucy sweetness that do coin heaven's image 
In stamps that are forbid. (ILiv.42-46) 
He is leading up to the implication that Isabella's refusal to yield to his 
lust would amount to murdering her brother, which would be as bad a 
crime as Claudio's own. 5 9 He also proposes the inverse of this, that her 
consent would be a virtuous mercy toward Claudio: "Might there not be 
a charity in sin / To save this brother's life?" (II.iv.63-64) Ironically this 
verbal trap that Angelo tries to set for Isabella's seduction forecasts his own 
situation: he tries to gain the "sweetness" from Isabella, yet he still orders 
Claudio's death. The terms into which he tries to force Isabella define his 
own willful choice of evil, and he chooses not the lesser evil but both. 
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But an ironic justice cancels his lawless acts. What Isabella cannot do 
by pleading for mercy, the Duke, as actual ruler who has left his political 
role to work in the guise of a spiritual governor who can influence hearts, 
achieves by stratagem. If the Duke is a figure of God or of Providence 
embodied in the ruler, his devious methods have a tough irony.6 0 Angelo's 
stealth that would filch pleasure from a woman and then make away with 
her brother's life (note the imagery of theft in his comparison quoted above) 
is matched by the Duke's "theft" of the objects Angelo sought and his 
substitution of another woman and another corpse. There is justice too in 
the Duke's stratagem near the end of the play (V.i.254-259) to slip away 
and come back disguised as the Friar, for he leaves Angelo to pronounce 
judgment on his own case, and thereby to learn to govern himself (as he 
should others) by searching his own conscience—as he must anyway and 
as Isabella had begged him to do in that first unlucky interview. Like 
Bertram, Angelo is denied the evil he thinks he wants and put in the 
care of someone who loves him; and both Mariana and Isabella forgive 
him and beg his life even when they think he has done the worst he 
intended. The right course for him is defined (in law and in audience 
sympathy) by his union with Mariana, and he is headed that way despite 
his perverseness and lack of self-government. The Duke, newly effective 
as ruler once he tries to work on inner human nature, will no longer 
allow evil in Vienna if he can expel it, and he converts Angelo's misguided 
will by stealthily redirecting its results. 
As an object lesson to Angelo in the futility of evil he makes Angelo's 
achievement of evil illusory. His purpose is a moral demonstration to 
Angelo: he does not merely want to save Claudio by the nearest subterfuge, 
for to do that he could have let Isabella's refusal of Angelo stand and 
merely substituted a dead man's head for Claudio's. Neither could he 
make his point to Angelo by revealing himself and stopping events (and 
the play) with Act III. Unless Angelo had committed himself to lust by 
overt action, he could claim to have been merely testing Isabella (as the 
Duke observes, III.i.195-197), and he would probably remain unrepentant 
and little wiser in governing (except in stealth) than before. Angelo's 
bad intentions must be objectified so that he can be confronted with them 
and made to revise his notions of human nature and its governance; but 
he must be prevented from doing actual wrong, and Claudio must be 
freed. In a harmless way Angelo must be taught by actions to do what 
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Isabella had been able only to urge in words: see himself in Claudio's 
place. 
For all her verbal commitment to mercy, Isabella is rigidly legalistic, 
and therefore ill-governed (over-governed is ill-governed here), in a sense 
different from Angelo's.*1 Her involvement in the bed-trick and in the 
deceits connected with it—especially the lie about her relations with Angelo 
that brings her temporary public shame—soften and humanize her. She 
loses her moral legalism and learns enough of mercy as a concrete act to 
beg leniency for Angelo despite his apparent killing of her brother: 
Look, if it please you, on this man condemn'd 
As if my brother liv'd. I partly think 
A due sincerity governed his deeds, 
Till he did look on me. Since it is so, 
Let him not die. My brother had but justice, 
In that he did the thing for which he died; 
For Angelo, 
His act did not o'ertake his bad intent, 
And must be buried but as an intent 
That perish'd by the way. Thoughts are no subjects, 
Intents but merely thoughts. (V.i.444-454) 
The more legalistic and deliberately superficial this is as logic, law, and 
ethics, the more it ignores intent for the technicalities of action, the better 
it is as a sign of Isabella's own sacrifice of selfish revenge and commitment 
to mercy. The result should be to scourge Angelo's conscience when he 
sees that such shifts are needed if something is to be said in his favor. 
Through restraint of her anger and admission that she may not have 
known after all exactly what was deserving of mercy and what was not, she 
achieves a victory of self-government, a victory that would have been lesser 
had the Duke not kept back the knowledge of Claudio's rescue. Her 
spiritual pride humbled, she is merciful in action as well as in theory. 
The Duke's teaching of self-government turns the law inward. In 
effect his disguised actions replace the abstract rule of law with his own 
personal intercession in the moral lives of some few of his subjects. He 
works to create a new good, an inner law of conscience, better founded 
than the external codes Angelo and Isabella had followed before.6 2 This 
self-discipline is the true check on that "liberty" that Claudio had abused 
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in the lax old days. Self-knowledge and recognition of human frailty show 
Angelo the true lawgiver within and Isabella the true spirit of mercy within. 
Finally, the order of love in marriage will be an inner law directing each 
(like the orders achieved by Rosalind and Viola) : Angelo will have his 
appetites directed properly toward Mariana, and Isabella will be guided 
toward continued involvement in the world. The Duke purveys law 
most effectively in teaching his subjects, as individuals, to be rightly 
themselves. 
Another supreme image of the ruler is Prospero in The Tempest. Having 
lost his dukedom through naive trust in his brother and through withdrawal 
into the seclusion of study, he now turns the very knowledge he gained in 
seclusion and later exile into government by power of magic; magic is the 
reassertion of his ability to govern and the means of regaining his dukedom. 
He rules over Ariel by promises of freedom and by stern reminders of the 
spirit's past which support Prospero's claim to obedience and the constant 
assertion of will by which he governs a powerful spirit.6 3 With Caliban 
he needs even more severe measures. 
Yet the hardest test of Prospero's governmental skill is in the management 
of the mortals he brings ashore; on his success depends the recovery of his 
dukedom. The opportunity is created for him by Fortune: 
By accident most strange, bountiful Fortune 
(Now my dear lady) hath mine enemies 
Brought to this shore; and by my prescience 
I find my zenith doth depend upon 
A most auspicious star, whose influence 
I f now I court not, but omit, my fortunes 
Will ever after droop. (Iii.178-184) 
Through his magical knowledge he knows the importance of this moment 
and the nature of the chance that is given him; but he owes this occasion 
to greater powers than his, and he must put it to best use when it is offered 
him. 6 4 He directs Ariel in handling the courtiers, and his methods are 
much like Oberon's though with a sharper edge, for the visitors are 
chased or led about the island, mocked, and put to discomfort. Through 
his magic he stages shows for them, to be contrasted with the more kindly 
vision devised for Ferdinand and Miranda. The moral of these shows 
is in Ariel's proclamation to Alonso, Sebastian, and Antonio: 
8 8 The God of Arts 
You are three men of sin, whom Destiny, 
That hath to instrument this lower world 
And what is in't, the never-surfeited sea 
Hath caus'd to belch up you; and on this island 
Where man doth not inhabit—you 'mongst men 
Being most unfit to live. . . . 
I and my fellows 
Are ministers of Fate. . . . 
But remember 
(For that's my business to you) that you three 
From Milan did supplant good Prospero, 
Expos'd unto the sea (which hath requit it) 
Him, and his innocent child; for which foul deed 
The pow'rs, delaying (not forgetting), have 
Incens'd the seas and shores—yea, all the creatures, 
Against your peace. Thee of thy son, Alonso, 
They have bereft; and do pronounce by me 
Ling'ring perdition . . . 
shall step by step attend 
You and your ways. . . . (III.iii.53-79) 
This makes the situation seem more grim than it really is—most clearly in 
the words about Alonso's son, which seem to imply his death (and so 
Alonso takes them), but also in the nature of the powers at work on the 
three. By such threats Prospero hopes to produce repentance at once, and 
he succeeds with Alonso. Alonso then regains his son when, on meeting 
Prospero, he spontaneously proposes Prospero's unexpressed terms: restora-
tion of Milan to him and a wish that Ferdinand and Miranda (if alive) 
might marry and rule in Naples (V.i.118-119, 148-152). Here is the objective 
of Prospero's governing, and he achieves it through magical illusions. 
The other two sinners are harder cases. They can be ruled only by 
Prospero's threat to reveal their full (and new) guilt to Alonso. Through 
Ariel's management this guilt first comes almost to the point of action and 
then is almost detected; he tests Antonio and Sebastian by charming all 
the others to sleep with a "solemne Musicke," as the Folio stage direction 
reads (II.i.184 S D . ; Through-Line Number 862) . 6 5 When they plot to 
kill Alonso (so that Sebastian can rule Naples) and have actually drawn 
their swords, Ariel returns "with Musicke and Song" and "Sings in 
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Gonzaloes eare" to wake him and avert the danger (II.i.296 SJD., 299 S.D.; 
T L N 999,1003)- There should be no surprise in the conspiracy, for Sebastian 
merely follows Antonio's precedent, though with direct intent of murder: 
"as thou got'st Milan, / I'll come by Naples (II.i.291-292). Prospero's 
governing magic brings out into the open the suspected viciousness of the 
villains. 
This knowledge is enough to give Prospero control over the plotting 
courtiers— 
you, my brace of lords, were I so minded, 
I here could pluck his Highness' frown upon you 
And justify you traitors (Vi.126-128) 
—and force Antonio to return the dukedom. The sinners make no sign of 
repentance, nor is Prospero deceived into thinking they have changed, 
though he forgives Antonio's faults. These two lords have shown no 
sign of reformation, and their final situation, though precarious, is not 
threatening enough to force a change of heart; we would not believe in a 
conversion. Nor should we ask for their reformation directly through 
magic, for that would deny the freedom of the will. Prospero must settle 
for coercion through law and control by a kind of blackmail, where he 
cannot reform; the state will be in outer harmony even if not all souls are. 
T h e scheme of bringing about repentance and then showing mercy 
implies that Prospero first gains control over the subjects of his concern 
and then relaxes his hold, though not too much. Both bondage and freedom 
are part of his strategy, and teaching the right use of freedom is the aim of 
bondage: he binds the visitors, sometimes almost literally, with his magic 
and frees them when they have repented past wrongs or at least yielded 
to his just demands. The method though not the purpose reverses the 
stratagems of The Merchant of Venice and Measure for Measure, where 
Portia and Isabella try first to induce proper behavior and then Portia and 
the Duke force it; but Prospero already knows the people he governs and 
the treatment they need. The success of his magic finally makes that magic 
unneeded, and it can be replaced by normal human methods of governing 
when the courtiers return to Italy. The extraordinary powers of Ariel can 
be turned loose again in their own sphere, Prospero can revert to merely 
human instruments of justice and mercy, and those who have learned from 
his rule can be free and self-governing in a better society. 
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In the same way Prospero tempers rigor with lenience toward Ferdinand 
—not as a purging of guilt but as a test of his worthiness of Miranda. The 
log-carrying service imposed on Ferdinand by Prospero is a symbol to 
Ferdinand of his love for her: 
The very instant that I saw you. did 
My heart fly to your service, there resides, 
To make me slave to it, and for your sake 
Am I this patient log-man. (III.i.64-67) 
He is released from his physical labors when he binds himself in promise 
of marriage, and in making that promise "with a heart as willing / As 
bondage e'er of freedom" (III.i.88-89) he finds inner freedom in love. 
Thus an imposed task is replaced by a willing vow, and inner desire 
matches social order and the need of a kingdom for an heir. 
The marriage of Ferdinand and Miranda is on Prospero's mind through-
out the play; he brings them together and tells us his joy at finding that 
they are falling in love (I.ii.420-422, 441-443, 451). It is part of his good 
government, as well as fatherly care, to settle Miranda well in Milan; 
this arrangement will both provide for heirs and give Alonso another 
inducement (besides his repentance) to accept Prospero's return to rule. 
So Prospero's governing role must not be underrated. From the begin-
ning of the play he has planned a marriage uniting two courts and a 
reconciliation with his enemies.6 6 Despite appearances, he already had 
intended mercy before Ariel's attempt to soften him: 
Art. Your charm so strongly works 'em 
That if you now beheld them, your affections 
Would become tender. 
Pros. Dost thou think so, spirit ? 
Ari. Mine would, sir, were I human. 
Pros. And mine shall. 
Hast thou, which are but air, a touch, a feeling 
Of their afflictions, and shall not myself, 
One of their kind, that relish all as sharply 
Passion as they, be kindlier mov'd than thou art? 
Though with their high wrongs I am strook to th' quick, 
Yet, with my nobler reason, 'gainst my fury 
Do I take part. The rarer action is 
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In virtue than in vengeance. They being penitent, 
The sole drift of my purpose doth extend 
Not a frown further. (V.i.17-30) 
This exchange fits the movement of the play as a working-out of Prospero's 
governing plan. The sternness of his threats to his old enemies has deceived 
even Ariel, his chief agent, who finds a need to beg mercy for them. 
Ariel's plea and his display of "human" feeling amuse Prospero, for whom 
severity is of no more use once he has brought about repentance. Yet even 
if Prospero's leniency is all according to plan and enacts a moral decision 
he had already made, 6 7 governing himself by this decision takes an effort 
of self-discipline, an assertion of "reason" and "virtue" against "fury" and 
recollection of "high wrongs." His self-control is essential to the success 
of his whole scheme: without Alonso's repentance and Prospero's for-
giveness of him, the marriage that Prospero has been encouraging would 
make no sense. As in other plays our sympathy for the lovers contributes 
to our wish that other matters will turn out well. 
T o overlook Caliban's place in the realm that Prospero governs would 
be to constrict the value of Prospero's achievement in ruling him. It is 
not that there is any serious threat in Caliban's rebellion, which is easily 
stopped by a clothesline hung with trumpery. Rather Caliban helps give 
us a sense of the scope that government must have: it must range not only 
above the human norm to the airy Ariel but below that norm. Caliban's 
nature is defined physically for us—Prospero calls him "Thou earth" (I.ii.314) 
—and the cramps he suffers are physical punishment for his resistance to 
rule. But Prospero and Miranda had once had better-than-physical hopes 
for him when they treated him more kindly and taught him language as 
if he could be a reasonable creature who might choose good. By the end 
of the play he promises to try again to "seek for grace" (V.i.296); until 
that new effort, at least, he can be controlled but not improved. He has 
expressed his resistance by perversion of language—"my profit on't / Is, 
I know how to curse" (I.ii.363-364)—and by an attempt to rape Miranda. 
H e has freedom of will, the power to resist Prospero's plans for him; and 
this ability is symbolized by his physical qualities—literal earthiness and 
grotesqueness, lust, debasement of speech. The limits of Prospero's govern-
ment are defined by the parody of the human which is Caliban. 
The other main example of a wise ruler, the Duke in Measure for 
Measure, also meets the limit of his power in the recalcitrant will of a 
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low-born subject. This one, unlike Caliban, is recognizably human, though 
barely so; it is Barnardine, who (as if in parody of the Duke's preparation 
of Claudio for death) "apprehends death no more dreadfully but as a 
drunken sleep, careless, reakless, and fearless of what's past, present, or to 
come; insensible of mortality, and desperately mortal," who is "Drunk 
many times a day, if not many days entirely drunk" and who is unmoved 
even when the guards seem ready to take him off for execution (IV.ii.142-145, 
149-152). The Friar-Duke, speaking almost in self-parody of his habit of 
intervention but with a doctrinally right concern for even the worst sinner, 
suggests that Barnardine needs spiritual counsel; but Barnardine has already 
rejected this. He seems in all ways convenient to the needs of the Duke's 
plan at this moment: justly condemned to die according to the laws of 
Vienna, emotionally indifferent to death, and unwilling to be argued into 
another state of mind, he could be executed without much injustice and his 
head could be substituted for Claudio's to prevent Claudio's unjust death. 
But Barnardine declines to help. He simply insists, "I have been drinking 
hard all night, and I will have more time to prepare me, or they shall 
beat out my brains with billets. I will not consent to die this day, that's 
certain" (IV.iii.53-56). The Duke, despite renewed efforts to play Friar, 
must conclude that he is "A creature unprepar'd, unmeet for death, / And 
to transport him in the mind he is / Were damnable" (IV.iii.67-69). 
Barnardine asserts his free will, and the Duke feels obliged to respect it, 
despite the inconvenience to his own plans and despite his legal power to 
enforce execution. But another prisoner, the pirate Ragozine, conveniendy 
dies a natural death, and it happens that he even looks a bit like Claudio; 
so his head can be the required substitute for Claudio's, and the Duke can 
stay within the moral limits of his office. In this action, Shakespeare's sources 
gave him the choice of leaving Barnardine offstage entirely; 6 8 so we must 
conclude that he had a special purpose in developing Barnardine as he did. 
As a spokesman for something basic (if base) in humanity Barnardine 
asserts his right not to be used for someone else's convenience. 
An obvious limit on the Duke's general plan to reform Vienna, and 
especially on Angelo's attempt to enforce this reform strictly, is the existence 
of professional vice, which implies public demand for illegal services. 
The pander Pompey suggests that to enforce the laws one would have to 
"geld and splay all the youth of the city" (II.i.230-231); and the market 
for prostitutes is represented for us by the frivolous and corrupt Lucio. 
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Lucio also shows us a consequence of law as applied categorically by 
Angelo, that subjects will attack what they dislike about the law in the 
enforcer of it, and so ridicule him personally: "They say this Angelo was 
not made by man and woman after this downright way of creation. . . . 
Some report a sea-maid spawn'd him; some, that he was begot between 
two stock-fishes" (III:ii.l04-109). But the Duke is not proof against Lucio's 
gossip either: Lucio slanders both the Duke's past laxity and his present 
active promotion (while disguised as a Friar) of virtue, and contrasts a 
Duke who "would eat mutton on Fridays" with a "meddling friar" 
(III.ii.181-182; V.i.127). Lucio follows the commands of his flesh and 
interprets the actions of others in a mainly physical way; and his coaching 
of Isabella, who knows little of the physical world at first in her crucial 
pleading with Angelo (ILii) , results in her working quite unknowingly on 
Angelo's physical desires. Such a carnal being as Lucio can hardly be 
controlled in his carnal acts, much less reformed internally as the Duke 
might reform higher characters. His forced marriage to a punk is probably 
a laughing dismissal of him, by Shakespeare and the Duke as well, a mock 
punishment for his unserious crime of "Slandering a prince" (V.i.524). 
T h e greatest spokesman for the lowest in human nature, and for the 
least governable human qualities, must be Sir John Falstaff; indeed he is 
physically the greatest spokesman for anything at all. When he is caught 
out in his usual faults by Prince Hal, he gives weighty and amusing 
defenses of himself, and one in particular invests his very flesh with a 
meaning: "Thou knowest in the state of innocency Adam fell, and what 
should poor Jack Falstaff do in the days of villainy? Thou seest I have 
more flesh than another man, and therefore more frailty" (1 Henry IV, 
III.iii.164-168). He playfully appeals for all the mercy that theology allows 
man, or perhaps more, as a weak being assailed by the temptations of the 
flesh. But this mercy, and the frailty that might occasion it, is a govern-
mental concern too, as in the second scene of 1 Henry IV: Falstaff can 
scarcely rule his bulk enough even to keep good time, 6 9 and he hopes 
that Hal , when he is king, will be lax (that is, more than merciful) toward 
thieves such as Falstaff (I.ii.58-62). His thievery, besides being an example 
of the ungovernable, is a specific parody of Hotspur and his fellow rebels; 
when the rebel Worcester insists in parley that " I have not sought the 
day of this dislike" and King Henry asks how the revolt has come about 
unsought, Falstaff puts in "Rebellion lay in his way, and he found it" 
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(V.i.26-28). This is, typically, "The thief's excuse when discovered in 
possession of stolen goods"; 7 0 Falstaff calls Worcester a thief of the realm. 
The attempt to steal a kingdom is made to seem only a bit more audacious 
than the exploit on Gadshill—-and both times some of the thieves run away. 
In the most general terms, though. Pal staff's claim to sympathy and 
significance as a human being is his frail and abundant flesh. Thus the 
crucial adjective when he is defending himself against Hal's mock sentence 
of banishment: "banish plump Jack, and banish all the world" (II.iv.479-
480). Love of humanity (for all its faults) must enjoin us to love of Falstaff 
(for all his faults). 
Yet of course Falstaff does not fit into any commonwealth. He is 
parasitic, and Hal must tidy up after him by paying tavern bills and restoring 
booty. He is no use in battle, and his recruiting practices are a disgrace, 
Human weakness is also, in a limited sense, human recalcitrance and 
perverseness. Once Hal becomes king he feels that he must govern Falstaff 
through banishment—or must publicize his mastery of Falstaff (and of 
himself) by banishing him. He deals severely with fleshly weakness: 
Make less thy body (hence) and more thy grace, 
Leave gormandizing, know the grave doth gape 
For thee thrice wider than for other men. 
Reply not to me with a fool-born jest. . . . 
(2HenryIV,Vy5m) 
His pun on "grace" ("grease," fat) and his allusion to the gaping grave are 
in a way the same old jokes—Falstaff is about to respond in jest—but, as 
always when the jolly flesh is reduced to its ultimate value by confrontation 
with death, the meaning is grim. Yet if the flesh insists on itself despite 
such killing argument, it can and does maintain its being against all the 
plans of rulers. Though Falstaff dies, perhaps killed by banishment, his 
survivors are as fleshly as he. But they are lesser and lower beings; govern-
ment has only succeeded, perversely, in cropping off the best and the 
symbolically most representative. 
Opinions on the banishment vary, and perhaps always will; but in 
fairness to Prince Hal we should notice that he had earlier given a more 
balanced and less public assessment of his friend; this, when he thought 
none could hear him, is surely more candid. It too makes death a time for 
summing-up of value, with the crucial difference that Hal at this point 
thinks Falstaff already dead in battle: 
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What, old acquaintance! could not all this flesh 
Keep in a little life? Poor Jack, farewell! 
I could have better spar\l a better man. 
0,1 should have a heavy miss of thee 
If I were much in love with vanity I (/ Henry IV, Viv.102-106) 
Now as in the banishment speech Hal labels his friend as vanity in 
Ecclesiastes* sense, and he recognizes that there are better men in his 
service. Yet whatever measures there are of "better" for society's purposes 
may conflict with his personal attachments, with his love for an essential 
humanity in Falstaff that he cannot easily spare. Falstaff's flesh is again 
expressive of an essence: because it embodies human vitality, it shows the 
qualities that make us value human life. Hal, not yet a ruler and not yet 
feeling the need to limit himself to a sovereign's perspective, can love the 
weakness and disorder that he dares not value in theory. 
"Falstaff in love/* if that is the subject of The Merry Wives of Windsor, 
turns out to be a weak Falstaff easily made to fall. It is hard to imagine 
how he could excite the passion that he hopes and thinks he arouses in 
the women. But his own aspiration toward both wives is in part to play 
a confidence trick in the guise of love: "I will be cheaters to them both, 
and they shall be exchequers to me" (Iiii.69-71). Falstaff in love is still 
Falstaff reaching for the purse. 7 1 
But there arc differences of character given by the nature of the play. 
The political context in the history plays often gives Falstaff's character 
in them a special meaning and function; his misgovernment of himself is 
often a parody of the rebels* disorder. His thievery mocks their attempted 
political theft. And when he entertains Hal with the boldness and openness 
of his misdeeds (his figure is unmistakable in a robbery, and his lies about 
the ruffians that put him to flight at Gadshill "are like their father that 
begets them, gross as a mountain, open, palpable," 1 Henry IV, II.iv.225-226), 
he exposes the fact that the rebels, and perhaps the King, make their great 
quarrels out of thinly-disguised pretexts about prisoners and old wrongs. 
In The Merry Wives there is none of this, only the parody, in Falstaff's 
mercenary wooing, of Fenton's original fortune-hunting (which grew into 
real love for "the very riches of thyself," III.iv.13-18) and eventual theft of 
Anne Page in elopement. But our attention is all on Falstaff, and without 
a political background in this play the focus rests on his self-assertion, the 
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failure of self-government. This time his faults do reflect on himself and 
mock him. 
The greatest absurdity about Falstaff's attempt to put himself forward 
is his compulsive openness about something that is often kept secret. In 
highway robbery he could dare to be open—indeed he could not help being 
known—because Prince Hal's favor and readiness to repay all thefts 
kept him from arrest; in adultery Falstaff is on his own, and discretion 
would be to his advantage. Yet with a little sly encouragement he confides 
all to the disguised Ford, even his designs on Ford's money (II.ii.271-275). 
And of course in an intrigue it would be much harder for him to employ 
disguise or to hide than it would be for lovers with normal proportions. 
Events mock his gross and unconcealable physical nature, which he has 
made seem grosser by professing to be enamored of the wives. This most 
fleshly of men vainly pursues fleshly delight (though partly pricked on by 
avarice) and then is forced to hide or disguise his hugely self-assertive body. 
His escapes from the jealous husband are all mild torments for his unruly 
flesh: he is put with the dirty wash as if that were a fit place for him, 
dumped in the river as proof of his (physical and moral) "alacrity in sinking" 
(III.v.12-13), forced to deny his masculinity as a fat woman, and persuaded 
to hide in the woods with horns on his head while "fairies" burn and 
pinch him. The burning is an ordeal devised as if to test whether he is 
innocent, and the pinching punishes and expurgates his purported lust. 
The horns he wears recall the myth of Actaeon, which was widely under-
stood as the story of lust punished,72 and ironically he had intended horns 
for Ford. Some of these "punishments," at least, quite befit the crime; and 
there is the special irony that Falstaff's readiness to brag brings punishments 
for a fault of lust that he professes but that is not a prime motive for his 
scheme. 
There is a typically FalstafEan self-justification in the knight's words as 
he waits in the forest with his buck's head: 
Now the hot-bloodied gods assist me! Remember, Jove, thou wast a 
bull for thy Europa, love set on thy horns. O powerful love, that in 
some respects makes a beast a man; in some other, a man a beast. You 
were also, Jupiter, a swan for the love of Leda. O omnipotent love, 
how near the god drew to the complexion of a goose! A fault done 
first in the form of a beast (O Jove, a beastly fault!) and then 
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another fault in the semblance of a fowl—think on't, Jove, a foul 
fault! When gods have hot backs, what shall poor men do? (V.v.2-12) 
If lovers might often excuse their actions by citing Jove's assumption of 
bestial forms as precedent, Falstaff can make the point more general. His 
comment "When gods have hot backs, what shall poor men do?" is a 
paganized and erotic version of "Thou knowest in the state of innocency 
Adam fell, and what should poor Jack Falstaff do in the days of villainy?" 
Falstaff again excuses what he is by the degenerate world he lives in; or 
worse, if his plea for the gods' help may really be to arouse an erotic 
fervor he does not feel, he makes the beastly example an excuse for still 
worse misuse of his own flesh. Doubtless this moralizing is all in the service 
of good fun; there is just a hint of such meanings in the absurd posturing 
of Falstaff's huge bulk. 
Throughout his stage life, as has been shown, Falstaff excuses himself 
by what he is, which he defines physically. Many other comic low-life 
characters in Shakespeare's comedies are essentially physical in their 
selfhood and, however well they may know how to thrive in the world 
(though not all do), they resist, often parody, the efforts of "higher" 
characters to govern themselves and others. 7 3 Thus the snores that prove 
Sly unlordly and unfit for lordly entertainments, Armado's physical 
gratification without regard for vows, Bottom's ass's head expressive of 
his nature, Sir Toby's unashamed indulgence in his cups. Shakespeare 
honors the claim to humanity of these and other characters, even if the claim 
is only a physical one. And such characters may gain more than a mere 
place in the world, as when Bottom recalls a vision or Dogberry unknow-
ingly uncovers a plot. The last of men may sometimes be put first. In 
this the artless comic character may be like the professional fool who 
proclaims himself wiser than the reputed wise men of society; the jester 
proves himself by conscious satire that is carefully self-controlled and astute, 
the artless comic by unconscious parody that hits on reality in moments 
of chance intuition. Thus both may not only qualify and limit the plans of 
the dominant characters but even claim a moment's glory for deep insight. 
We respond to them as Lords of Misrule—especially if we know that the 
stupid ones will soon return to themselves. We feel and sympathize with 
both the earthy self-possession of the artless characters and their amazement 
at their brief intrusion into the world of important affairs. To banish 
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such persons from Shakespeare's comedies woul4 indeed have been almost 
to banish all the world. 
The concept of "government," as taken very broadly in this chapter, 
implies first of all a self-discipline in the ruler, a control of his own 
impulses, and at least a delay of his immediate interests for the sake of a 
larger purpose that by indirection will bring out the best in others and 
create the greatest possible harmony. Apart from the literal actions of 
government, the clearest example of such fruitful self-rule would be the 
actions of disguised heroines—especially Rosalind and Viola, the ones who 
most deliberately try to teach others self-control in love. Disguise promotes 
their own self-discipline by creating an added viewpoint for their under-
standing of themselves, and by involving them in roles in the outer world 
that may not seem at once to serve their own interests directly, indeed may 
run counter. 
The same self-control is needed by manipulative figures proper. The 
really active ones either take on disguises or have other means of influencing 
events while keeping hidden, through magic—thus Portia as a judge, Oberon 
and Puck as unknown magical agents, the Duke of Vienna as a friar, and 
Prospero as a magician who conceals his powers until the end. The point 
about such secrecy is that the ruler can adjust the way that he, or his action, 
will appear to the subjects being governed so as to yield the best effect in 
them (though Oberon and especially Puck are rather more casual in their 
rule, which is mixed with a bit of misrule). The Duke of Vienna suits 
his methods to the individual and tries to produce an inner law, individually 
perceived and willed, in each. Prospero too varies his severity with the 
case. Portia has only one guise and one case, but she is as flexible as the 
others in trying one approach after another until she sees what is needed. 
The hidden action of government may draw out, as well as possible, the 
potential of self-rule in each subject; where this fails, harder measures must 
be used, often threats that can later be remitted. 
Efforts at self-control and schemes to rule others for their own good 
are mocked or qualified by the self-assertions of those low characters who 
insist on choosing their own good. Though they can sometimes be 
wondrously transformed they are still themselves, always at home and 
always possessed of the same appetites and faults. Their resistance to plan 
makes them persistently yet erratically human (we must hope that Caliban, 
the most grotesque of these characters, is an exception), and we must love 
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this quality of humanity beyond any value we can assign it in a "rational" 
order- It gives warmth, urgency, and complexity to the concept of self-
hood, a crucial notion in Shakespeare's comedies because of the problems 
created by serious self-will and mistaken self-definition. There is a radical 
irony in the whole process by which we judge obstinate selfhood in 
comedy. We must recall that self-will can exercise itself in sport too, and 
we must insist that comedy exerts no more control over selfhood than is 
needed for happy endings. 
7 
Miracles and Fading Visions 
There is another influence on external actions, though we may not know 
much about it, beyond the directing power of a ruler to shape events. 
Even Prospero, whatever his knowledge and skill, cannot overcome his 
enemies until the proper moment; as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
he must make the best of the opportunities offered to him when they are 
offered. Making the most of time—' redeeming time," in Prince Hal's 
words—was an accepted rule of personal morals, 7 4 and it would seem to 
apply to statecraft too; but what kind of power is it that offers the occasion 
for enterprising mortals to act out their wishes, and how can the chance be 
known when it comes? The question leads toward the theophanies of the 
last plays that seem to imply a supernatural pattern governing events. 
Shakespeare's approach to the idea of such a pattern is crablike.75 In 
All's Well that Ends Well, which seems to aim at the miraculous resolution 
typical of later plays and which hints that its heroine may be receiving 
divine aid, 7 6 our doubts of the hero's qualities and the means necessary to 
his reform make the result almost too much a miracle. If the Duke's 
intervention in Measure for Measure is analogous to divine rule, there are 
enough irregularities about his conduct as Friar to raise questions. In 
Pericles, although Gower directs our reactions through our assumption that 
he knows the total pattern of events and sees a higher purpose in them, 
the characters themselves lack confidence in what is happening—indeed 
Pericles withdraws from the world totally—and Diana, the deity most 
involved in the play, appears only at the last minute to direct a reunion. 
The characters in Cymbeline too fail to see that events are headed anywhere 
(though there are attempts to plan parts of the action), and Jupiter's descent 
and prophecy come late. Only in The Winter's Tale, with the arrival of 
the message from Apollo's oracle in the third act, and The Tempest, with 
a scarcely-divulged awareness of higher powers implicit throughout 
Prospero's management of his opportunities, are revelations from above 
known to some characters for very long. 
T h e value of having an early and detailed statement of the divine plan 
in The Winter's Tale is that we can follow the characters' attempts to deal 
with it and the way that it is carried out. There is an absorbing and teasing 
combination of actions that consciously or unconsciously fit the plan, of 
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chance that works opportunely, and of minor supernatural events (like 
Antigonus' dream of Hermione that tells him where to leave Perdita and 
what to name her) that contribute to the outcome. Shakespeare is extremely 
careful about the agents in this play who work out apparently supernatural 
purposes; he misses no chance either to assert a meaning or to qualify, mock, 
and make ironic comparisons.77 
No sooner is the judgment of the oracle of Apollo read to Leontes 
(III.ii.132-136) to tell him that he has wrongly accused his wife, than he 
learns that his son is dead of anxiety over the accusation. Leontes takes 
the loss as an immediate sign of Apollo's displeasure—and its timing 
suggests that likelihood, though a "natural" cause of death is given too. 
Apollo's role is shown decisively, though, in the words of the oracle: 
"the King shall live without an heir, if that which is lost be not found"; 
these words presuppose that Mamillius is dead and that the abandoned 
infant Perdita is sole heir. The ways of the god are hard, for although 
Leontes vows repentance at once and perseveres for sixteen years, this one 
major punishment inflicted by the deity is not removed; he cannot have 
his son back. 
Human agency takes up where the oracle leaves off; it becomes a way 
(though we do not fully know it yet) of impressing its truth and intensify-
ing its punishment. The oracle had spoken the truth about the jealous 
Leontes' mistreatment of others—his suspicion of his friend, abuse of a 
subject's loyalty by commanding him to poison the suspect, and unjust 
rejection of a child as not his own: "Hermione is chaste, Polixenes blameless, 
Camillo a true subject, Leontes a jealous tyrant, his innocent babe truly 
begotten. . , ." As a defender of Hermione, Paulina takes up all of these 
judgments (especially Leontes' tyranny), almost as if expounding a Biblical 
text phrase by phrase in a sermon; she wants each wrong to sink in, yet 
she minimizes all the others against the new one she reports, Hermione's 
death. This seems a punishment of Leontes answering directly to his main 
fault, unjust suspicion of his wife. But if we knew Paulina's stratagem 
now, we would see that she was copying the oracle, creating Hermione's 
feigned death in imitation of Mamillius' real one. Her art imitates Apollo's 
control of nature, and the aim is Leontes' repentance. She imitates the 
oracle in another way too by holding back a reward for repentance, the 
return of Hermione; nothing like this can happen with the first event 
forecast by the oracle, the death of Mamillius, but there is an implied hope 
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of Perdita's restoration in the oracle's words "if that which is lost be not 
found." Paulina has foreseen the movement of events as predicted and 
directed by the oracle, and believing in the validity of this pattern she 
reinforces it with her own actions. She announces Leontes' need for 
repentance in the proper wintry term: 
A thousand knees. 
Ten thousand years together, naked, fasting, 
Upon a barren mountain, and still winter 
In storm perpetual, could not move the gods 
To look that way thou wert. (III.ii.210-214) 
She understands Apollo's plan for penitence followed by restoration, and 
she thinks of it in the seasonal imagery that soon begins to dominate the 
play. 7 8 She guides Leontes into the winter phase—and as we later find, she 
will have a role in springtime too. 
Next, the supernatural and the apparently casual unite to leave Perdita 
isolated in the preordained place, the wilds of Bohemia. Antigonus is 
guided there by a dream, and then he and his companions are killed by 
parallel mischances with a bear and a storm. Of course we suspect some 
controlling purpose behind these events, and the figure of Time, introduced 
at the outset of Act IV, reassures us that there is. Meanwhile strictly human 
purposes work toward another part of the plan, as Leontes' penitence moves 
him to contact his estranged counselor Camillo and arouse Camillo's 
homesickness (IV.ii.4-9); his action has no result at first, but it will when 
Camillo can send the lovers to visit Leontes and can follow with Polixenes. 
In this way Leontes' act in penitence helps return his daughter to him and 
recover his wrongly-suspected friend. 
Once Florizel and Perdita enter the story as lovers with wishes of their 
own, they also become unwitting embodiments of Apollo's will to restore 
most of what had been taken away. Florizel is aware that just as he, a 
prince, wears shepherd's garb in wooing Perdita, so "the fire-rob'd god, / 
Golden Apollo" had for a time lived as "a poor humble swain" (IV.iv.29-30). 
Meanwhile Perdita, who mentions Proserpina's flower-gathering, is un-
consciously living out the seasonal myth of Proserpina, which has a 
providential meaning that fits well with the message in this play from the 
oracle of the sun-god Apollo. 7 9 The lovers, as "displacements" of mythic 
figures (in Northrop Frye's term—though he finds them more directly 
mythic than most comic characters), actually do in a sense take the place 
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of the mythical oracle in the later actions of the play, for they become the 
main forces unknowingly working out the divine will as pronounced by 
the oracle, the finding of "that which is lost." 
It is important that this function is known to us but not to them. 
By means of the difference between their awareness and ours, Shakespeare 
both forestalls criticism of the resolving miracle by ironic commentary and 
suggests that the much-desired good may actually come about best without 
human planning, through some unknown benign force. Florizel has no 
purpose except to win Perdita while losing everything else if need be; 
when he resolves on flight he admits that 
as th' unthought-on accident is guilty 
To what we wildly do, so we profess 
Ourselves to be the slaves of chance, and flies 
Of every wind that blows. (IV.iv.538-541) 
Though he gives a needed push to events, he has little sense of direction. 
And Perdita herself resists throughout; she has misgivings about being 
"Most goddess-like prank'd up" as Flora at the shepherds' feast (IV.iv.10), 
and when she must disguise herself and flee she merely acquiesces by saying, 
"I see the play so lies / That I must bear a part" (IV.iv.655-656). Ignorant 
of her true birth and inheritance, she dislikes pushing claims of any kind 
for herself. Yet she must be brought round to such claims for her own sake, 
and FlorizePs and Leontes'. 
The enactment of myth and miracle is further qualified by parody. 
Among the Olympian gods, the natural parody of Apollo would be Hermes 
or Mercury, a figure who presided over much the same activity as Apollo 
but in a comic, low-life manner. 8 0 As Apollo was god of poetry, so Mercury 
had his own arts of lying, thieving, and oratory; and he was a lowly cowherd 
rather than a shepherd (as the Nomian Apollo was). His embodiment in 
the play is Autolycus, who was "litter'd under Mercury" (IV.iii.25) and 
professes the arts of balladry (a parody of poetry, in Renaissance eyes) and 
thievery. Indeed he unwittingly mocks the serious claims of art in the play 
(to be discussed later) by using his ballads to distract attention from his 
purse-cutting (IV.iv.604-618). His actions parody the uncanny movement 
toward good through fulfillment of Apollo's prophecy, for despite his 
intention they have good results and are needed for fulfillment of the oracle's 
words. When he is forced to change clothing to provide Florizel with a 
Miracles and Fading Visions 105 
disguise, he learns the lovers' plan of flight. But for his own perverse 
reasons (related to his notion of fortune's absurdities) he does not reveal it 
to someone who could prevent them: 
Sure the gods do this year connive at us, and we may do any thing 
extempore. The Prince himself is about a piece of iniquity: stealing 
away from his father with his clog at his heels. If I thought it were a 
piece of honesty to acquaint the King withal, I would not do't. I 
hold it the more knavery to conceal it; and therein am I constant to 
my profession. (IV.iv.676-683) 
Then, overhearing the Shepherd's news that Perdita is a foundling and 
feeling a new loyalty to his "master" Florizel, he intercepts the message 
(IV.iv.831-842), with the result that the proofs of Perdita's birth go with 
the lovers to Leontes. He justifies his act through an absurdist concept of 
self-interest: "If I had a mind to be honest, I see Fortune would not suffer 
me: she drops booties in my mouth" (IV.iv.831-832). But this mocker of 
providence is himself mocked by his mercurial fortunes: through chance 
mishaps he goes unrewarded for this valuable information. 
In the events of the play this Mercury-figure cooperates with the ordering 
purposes announced by Apollo, even while he ridicules the notion of a 
supernatural will working toward good. If one may find earnest in this 
jest there is a tradition that Mercury may function in just this controlling 
way. In one of Andrea Alciati's emblems, Fortune, blindfolded, stands 
unsteadily on a globe; Mercury is solidly planted on a cube. The meaning is 
given thus by Francis Thynne: 
On rolling ball doth fickle fortune stände; 
on firme and setled square sitts Mercurie, 
The god of Arts, with wisdomes rodd in hande: 
which covertlie to vs doth signifie, 
that fortunes power, vnconstant and still frayle, 
against wisdome and art cannot prevaile.8 1 
Without making any solemn claims for himself, Autolycus, the artist of 
confidence tricks, ballads, and purse-picking, does his part against blind 
misfortune. It may be more than coincidence too that Mercury was some-
times called Camillus; 8 2 Shakespeare's Camillo works more directly than 
Autolycus to promote good fortune, and the two characters are related also 
in dividing between them the functions of one character in Shakespeare's 
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source.8 3 Carnillo is responsible for Polixenes' safety from the jealous plot 
of Leontes, and later for the return of Perdita (with Florizel) and Polixenes 
to Leontes* kingdom. The artful, even sly, plans of the two characters 
contribute to the workings of Apollo's oracle. 
The truth of Perdita's origin (which is revealed to Leontes through 
these characters' unwitting help, though we had known it all along) relates 
ironically to her own resistance to events. She distrusts the artifice in which 
she is involved; but this "artifice" is, without anyone's intending it, leading 
toward a "natural" situation in which Perdita will have the place due her 
by birth, Leontes will have his daughter back, and Florizel and Perdita will 
be evenly matched as heirs to thrones. In this outcome the famous discussion 
of art and nature (IV.iv.84-103) is both validated and superseded. When 
Polixenes, perhaps being ironic (as some readers believe) or else testing 
Perdita, proposes the idea that 
we marry 
A gentler scion to the wildest stock, 
And make conceive a bark of baser kind 
By bud of nobler race (IV.iv.92-95) 
he thinks he is using the art of grafting trees in ostensible support of a 
union between his son and this shepherdess Perdita. He continues with 
the assertion that "This is an art / Which does mend Nature—change it 
rather; but / The art itself is Nature." If he had known that Perdita was 
a princess, he could have said without irony that her marrige to Florizel 
would be perfectly natural and that the "art" that brought them together 
was nature. Art and nature are reconciled in everyone's knowledge when 
the oracle is miraculously fulfilled and Perdita is restored to Leontes.8 4 
The achievement of this prophesied reunion is a sign to Paulina, who as 
self-appointed ruler of Leontes' spiritual state had been keeping Hermione 
hidden for sixteen years until Leontes had done sufficient penance. She 
responds with her own "art" that turns to "nature," a supposed statue of 
Hermione that becomes the living woman. 8 5 She evokes the strongest aura 
she can of magic and miracle; she is confident that her artifice in managing 
events follows a divine will as expressed in the natural (yet miraculous) 
quality of external occurrences. Again nature and art become one, in 
human purposes as in the events that are controlled by forces beyond human 
ken. 
The equation of art with nature is both an assertion by Shakespeare and 
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a retreat. His most direct allusions to the artful quality of the whole play 
and the events in it are self-mocking: a "winter's tale," like an old 
wives' tale, is to be taken none too seriously,86 and the story of Perdita's 
restoration meets with the comments that "Such a deal of wonder is 
broken out within this hour that ballad-makers cannot be able to express 
it," and "This news, which is call'd true, is so like an old tale, that the 
verity of it is in strong suspicion" (V.ii.23-25, 27-29). Autolycus, as a 
practitioner of balladry, has been before hand to make game of the wondrous 
recoveries that are the goal of the action in the play. To say that "The art 
itself is Nature" is in one way to limit what the play as art can do to what 
its audience will accept as natural. 8 7 Shakespeare does not match a princely 
Florizel to a really lowborn Perdita (even a gracious one), nor does he have 
Paulina perform her miracle before she receives a natural sign from outside 
events that Leontes has prepared himself naturally by long repentance. The 
apparent wonder in the fulfillment of the oracle must be qualified by 
relegation to the humblest forms of art; even divine purposes may be only 
the fictions of the storyteller or playwright. And there is equivocation 
between the supernatural and the natural: the power of Apollo to shape 
events to his will becomes in the synthesis of art and nature only a con-
trivance to achieve no more than what seems right and natural to us. Thus 
a control over external events that seems to transcend human power and 
to serve as a model for humankind (notably Paulina) in such government 
of affairs as they can manage, suddenly dissolves into the fiction of the 
artificer, too pat to be trusted. 
There is the same final ambiguity in The Tempest, where the super-
natural power (or "art," as it is called) by which Prospero governs humans 
and even spirits consists often of creating illusions to affect humans' behavior. 
The greatest and most significant of these is the masque of spirits that he 
presents for Ferdinand and Miranda (IV.i.60-138). It is meaningful in 
itself, and the reason that Prospero gives for interrupting it (apart from 
his need, kept secret from the lovers, to deal with Caliban's plot) is also 
meaningful, both as a statement in itself and as a lesson in the context of 
the lovers' needs. The vision presents an ideal harmony of divine blessing 
in marriage and divinely-fostered plenty on earth; and before it disappears 
it seems to be working toward an embodiment of bounty in specifically 
earthly terms with the dance of nymphs and reapers. Obviously there is a 
message for chaste lovers who intend marriage, and obviously Prospero has 
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motives for this lesson in a desire for Miranda's happiness in love and for 
stability in political position. But there would be counsel for rulers as 
well in the ideal of a land blessed with plenteous harvest. The gods in this 
masque may show Prince Ferdinand the aim of a good sovereign to 
imitate divine rule (again art imitates a "nature" which is supernatural), 
and they may imply that he can achieve this ideal of government only if 
he succeeds in self-government through chaste love. Though it is hard to fix 
these implications, they would be consistent with what appears in other 
comedies and with the concern ilua Prospero shows by the end of the play 
(as discussed in the previous chapter) tor the eventual accession of Ferdinand 
and Miranda to joint rule. 
Ferdinand almost mars the harmony of the masque and of Prospero's 
plan. Entranced by the vision, he exclaims, "Let me live here ever; / So 
rare a wond'red father and a wise / Makes this place Paradise" (IV.i.122-124). 
Prospero must quiet him to preserve the spell that makes the vision, and 
we may wonder if Ferdinand is absorbing the lessons that are being set 
before him. Certainly a life as perpetual spectator at masques is very 
different from what Prospero intends for Ferdinand. Rather, Ferdinand 
must prepare himself for a return to Naples with Miranda and eventually 
for a kingly role; this is the object of all of Prospero's teachings, which 
culminate in the masque.*8 Ferdinand, like Pros{>cro himself in a more 
complex way and like Rosalind's father, must quit this delightful sojourn 
and resume the duties of public life. Here is the hardest but finally most 
essential lesson of self-government for any ruler who is sensitive to the 
ideal: that the vision of the ideal, delightful as it is, exists not for the 
ruler's private delectation but for his use as a model of government. It 
is the lesson Plato teaches when he says that the philosopher must return 
from the sunlight of truth into the cave to lead his fellow men out (Republic 
519D-520E). If Ferdinand were to live in visions forever, he would be 
repeating Prospero's old mistake when Prospero cast the government of 
his dukedom on his brother, "And to my state grew stranger, being trans-
ported / And rapt in secret studies" (I.ii.76-77). The result was that the 
brother, Antonio, became a usurper; and if Ferdinand were now lost in 
strange visions on this island without a Prospero to guard him, it is not hard 
to imagine that Sebastian might have killed Aionso (at Antonio's suggestion) 
and then, meeting with Ferdinand, dispatched him too and become usurping 
King of Naples. The interruption of this masque now actually has a like 
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practical concern, preservation of Prospero's rule against Caliban's minor 
threat. The art that Prospero shows to Ferdinand must become a preparation 
for practical reality, not a distraction from it. 
In a broader sense, Prospero too can learn from his own show. The 
moral for himself, and in a long view for Ferdinand too, is the one he 
propounds as he dissolves the masque: 
These our actors 
(As I foretold you) were all spirits, and 
Are melted into air, into thin air, 
And like the baseless fabric of this vision, 
The cloud-capp'd tow'rs, the gorgeous palaces, 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself, 
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve, 
And like this insubstantial pageant faded 
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff 
As dreams arc made on; and our little life 
Is rounded with a sleep. (IV1148-158) 
There will be no more visions, not only because practical needs intervene, 
and not only because Prospero will soon break his staff and drown his 
book, but because human life has an ending, and with it the visions that 
are our experience. These last two, at least, are parallel ideas, as Prospero 
shows in his preparations for Milan: he will return without his magic, and 
when he gets there, "Every third thought shall be my grave" (V.i.312). He 
is acknowledging human limits; renouncing magic is a return to the normal 
human condition, and making ready for death is an ultimate recognition 
of that condition. 
In several ways art shows human limits here as in The Winter's Tale. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Prospero's magic is limited by the 
freedom of its subjects' wills, and his relinquishing of magic shows its 
limitation to temporary use. The very claim of its success perhaps limits 
it too; Gonzalo exclaims joyfully that 
in one voyage 
Did Claribel her husband find at Tunis, 
And Ferdinand, her brother, found a wife 
Where he himself was lost; Prospero, his dukedom 
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In a poor isle; and all of us, ourselves, 
When no man was his own. (Vi.208-213) 
Art achieves its great triumph in realizing and perfecting nature, in allowing 
the characters to find themselves. More narrowly the aim of Prospero's 
masque is to show rulers and rulers-to-be their own need to hold themselves 
within divine precept, and the fading of the masque shows limitations that 
apply to rulers as to other mortals. There is obviously a theatricality about 
the situation: we are dealing with a masque-within-a-play,89 and Prospero 
refers to "our actors" and the "pageant" of all human life. In the Epilogue, 
Prospero fittingly steps out of his part as actor by announcing that his 
"charms are all o'erthrown"; his magic was not only the power to control 
characters in the play and show them illusions, but to control us too 
and lead us into the illusion of the play. This magic gone, he is at 
the mercy of our reaction, our approval of the vision. The lesson of art 
is that it is a show and must end, that we must part with it yet carry it 
with us as a guide and not a replacement for nature. The self-government 
of the ruler in accord with his vision returns to the self-government of the 
visionary poet and the theatrical audience. 
The fading of this vision recalls the dissolution and yet the permanence 
of magic at the end of A Midsummer Night's Dream?0 In that play the 
fairies' magic, whether or not it is technically an "art," surpasses the power 
of any mortals and achieves the governmental aim of harmony where the 
Duke had failed. Yet to the mortals who have felt the power of this magic 
without knowing what it was, its status is equivocal: it may seem "a dream 
and fruitless vision" or "the fierce vexation of a dream" (III.ii.371; IV.i.69) 
—or better, but still vaguely, "a most rare vision . . . a dream, past the wit 
of man to say what dream it was" (IV.i.204-206). Though Hippolyta, 
reflecting on the lovers' accounts of their experience, thinks that the whole 
pattern "More witnesseth than fancy's images," Theseus minimizes it by 
grouping together "The lunatic, the lover, and the poet" (V.i.7, 25) ; for 
him, "imagination," poetic or not, has a low status. He is as patronizing, 
though kindly, toward the lovers as he is toward the mechanicals in their 
acting; and of actors too he has a tolerantly low opinion, that "The best 
in this kind are but shadows" (V.i.211), By making comparisons with 
poetic and dramatic arts, Theseus tries to dismiss what has happened to the 
lovers; the magical results that were above human ability to produce would 
then become actually less real than normal human experience. Of course, 
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since we know the secret of the magic, we resist this movement and are 
ready to interpret the experience of the lovers, and poets, actors, and maybe 
lunatics as well, as being above the normal level. Yet at the end Puck 
dissolves the whole play as a "weak and idle theme, / No more yielding 
but a dream" and reduces its actors (as Theseus had, but including him 
too) to "shadows" (V.i.423, 427-428). The art of magic yields happy results 
that fit human desire but exceed human power; the art of the theatre, as 
broad in scope but humbler in claim of results, makes images of such 
results, and if we are wise we will not forget these images though they 
dissolve before our eyes. 
8 
Development and Integrity 
in Shakespeare's Comedies 
The ideas of selfhood and of outer ruling powers in Shakespeare's 
comedies are of course only the barest scheme of some forces that operate 
in the plays. W e must return to the plays themselves, to their integrity as 
dramas, and we must heed the complications and countercurrents that 
bring ideas to life. W e should be learning anew the richness of these plays. 
The intricacies of The Comedy of Errors are built on a simple concept, 
that events thwart attempts by the characters either to seek out new identities 
or to remain comfortable with old ones. The will of chance (as it seems) 
favors mistakes that undo human purposes and therefore human concepts of 
selfhood, and it encourages self-detachment and acquiescence in the illusory 
and capricious quality of the external world. The father, Egeon, is threatened 
with death for being frankly himself, a Syracusan merchant in hostile 
Ephesus; his Syracusan son hides his origin and is laden with gifts and 
courtesies that he had best not scrutinize. The Ephesian twin, in trying to 
learn why he is losing the comforts and prerogatives he thinks due himself, 
brings himself only trouble. When selfhood is uncertain, so are social 
connections (marriage, business) that depend on its constancy. The 
characters are thrown into turmoil in the experience of being treated always 
as persons different from what they had been just a few minutes ago. 
And although our knowledge of the true cause of events puts us at an 
advantage over them, we are always being asked to forgo that awareness 
and enter into the bewilderment of this world where selfhood is insecure. 
There is a temptation here for the characters and for us: wouldn't it be 
easiest just to be irresponsible and accept what other people think we are? 
T o our delight the characters play the roles that are thrust on them, until 
truth summons them to the more settled joys of a family reunion. 
In The Taming of the Shrew Petruchio deliberately conducts the same 
kind of assault on assumed notions of character and assumed social judg-
ments; he proves to Kate that she is better than she has been judged to be, 
and he invites her to join him in upsetting the social wisdom of Padua. 
But this creation of character simply by assuming its existence is parodied 
to its limit in the Induction: Sly is not a lord and will not behave like one, 
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no matter how well he is treated. In another way Sly travesties Petruchio's 
self-will; but Sly's will changes nothing, Petruchio's everything (and to 
good purpose). In this parody we see the precariousness of our acceptance 
of Petruchio: what presumption it is to determine by oneself what another 
person's nature should be, and to enforce that decision with a cudgel! We 
allow Petruchio's methods because they disconcert and mock all Padua, 
impose themselves only on what is a real uncertainty in Katherine herself, 
and show a concern for her deeper nature. We conspire with Shakespeare 
and his characters in a revelry of paradox. And the characters define them-
selves in paradox: they will not or cannot be what they seem. 
In these two plays Shakespeare stayed close to two sources, Plautus' 
Menaechmi for The Comedy of Errors and Gascoigne's Supposes (adapted 
from Ariosto) for the subplot of The Taming of the Shrew?1 Both are 
fairly complex and mechanical plots, and both involve people's changing 
places with each other, either deliberately or by accident. The exchanges 
confuse, deceive, and mock characters: in Menaechmi the persons who are 
unwittingly exchanged, in Supposes others who are to be duped by the 
deliberate trading of identity. Yet although Shakespeare puts deliberate 
trickery into The Taming of the Shrew, he controls and subordinates it; 
Lucentio's deceptive assumption of a role is inferior to Petruchio's instructive 
evocation of a role for Kate. Thus Shakespeare was early attracted to the 
comic potential of a contrast between the role a character assumes toward 
others or is thrust into by the acts of others, and his nature and purposes as 
he himself perceives them. There is a dichotomy between the character 
considered in isolation (his image of himself) and his involvements with 
others in the events of the play. 
The open and external prevails. The odd actions in The Comedy of 
Errors turn out to have a rational basis, Petruchio's brash claims and acts 
win out over Katherina's first notions of herself, and even the tricky 
Lucentio and Tranio must feel less clever when Bianca is proved to be 
no prize. The triumph of the external must mislead critics who think of 
these two plays as farcical and out of touch with Shakespeare's later work. 
But the vows in later plays are simply a more complex external involvement 
(more sharply opposed to private wishes), and they develop straight from 
these two plays. 
A more extreme exchange between persons would be the bed-trick; this 
device figures in Plautus' Amphitruo, which in other ways influences The 
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Comedy of Errors, and in Sir Thomas Elyot's tale of Titus and Gisippus, 
which seems to have affected the conclusion of The Two Gentlemen of 
Verona. Shakespeare does not put this trick into these plays, or into any 
plays except All's Well that Ends Well and Measure for Measure, where 
he is concerned with making the claim of vows as strong as possible in the 
consummation of betrothals; but he has in reserve this complication, which 
extends (almost beyond recognition) something that he finds basic in 
comedy. 
The power of love to transform a person is the basis of an impressive 
moment in The Comedy of Errors when Antipholus of Syracuse met 
Luciana, and of Kate's whole character change; it is likewise a main force in 
The Two Gentlemen of Verona. It competes with prior commitments to 
other characters as a basis for the individual's self-definition. Though the 
play singles out Proteus' changes as destructive of love and friendship, it 
invites us to notice and compare the less disruptive instabilities of others. 
Valentine falls in love after having resisted; so does Julia. And Julia trans-
forms herself again in disguise to follow love and alters yet again in accepting 
a task in disguise that conflicts with her self-interest as a lover- Our 
sympathies give the first vows of love precedence, and we support friendship 
as it agrees with them; and when other attempts at self-definition through 
love conflict with first commitments, we think of the disruptions as self-will. 
Yet we cannot be easy with the suggestion that love is an amoral force that 
almost compels reckless self-definition beyond one's own control; Proteus 
is not more vulnerable to change than others (until the end of the play); 
he is just more fully committed before his change. Others find Proteus' 
instability no more manageable than he does. Julia, like later heroines, 
can only let Proteus' infatuation with her rival run its course; that is, she 
lets the worst in him come out and be exorcized by his shame. And Valen-
tine can only test Proteus by offering him what he had thought he wanted. 
The practical demands of a happy ending require that we and the characters 
make moral distinctions and enforce them in action; these judgments are 
not capricious, but they are facile abstractions from a complex reality, and 
it is mainly through Shakespeare's artful invention of lucky resolutions 
that they succeed in their object. 
The men's vows of study in Love's Labor's Lost obviously conflict with 
their specious attempts at redefinition of themselves through love. The low-
comic characters of that play parody them in several ways, with behavior 
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that is no better, indeed more absurd, and language that is more pretentious 
and often sillier. The satire of language is apt, for the courtiers spend much 
of their time searching for verbal forms that will disguise the basic problem, 
their instability of purpose. In the ending of the play there is a new kind 
of "reality" unlike the stubborn self-assertions in early plays (Sly, Crab, 
the two Dromios): the news of death is an objective fact brought literally 
from outside, and it seems hostile to love because it interrupts the wooing. 
Yet it actually resolves the lovers' difficulty in making their faith convincing; 
through the tasks of penance that they undertake, they acquire a means of 
acting out their love externally which at the same time fulfills, with a more 
serious intent, their original vows. This new function of external reality is 
important for later plays, though it never again takes such a simple form. 
As a test of love too it is like tests in other plays to come: the ladies, and 
the audience too, must gamble that the lovers will confront a new reality 
more steadily than they had faced the more limited and manageable realities 
embodied in the play. We are at the mercy of the wishes and hopes that 
comedy elicits from us: we want the play's title proved wrong, though we 
cannot be sure that it will be. 
The fairies' intervention in A Midsummer Nighfs Dream produces the 
same kind of mockery of its mortal objects through unexplained change 
as chance had done in The Comedy of Errors. Again the characters would 
be wise not to try to guess why things happen as they do or to define 
themselves through decisions the deepest motivations of which they them-
selves do not know; but they work even harder at finding such explanations 
than in the earlier play, and fret themselves and each other a great deal. 
Like the courtiers in Love's Labor's Lost, the men pretentiously try to 
rationalize and justify their change of feelings (though the kind of change 
they undergo differs). The very pattern of continual change in the men 
suggests that A Midsummer Night's Dream is a light parody of serious male 
faithlessness as it appears in such a play as The Two Gentlemen of Verona: 
would that we could believe that changes in love were caused by nothing 
worse than magic and bumbling! Except for one or two moments when the 
lovers' strife could become spiteful or dangerous, we do not take their 
disorders seriously: we watch the play from the fairies' vantage point. We 
detach ourselves from the lovers' confusions of the moment and look for 
a return to old vows, which gave Demetrius to Helena and Lysander 
to Hermia. Other absurdities and inversions put us at a distance from 
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this capricious world: the most ludicrous o£ the characters, Bottom, is 
the only one given direct experience of the fairy realm; and the passions 
that should most claim our engagement, the nominally extreme sufferings 
of Pyramus and Thisbe, are of course the most laughable of all. The 
mechanicals' play almost dares us to take art seriously—yet the accom-
plishment of the fairies' greater art, however little it sometimes claims, 
does not let itself be overlooked. The theatricalism that dissolves into 
unreality the fairies' art, and finally the whole play, implies a complementary 
and genuine reality somewhere else in our experience. 
Shylock defines himself in resolute Jewishness (with strong, if discordant, 
claims to sympathy) and in absolute hatred of Antonio; and there is a 
stubborn reality about his character for all its extremes. Yet despite the 
compelling quality of his own viewpoint, he is extrinsic to the concerns of 
the lovers in The Merchant of Venice, a menace whose involvement in 
their lives was willed not by them and only reluctantly by Antonio. The 
bond expresses the hatred in his nature, and even after his power over 
others is broken he is subject to punishment for his inmost intent. 
In contrast to this is the bond of love that is confirmed when Bassanio 
chooses the leaden casket; in secret fulfillment of her vows of love, 
Portia brings skills that can overcome the peril of Shylock. As this play 
presents matters, love cannot avoid danger; that is the message on the leaden 
casket, and it is enacted in the conditions that bring Bassanio to Belmont. 
Yet once that danger is confronted, it cannot be more than held in uneasy 
control as long as it retains the power of self-definition. The social forces 
represented in vows and in legal and political authority may, for better 
or worse, choose to restrict or even threaten obstinate selfhood, and we may 
not be happy with the choice. Yet in seeking to act out his hatreds, Shylock 
has indeed abused the fact that he is needed by Venetian society, and he 
pays for his malice and abuse of power. 
The Merry Wives of Windsor bears interesting relations to The Taming 
of the Shrew in its use of strongly self-defined characters for parody. Both 
plays have subplots in which lovers trick parents who want to arrange 
undesirable marriages, though the runaway lovers of The Merry Wives 
are more direct and ingenuous by far than the schemers in The Shrew. 
The subplots are also very differendy related to the main plot in the two 
plays. Petruchio's doings might seem to parody in their frankness and 
boldness the intricacies of Lucentio's approach—except that Petruchio gains 
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a better wife thereby. But Falstaff really is a parody of the idealistic lovers 
who naively assume that love should prevail over parental approval; his 
intentions as would-be adulterer should, though they don't, make him 
circumspect, and the pleasures he looks for in his escapade are no less 
monetary than amatory. In intellectual status though not in comic interest, 
the true vows of the lovers rank ahead of Falstaff's thorough self-dedication. 
True to his function as parody figure, Falstaff is unchanging: unmistakable 
in whatever guise, and never transformed (save perhaps in momentary 
humiliation) by love or by pinching. 
The villain of Much Ado about Nothing, Don John the Bastard, is as 
intransigent in self-definition as Shylock—"I cannot hide what I am" (I.iii.13) 
—yet, without being quite trusted, he manages to intrude into others' plans. 
He is able to present his schemes as unwelcome yet unavoidable fact, fact 
that is so clear as to overcome the hearers' distrust of its source. He inverts 
Claudio's sense of reality: Claudio distrusts what he ought to trust and 
would be happy trusting, Hero's vow to him (and her loyal nature expressed 
in the vow), and he is taken in by the treacherous appearances arranged by 
Don John. All this, to Claudio, is in the name of penetrating to the reality 
beneath appearance. Worse, Claudio dismisses Hero's blush, the true sign 
of her innocence, as dissembling. Everything that harmonizes with the 
vow is true and would return the lovers to happiness if Claudio would 
believe; the threatening yet seductive appearances that Claudio accepts as 
reality originate in Don John's will to corrupt. The inversion is parodied by 
another, the overhearing by the stupid Watch of the truth that wiser men 
had missed; and this inversion in turn is parodied by a further one, the 
dismissal of Dogberry's attempt to report the truth as nothingness because 
his pompous language seems to make much ado about nothing. Dogberry 
is in some ways a benevolent version of Don John, as if Don John's methods 
were being turned against him: like Don John he is self-willed and generates 
falsity, but he does it through obtuseness and through stubborn (if uncon-
scious) misuse of language. 
The plays from The Two Gentlement of Verona through Much Ado 
about Nothing seem the most diverse grouping that could be made among 
Shakespeare's comedies; yet in their varied ways they mock or correct 
absurd or otherwise mistaken self-definitions, often by contrast or outright 
opposition to vows (which should involve concern for other persons). What 
happens depends first on the location of self-will. Proteus and Claudio are 
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both erring heroes, but they differ in that Proteus' wrong intents begin in 
his own willfulness whereas Claudio is misled by Don John. Proteus (like 
the hard cases in the bed-trick plays, All's Well and Measure for Measure) 
is allowed to show the worst he would do but is prevented from doing it, 
and then is brought to repentance when he sees the strength of Valentine's 
avowed friendship (shown first in disillusionment) and of Julia's avowed 
love. Claudio, more simply, can be disabused of error and set a task of 
penance; he ends by unknowingly confirming an old vow and being 
rewarded. In more difficult situations than either of these, self-will is 
found in blocking characters, Shylock and Don John, who intrude from 
outside the lovers' circle; they must be punished and neutralized—perhaps, 
in Shylock's case, grudgingly reformed. 
Errors of self-definition and justification are less grave in Love's Labor's 
Lost and A Midsummer Nighfs Dream; our impression is more of group 
chaos and delusion than of individual wrong. The men who have broken 
vows of study to redefine themselves in vows of love have no way of making 
the new vows plausible for all their constant effort, and they are mocked 
again and again; they need outside help to resolve the impasse. No more 
can the lovers in the woods outside Athens cope with their own or each 
other's changes, which they cannot understand, and explain wrongly. Events 
mock them, and they mock each other. They always respond unconsciously 
to external influence, which finally helps them to an end of their problems. 
Some willful characters are parodies, and they too are lightly treated. 
Falstaff is the chief one, and he is simply mocked out of his foolish attempt. 
Bottom and Dogberry are just as absurd, but they are finally superior to 
the wiser men they parody. All the parody figures, by better suggesting the 
truth of human frailty than the idealized characters do, help to put high 
comedy, despite its artifices, in touch with reality. 
As usual Shakespeare gains the best of both sides in an equivocation. 
In one way the comedies define "reality" in their own terms, whether 
through the characters' public commitments to vows or through external 
forces or events that seem to menace, or through both; and both seem 
realistic (though in different fashions) by contrast with characters' private 
wishes. When the reluctance toward vows is overcome, the vows prove a 
basis for happiness; and when the threatening quality of exterior forces 
or events is softened, they become no obstacle to desire. Thus reality in 
this sense can harmonize with a fortunate outcome. But our own sense of 
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the real world, where happy results are more often wished than provided, 
creates resistance. The parody characters respond to this second meaning 
of "reality" by letting us follow out (though in more laughable form) human 
nature as we suspect it really is. And as characters who are basically 
parody figures do not endanger the outcome of events in the play, they 
can usually find a place in the final comic harmony. 
The major sources of these plays often emphasize disguise, deceits, or 
some other kind of strong contrast between appearance and reality. The 
Diana of Montemayor, chief source for The Two Gentlemen of Verona, 
has disguise in its story, and the didactic Fourth Book talks about true 
and false love. The casket tale behind part of The Merchant of Venice 
shows a difference between true and apparent values in the proper choice 
of casket. Falstaff's mishaps begin as medieval stories of tricks to conceal 
adulterers (though such tricks might often be approved by their readers 
and might be successful without mocking the lover), and the runaway 
lovers in the subplot re-enact the typical dodges of New Comedy. The 
sources of the Claudio-Hero plot in Much Ado of course involve deception. 
In differing ways these sources may help Shakespeare to develop varying 
degrees of reality within the terms of individual plays. He might thus 
achieve a sense of depth which some critics miss in A Comedy of Errors 
and The Taming of the Shrew (and for that matter in The Merry Wives). 
In the plays for which we lack major sources, Love's Labor's Lost and A 
Midsummer Night's Dream, he seems to have deepened the action of repeti-
tive group confusion in Errors: in Love's Labor's Lost by the contrasting 
reality at the end, in A Midsummer Night's Dream by a subtle dialectic o£ 
art, dream, and magic against reality. 
The contrary opinions about Arden in As You Li\e It describe a com-
monplace irony about the status of ideals: they may exist somehow as guides 
for rule (and self-rule), yet no actual embodiment of them is itself ideal. 
The satirizing figures in the play remind us of pragmatic shortcomings— 
and finally the extremist among them, Jaques, must withdraw from all 
actual worlds to a hermit's life, where perhaps he will learn idealism for 
the first time. The ambiguity of Arden is matched by the ambiguity toward 
love that Rosalind shows in her disguise: what she seeks as Rosalind she 
mocks as Ganymede. In the pose of Ganymede-playing-Rosalind she unites 
her mockery with an expression of her love; she tests Orlando and teaches 
him the self-government which balances contrary attitudes, and when she 
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thinks him ready she contrives to enact a betrothal. Her indirect self-
impersonation in the enactment responds to his wishes in love; but since 
she performs on her own terms and teaches him her own attitudes toward 
love, she is able at the same time to act out her own wishes. She resolves 
the tangle of affections in the play by vows, and before that, all her treatment 
of Orlando establishes that he has the right attitudes behind those vows. 
Just as vows express a public commitment in love, so the Duke, it seems, 
has a public obligation to leave his parasitic (though to him idyllic) existence 
in Arden and resume his destined career as ruler. 
Twelfth Night gives examples of a rigorous self-centeredness that tries 
to impose love against another's wishes: Orsino, Olivia, and in parody 
Malvolio. Malvolio indeed knows so little of Olivia, the object of his 
impassioned ambition, that he does not suspect her aversion to yellow and 
to cross-gartering, both commanded in his garb by the forged letter; and 
when he comes before her, he fails to observe that his smiling, also on 
command, ill fits her mood. His lack of perception is aptly mocked by 
his confinement in a dark room with, as Feste tells him, 'clerestories 
toward the south north . . . as lustrous as ebony" to represent the darkness 
of his ignorance (IV.ii.36-44). Even more than his mistress and the Duke 
he encloses himself in false self-definition; yet in another sense he has no 
selfhood at all, for he abandons his character, including his supposed moral 
principles, in hope of advancement. In a somewhat less absurd way, 
Olivia's mourning seclusion yields to infatuation. 
In contrast to these self-assertions are Sebastian's openness to Olivia's 
affections and Viola's readiness to promote the Duke's wishes in her disguise, 
despite her own hidden and conflicting desires. Without any plan of action 
but with some telling comments on his self-will, she indulges and dutifully 
aids his obsession for Olivia. Even when events make him spiteful and she 
has no sure hope of a good outcome (just a possibility that her brother may 
be alive), she offers her life to Orsino's caprice. Her subordination to 
the Duke's wishes, qualified by hints to him of her own desires glimpsed 
through the disguise, and her willingness to let time work matters out, are 
a kind of self-government; it is rewarded by her brother's lucky arrival. 
We do not always remind ourselves of the artifice in these events and 
the potential for evil in Orsino that is narrowly averted. Viola governs 
herself admirably, but she cannot control Orsino, for he gives himself 
without limit or reason (and so without openness to Viola's suggestions) 
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to his passion for Olivia. (In contrast, any lapse of government in Orlando 
could have been controlled by the mere name of Rosalind.) She can do 
no more than rule herself, observe Orsino and cater to his wishes, and 
hope that time will awaken his love. Time gives her more occasions to 
serve Orsino's whims, but no chance to plan her advancement. Malvolio's 
only-too-calculated sacrifice of character for advancement is a parody by 
opposites, and Sir Andrew's sacrifice of cash (in the absence of character or 
wit) is another kind of parody. For quite different reasons the objects of 
their devotion and Viola's are oblivious to what is offered. So it is extreme 
good fortune that Viola's indulgence of the Duke's wishes leads to fulfill-
ment of her own. From the luck of this comedy we return toward the 
real world in Feste's song of knaves and thieves, swaggering and drinking. 
The risks are only too evident in All's Well that Ends Well. Helena's 
acceptance of Bertram's stray desires for Diana in order to redirect them to 
herself is a long gamble; it can work only if she really convinces him, with 
an edge of cynicism, that his contrary wishes that she had indulged might 
really settle on her just as well. There is a hazard too in the actual means 
that she uses to win Bertram; her yearnings seem to run ahead of his 
wishes, contracted marriage or no. In undertaking to heal the King, she 
had promised to risk, among other things, the name of "A strumpet's 
boldness" (II.i.171) f2 she risks the same charge, in our reactions though 
not in law, in her healing of Bertram. If, as Parolles tells her in a fore-
shadowing dialogue, "virginity murthers itself" (I.L139), sexual love risks 
itself; and if we grant the risk we must honor the rewarding of it provided 
it is truly won. 
The play treats Bertram's attitude as an obstinate self-definition (he 
professes concern for his family name) to be reformed by enforcement of 
his vows. These vows are both his marital debt to Helena and his unintended 
promise to accept her if she fulfills what he thinks impossible tasks. Her 
success requires the self-discipline of risk, and in another sense she governs 
him by meeting his self-indulgence with a carefully-directed and licensed 
"self-indulgence" of her own that brings him under control. Later 
her actions shade into the literally governmental as she gains the. 
King's help and the threat of law to reclaim Bertram. There is a 
parody of self-definition in Parolles, the self-proclaimed warrior and 
fomenter of Bertram's defection, who hopes even in disgrace that "Simply 
the thing I am / Shall make me live" (IVjii.333-334). Bertram is a little 
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more nearly parodied by Touchstone, who has desires of the flesh (I.iii.28-30 
—though they lead to marriage) and later finds his impulses straying from 
marriage (III.ii.12-16). 
In comparison to Twelfth Night this play seems like a deliberate testing 
of a more cynical hypothesis, a reckoning with the "real" world of Feste's 
song. Just how much can one impose love against another's wishes? 
Bertram's defense of his reluctance as family pride is weak; but as even in 
a better world Viola cannot reason the Duke out of misplaced desire, in 
this one the King cannot reason Bertram into proper love for Helena. 
Ultimately the hope behind Helena's determination is that Bertram cannot 
tell just where his wishes will lead him. His carelessness about commit-
ments, in his letter to Helena and his bargaining with Diana, does indeed 
send him where he had not intended; and Helena guides him to her 
destination with a legal and political power that Viola had lacked. Against 
the cynical strain in the play Helena also asserts the power of miraculous 
healing—though as always a miraculous result removes us from the real 
world and thus in a sense asserts less about reality rather than more. 
In Measure for Measure the Duke's undertaking is to purge all Vienna 
of lechery. We may doubt that he can do it, and the project, as carried 
out by Angelo, meets realistic criticism from professional traders in vice 
and their friends: "Does your worship mean to geld and splay all the 
youth of the city?" (ILi.230-231, Pompey to Escalus) and "the vice is of a 
great kindred; it is well allied; but it is impossible to extirp it quite, friar, 
till eating and drinking be put down" (III.ii.101-103, Lucio to the disguised 
Duke). In trying to force reform by mass arrests, Angelo makes his own 
temperament into law; he corrupts it into self-assertion of an impossible 
austerity. This is not government; extremes of severity and laxity simply 
battle. When Angelo himself succumbs to lust, his fall bears out a realistic 
notion of the futility of all-out struggles and absolute judgments. 
The Duke shows more skill. He works case by case, with care for the 
potential good in each individual (Juliet, Claudio, even in some degree 
the stolid Barnardine); his guise as friar suggests this inner concern. His 
government also controls and directs the forces that should be working 
for good: moral fervor as embodied in Isabella and law as first represented 
by Angelo. Isabella bungles until the Duke takes her firmly in hand: she 
inadvertently wakes perverse desire in Angelo through a perhaps equally 
sick intensity, and in the tactless way she tells Claudio of Angelo's offer 
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(III.L48-150), she undoes the Duke's preparation of Claudio for death. 
With the Duke's guidance she learns the complexity of moral judgments: 
to achieve good and escape the dilemma of lust or death posed by Angelo, 
she must involve herself in trickery and exploitation of the latter's sexual 
desire. 
The Duke's treatment of Angelo is like Helena's of Bertram, except 
that Angelo's hypocrisy in his governing role raises further issues, and 
Angelo's wickedness exceeds the Duke's suspicion. Like Helena with 
Bertram, the Duke lets Angelo act out his impulses to their fullest (while 
preventing the bad results), and then exposes and shames him. The Duke 
reminds Angelo of the ideals and purposes of government that he has 
violated by making him investigate part of the case himself. In the Duke's 
teaching, the rule of law becomes a principle of self-government. 
These four plays {As You Li\e It, Twelfth Night, All's Well that Ends 
Well, Measure for Measure) show disguise or trickery used (whether in 
testing and awaiting love, or in actively reforming error) as a way of 
submitting to someone else's self-will in order to retrieve his better 
potential.9 3 Through disguise or a bed-trick one character seems to bend 
to another's wishes, but with his own purposes in mind he develops, 
redirects, or censures and reforms what the other person wants. The process 
(which inverts Petruchio's method but figures directly in the reform of 
Proteus) requires- self-government in the disguiser or controller; he must 
at least appear to subordinate or defer his own interests, he must keep 
order in his own conflicting roles and feelings. And he must observe 
closely anyone he wants to influence and must manipulate events, as well 
as he can and as occasion offers, to produce the right effect. 
As in earlier plays, there is a contrast between the self and its dealings 
with others. For the disguiser the self consists of his hidden nature and 
ultimate purposes, and the external element is his role toward other 
persons while in disguise, his apparent yielding to someone else's wishes; in 
a sense the outer does not dominate as in the other plays, but acts as means 
to the disguiser's hidden end. The aim of course is to unite the two, to bring 
events and other characters around to the disguiser's own purpose so that 
disguise is no longer needed.94 To that end he tries to create, or at least 
prepare for, a double awareness in someone else to match his own: Rosalind 
teaches Orlando self-mockery like her own, yet allows him his vicarious 
wooing; Viola hints her loyalty and love so that Orsino will recall them 
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once he knows she is a woman, while she follows his orders loyally in 
disguise; Helena arranges Bertram's actions according to her own hopes 
while letting him think he follows his will; and the Duke, acting through 
others, imposes his own plans on Angelo's intended acts. In effect, the 
disguiser creates an unconscious "purpose" or "self" in the other person 
through trickery in overt actions, so that when the deceit is known this 
new selfhood will redefine the person in harmony with the disguiser's 
wishes. Sometimes the overt acts involve vows or other commitments, and 
these help in the redefinition, as in earlier plays (The Two Gentlemen, 
Much Ado). Such commitments are the betrothal of Orlando and Rosalind 
when Orlando thinks a boy is merely playing Rosalind's part, Bertram's 
unintended setting of tasks for Helena in his letter, Angelo's old vows 
to Mariana that are confirmed by his unknowing consummation of their 
marriage, and perhaps even Orsino's admission of love for Viola-Cesario at 
the moment he intends mischief against his servant (V.i.130). In all of 
these there is an unintended implication because of the disguise or trick; 
it is thus that the character is led into his new selfhood. The play may show 
a sequence moving from the disguiser's inner intention through his 
deceptive interactions with another person, which may be formalized in 
an equivocal vow, to the creation of a new self and revised intentions in the 
other person. 
Obviously the disguiser acts out a role when he plays the part his 
disguise calls for. Creating, as he does, a sort of play-within-the-play inside 
this role, he enjoys a situation in which he may act out his wishes; these 
are known as reality only to him, and are presented as fiction when he acts 
them; but eventually he will make them public and achieve them in his 
relations with others. Thus Rosalind plays out her desires, under cover 
of being a boy impersonating Rosalina, in the betrothal; Viola, who has 
less freedom and little hope, throws paradoxical hints about herself and 
her love to Orsino; and Helena and again Mariana (with the Duke's 
contrivance as chief disguiser) act out their wishes in bed, with the fiction 
of illicitness. But the disguiser also manages a second kind of enactment 
if he is dealing with someone who needs reform. This time it is the 
erring character who is the actor, and his scenario is the wrong he wants 
to do. But while he acts out his perverse wishes, the fact itself differs: it 
is controlled by the disguiser and is harmless. When the erring one feels 
shame and fears punishment for what he had acted out, the disguiser 
126 The God of Arts 
shows him the gentler truth of what he really did and offers forgiveness. 
The purpose of this playing is indeed to hold the mirror up to nature, with 
an obvious moral emphasis that will correct any flaws in nature. But of 
these alternative deeds—the one intended by the erring character but merely 
acted out and the unintended one he was tricked into really doing—, which 
is nature and which art? The enacted version reflects the evil that was "really" 
intended, but it is not what "really" happened. Finally we may settle on 
a benevolent interpretation, that the worse intention is somehow unreal 
even in its author's mind and he will hereafter follow his better self. But 
we are aware of artifice, which in its result may be called a miracle but 
which removes us from the world of natural purposes and consequences. 
Or in another way the miracle is simply the art of government, which 
Shakespeare would think the center of the natural world. Whatever art 
this may be, its methods, even when dubious, yield results that may be 
founded in nature and certainly trace out our wishes. 
In Pericles the wandering hero must be on guard against hidden evil 
(since there may be corners of the world where moral retribution, if it 
exists, has not yet done its work) and receptive to good. Evil sets alluring 
traps that only the quick judgment can avoid; virtue presents tests (as 
Pericles finds in wooing Thaisa) that make its winning not easy. Yet the 
hard-earned good is quickly lost in bad chance, if that is the cause of Pericles' 
separation from his family; it seems a harsh world. Pericles withdraws 
into himself, but not too far to be reclaimed by Marina. As she proves, 
appearances may really be better than they seem; she has had the self-
govenment to endure misfortune patiently, and she brings Pericles healing 
power from an unlikely place. Though he has little self-government left, he 
recognizes and responds to her virtue and to the music that symbolizes it. 
As he regains his faculties and is united with his family, he learns about 
the hidden moral order in life and sees a vision of deity. 
In Cymbeline there is known evil poisoning the court; personal vices and 
weaknesses show a failure of self-knowledge and self-government that has 
chaotic political results. The Queen's ambition leads Cymbeline to mis-
judge and banish unfairly, so that false values prevail at court and the 
good must live elsewhere. Cloten, lacking in perception and judgment of 
good, cannot see why he is unfit to be heir to the throne or mate to Imogen, 
and he seeks revenge on her and Posthumus. And those who leave court 
meet other evils and dangers: the hidden wiles of Italy are too much for 
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Posthumus to deal with, and his failing almost overcomes Imogen too. 
Government must be restored in both the person and the nation. 
In coping with their personal griefs, Posthumus and Imogen help to 
set right the ills of the state and to unite Cymbeline's family—just as the 
personal dissatisfaction of the two princes themselves drives them to achieve 
military glory and a return to court. The way to a resolution is not clear 
to the spouses, each of whom thinks the other dead. Indeed they do not 
hope for happiness: each one, disguised, is in effect alienated from his 
recent loyalties (Imogen as, almost accidentally, page to the Roman general; 
Posthumus as a British peasant after having landed with the Romans, and 
later as a Roman soldier). But Posthumus* disillusioned search for death in 
battle helps instead toward British victory. Imogen stays closer to personal 
concerns, but her questioning of Iachimo brings about Posthumus* self-
disclosure and gives reason for hers; thus is the royal family augmented 
again while a marriage is restored. Without much notion of what they 
were doing, they have acquiesced in events and served well, and events 
have brought them together to do good to themselves and others. Their 
involvement in battle and return to court help piece together their lives 
and restore political order, with divine and imperial sanction. Their 
self-government has spread much further than they could expect in a 
chaotic and corrupt land. 
These two plays try out a harder assumption, as far as the good characters 
themselves know, than earlier comedies: not only is the moral order so 
far deteriorated that public means of reform (invocation of vows and laws, 
arousal of shame for wrong acts, and appeals to rulers for justice) are futile, 
but events themselves, through mistaken reports of death and separations 
that seem to be death, have apparently put happiness out of reach. Though 
Pericles breaks under the strain, Marina, Posthumus, and Imogen continue 
to order their own lives and to bear up even if they have no hope of 
anything meaningful in their lives. They persist in self-government even in 
what seems a moral void around them. But through them and around them 
moral control asserts itself: all losses are restored and divinities come down 
in visions. 
In the remaining two plays, The Winter's Tale and The Tempest, a 
moral pattern is clearer to at least some characters much earlier, even if 
Hermione's survival is kept from us and Mamillius is not restored, and even 
if Prospero's rule has limits. This ordering, and the supernatural claims that 
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might be made for it, are well known; it seems useful as well to consider 
the natural basis for the stable pattern. 
In The Winter's Tale there are parallel orderings of the seasons (the 
natural substratum for myths of Apollo and Proserpina) and the genera-
tions. 9 5 Winter belongs with old age, and the dominant idea of old age 
is repentance. Leontes is of this generation, and once he repents (and 
continues to do penance) he must await renewal from outside by other 
agents. Polixenes, in opposing his son's marriage, joins Leontes in that he 
needs to learn better judgment; the marriage itself will bring renewal. 
Other aged, wintry characters—Camillo, Antigonus, the Shepherd, Paulina-
help in varying ways with the repentance or with the continuity from the 
old generation to the new. Renewal comes with springtime, and the 
springtime generation is young. This season is announced by Autolycus, 
embodied in Florizel and Perdita, and given freshness and life in the great 
pastoral feast. Yet the finest restoration after all else is the return of 
Hermione—and whether this be miracle or not, she bears on her face 
the tokens of realism, the wrinkles of sixteen wintry years. 
Prospero's art of governing magic gives order in The Tempest; but as 
Apollo's order in The Winter's Tale has a natural basis in the seasons and 
their human agents, the results that Prospero can achieve also have a natural 
quality in that they help characters to find themselves and to place (that 
is, govern) themselves in the world. Ferdinand and Miranda find them-
selves in their commitment to love (while individually Miranda is beginning 
to learn about human nature and Ferdinand about the duties of rulers). 
Alonso finds his proper role in repentance and learns that marriage is a 
better way than political intervention to make connections with other 
states. Gonzalo perhaps finds nothing new, but his sententious heart is 
gladdened when Prospero's rule works to confirm his optimism. Caliban is 
reminded of the moral authority above him and sees the foolishness of his 
fellow rebels; with better judgment he may begin to improve himself. 
Antonio and Sebastian recognize a moral power (in Prospero) stronger than 
they had expected, though they consider it only as a threat from which they 
must hide; they are forced to accept their subordinate position, to be ruled 
when they will not reform and rule themselves. Like the Duke of Vienna 
Prospero teaches self-government and largely succeeds. Finally, Prospero 
governs himself too and finds himself: he knows mortal limitations in 
his art, his dukedom, and himself. 
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Some of the means of control and reform in these last two plays are 
repeated from earlier comedies: vows and other loyalties are invoked, and 
controlling characters must both discipline themselves and teach others 
the same self-limitation. Another method, the trick of making misdeeds 
and their consequences appear worse than they really are, continues too; its 
most striking uses are perhaps in the bed-trick plays, but the closest 
parallel with these last two plays is the feigned death of Hero in Much Ado. 
Ironically the deceit had not worked by itself in that play, since Claudio 
did not repent until he also heard of Hero's innocence. In these final plays it 
does work, and there is another new element: the cooperation of supernatural 
powers in playing the trick. Leontes repents when he learns of the death 
of Mamillius, which is actual and will not be remitted; it seems to be a 
punishment from Apollo. Apollo too must be in charge of the apparent 
loss of Perdita and of her recovery years later. The one purely human 
contrivance of appearances for the sake of punishment and reward is 
Paulina's hiding and restoration of Hermione; but its merely natural 
character is heightened by the surprise to us and by the magical aura that 
Paulina evokes. In The Tempest also the trick of apparent death succeeds : 
Alonso repents when told that the fates have caused Ferdinand's death. 
The cooperation of natural and supernatural exists in Prospero, who has 
a human future and shows human concerns for Milan and his daughter as 
he arranges a repentance and a marriage, but who also has supernatural 
powers that he wields through Ariel to keep Ferdinand separate and to 
announce the apparent doom of the fates. So the changes wrought in 
mistaken characters in these two plays by reports of death surpass the 
results in earlier plays and suggest higher powers at work—unless we 
follow equivocal hints in the plays, and refer the arts they portray back to 
nature, and Shakespeare's own art back to dreams or old tales. 
In a rough way the whole sequence of Shakespeare's comedies follows 
the course of the previous chapters from the individual and his immediate 
circumstances outward. If the standard chronology is right, it appears 
that he really did start by filling out comic situations where characters 
are treated differently from the way which they expect and think proper 
for themselves. Then after some studied concern with characters' conscious 
self-definition, he seems to have moved out toward ever more powerful and 
more complex ways of changing characters through mockery, vows, dis-
guises (including bed-tricks), and staging of events so that they are other 
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than they seem. There is a complementary movement inward (since 
management of these changes requires self-control in the character who 
directs them). As the controller becomes subtler in his self-knowledge, the 
effects he tries to produce in others take on finer shadings. Control of 
others also involves legal and governmental power, so here is another develop-
ing concern (though present early too) in the outward progression. Events 
beyond human control, perhaps described through concepts of chance or 
fortune, may either threaten or cooperate with any means of control; they 
enter variously in many plays and are especially vivid when symbolized by 
places of exile, but they become full adversaries to human purpose in the 
first two romances. And finally, even events that mortals cannot control 
may yield to a pattern imposed by a supernatural power; and with this 
possibility, tempered by the playwright's humility, we reach the outer 
limit. Of course the scheme as stated here is much too regular to fit all 
the concrete facts or to be fully demonstrable, however plausible, in Shake-
speare's development; any brief summary would be. But it displays 
Shakespeare's habit of varying and complicating as he reworks elements 
from comedy to comedy, and it can connect the development of elaborate 
plans by characters for the control of others with an increasing concern 
for law and government and for powers beyond human government. 
Finally, all of Shakespeare's comedies, and our attempts to respond to 
them and theorize about them, should be taken with the saving ambiguity 
that pervades A Midsummer Night's Dream, The Winter's Tale, and The 
Tempest: comedy can be both a vision of how life might or should be and 
an absurdity. Absurd or no, the comic vision may be a guide in life, which 
has its absurdities and may seem as brief and insubstantial as a play. It 
cannot be substituted for life. 
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